United States of America

Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9,000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6,000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3,000 feet. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2,100 feet for a runway 05L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the n°1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1,800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10,000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4 nm southwest of the runway 05L threshold. Five passengers survived while 15 other occupants were killed.

The airplane was on a flight at night from Nome to Koyuk, AK, when it crashed into a mountain at the 2,725 foot level. The accident site was directly on a course line between the Nome and Koyuk Airports. The ceiling at nome was 3,500 overcast at the time of departure. According to rescue personnel, weather at the accident area was: indefinable ceiling and poor visibility with heavy snow and blowing snow. The pilot had a hand held GPS on board that he had barrowed from another pilot. But the database could not be retrieved from the GPS. According to the owner of the GPS, he and the accident pilot programmed different waypoints. The pilot did not file a VFR or an ifr flight plan with the FAA.

The airplane was on a positioning flight at night, cruising at 6,000 feet. Also, the pilot was operating on an IFR flight plan and was on his 6th flight after reporting for duty at 1530 est. During a frequency change and radio check at 0207 est, the pilot's response was normal. Radar data revealed that about 16 minutes later, the airplane entered a right turn, then disappeared from radar at about 0222 est after about 255° of turn. It impacted the ground in a steep nose down descent; debris from the airplane was found down to 6 feet below the surface. During the final 15 minutes of flight, there were no radio transmissions on the assigned frequency. No preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was found. The propeller blades had s-curves or were bent forward; they also had leading edge impact damage and Rotational scoring. The pilot had flown in excess of 120 hours (110 hrs at night) in the preceding 30 days. There was evidence that he may have lacked crew rest during the day(s) before the accident.

During arrival at night in fog and drizzle, the pilot was cleared for an ILS runway 1l approach. While on the approach, she reported encountering moderate rime ice. Radar data showed that the airplane continued inbound on the localizer until it neared the middle marker, then it deviated about 20° left and collided with the ground, about 300 feet short and 300 feet left of the threshold. According to witnesses, the airplane stopped its descent and slowed down, shortly before entering a steep descent and a spin. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact airframe, control system, or powerplant anomalies. The wings had 1/4 inch of ice on the leading edge and a 1/2 inch high ridge of ice, parallel to the deicing boots, about 3 inches aft of the boots. The cockpit and windshield heating system were found in the 'off' position. The pilot's logbook was not available for inspection. Company records showed she had passed a 14 cfr part 135 checkride on may 20, 1994. The faa checkride form was administered and signed by the chief pilot. However, other records/information showed the chief pilot would not have been able to have given the checkride on that date.

The airplane was level at FL220 at night when vertical fluctuations in altitude up to 500 feet above altitude were noted by the Salt Lake Center controller. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft began a descent and transponder targets were lost. A trajectory study showed the aircraft descending in a tight right turn. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right elevator separated in negative overload with both wings separating negatively. Wreckage distribution established separation of the empennage and its associated control surfaces before the separation of the wings. A preimpact fire was witnessed and the main fuselage was destroyed by an intense post crash fire. The initiating event which resulted in the altitude divergence and descending turn could not be determined.

Two technicians took over the airplane from the main Continental maintenance hangar to the gate 41. While approaching the gate, the right wing of the B737 collided with the left wing of a Continental Airlines Boeing 737-300 that was towed from the next gate. While the second B737 was slightly damaged, the right wing of the B737 registered was partially sheared off. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll on runway 30R, the MD-82, N954U, collided with the Cessna 441, N441KM, which was positioned on the runway waiting for takeoff clearance. The pilot of the Cessna acted on an apparently preconceived idea that he would use his arrival runway, runway 30R, for departure. After receiving taxi clearance to back-taxi into position and hold on runway 31, the pilot taxied into a position at an intersection on runway 30R, which was the assigned departure runway for the MD-82. The ATIS current at the time the Cessna pilot was operating in the Lambert-St. Louis area listed runways 30R and 30L as the active runways for arrivals and departures; there was no mention of the occasional use of runway 31. Air traffic control personnel were not able to maintain visual contact with the Cessna after it taxied from the well lighted ramp area into the runway/taxiway environment of the northeast portion of the airport. An operational ASDE-3, particularly ASDE-3 enhanced with AMASS, could be used to supplement visual scan of the northeast portion of the airport.

The airplane was on an ILS runway 15 approach and collided in-flight with static wires, approximately 2 miles north of the runway. The wires were located in the airplane's flight path, and in a direct line with the ILS final approach course. At the time of the accident the local control tower was closed. Three other aircraft made the approach prior to N402BK, and the pilots of those aircraft all agreed that at about 500 to 700 feet msl, on the final approach course, they encountered downdrafts and turbulence. All the pilots agreed, the downdrafts caused their airplanes to fall below the glide slope, and that in order to rejoin the glide slope, they had to increase power or change the airplane's pitch attitude. The Otis Air National Guard Base 2155 weather observation was; indefinite ceiling 100 sky obscured, visibility 3/4 miles, light rain and fog, temperature 59° F, dew point 58° F, wind 170°, 14 knots, gust to 19, altimeter 29.96 inches hg.

The pilot was on an IFR flight plan level at 10,000 feet msl in VFR conditions. The ATP rated pilot was the sole occupant, and there was no autopilot installed in the Beech C99 Airliner. About 10 minutes after a hand-off from Los Angeles center to Oakland center was acknowledged, radar contact was lost at 0239 hours. A review of the radar data revealed that over the last 4 minutes the airplane's altitude increased to 10,500 feet, then it started a left descending turn with a maximum diameter of about 2.1 nm. The last radar returns indicate the airplane continuing the left turn and descending through 5,600 feet msl, with a descent rate of about 18,000 feet per minute. There was no evidence of a mechanical malfunction of the aircraft, engines, or propellers.

The pilot was completing the first leg of an IFR flight in a multi-engine airplane. As the airplane was established on final approach, about 5 miles from the airport, the pilot encountered visual meteorological conditions and canceled his IFR flight plan. Moments later, the right engine began to sputter and then lost power. The pilot said that he switched the fuel selector valves to various positions and positioned the fuel boost pump to high-flow; however, during this time, the left engine also lost power. The pilot attempted to start both engines, but without success. During a forced landing, the airplane struck a pole, then crashed into a condominium. A fire erupted, but all 4 occupants survived the accident. Two occupants in the condominium received minor injuries. The pilot believed that he had moved the fuel selector valves to the auxiliary position for about 1 hour during flight; however, the passengers did not see him move the fuel selectors until after the engine(s) lost power. The right fuel selector handle was found between the right main tank and off positions. The left fuel selector was destroyed by post-impact fire.