Kansas City

The airplane crashed immediately after liftoff during a three-engine takeoff. Flightcrew had shortened rest break; rest periods not required for ferry flights. Flight crew fatigue from lack of rest, sleep, and disruption of circadian rhythms. Flightcrew did not have adequate, realistic training in three-engine takeoff techniques or procedures. Flight crew did not adequately understand three-engine takeoff procedures, including significance of vmcg. Flight engineer improperly determined vmcg speed, resulting in value 9 knots too low. During first takeoff attempt, captain applied power to asymmetrical engine too soon, was unable to maintain directional control, and rejected the takeoff. Captain agreed to modify procedure by allowing flight engineer to advance throttle, a deviation of prescribed procedure. FAA oversight of operator was inadequate because the poi and geographic inspectors were unable to effectively monitor domestic crew training and international operations. Existing far part 121 flight time limits & rest requirements that pertained to the flights that the flightcrew flew prior to the ferry flights did not apply to the ferry flights flown under far part 91. Current one-engine inoperative takeoff procedures do not provide adequate rudder availability for correcting directional deviations during the takeoff roll compatible with the achievement of maximum asymmetric thrust at an appropriate speed greater than ground minimum control speed. All three crew members were killed.

During arrival at night in fog and drizzle, the pilot was cleared for an ILS runway 1l approach. While on the approach, she reported encountering moderate rime ice. Radar data showed that the airplane continued inbound on the localizer until it neared the middle marker, then it deviated about 20° left and collided with the ground, about 300 feet short and 300 feet left of the threshold. According to witnesses, the airplane stopped its descent and slowed down, shortly before entering a steep descent and a spin. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact airframe, control system, or powerplant anomalies. The wings had 1/4 inch of ice on the leading edge and a 1/2 inch high ridge of ice, parallel to the deicing boots, about 3 inches aft of the boots. The cockpit and windshield heating system were found in the 'off' position. The pilot's logbook was not available for inspection. Company records showed she had passed a 14 cfr part 135 checkride on may 20, 1994. The faa checkride form was administered and signed by the chief pilot. However, other records/information showed the chief pilot would not have been able to have given the checkride on that date.

Buffalo Airways flight 721, a regularly scheduled cargo flight, was operating between Oklahoma City, OK, and Fort Wayne, IN (FWA), with en route stops at Wichita, KS (ICT), and Kansas City, MO (MCI). The flight to Wichita was routine. En route to Kansas City, the crew deviated from course to avoid thunderstorms, but the descent into the terminal area was routine. At 21:42 flight 721 contacted the TRACON arrival radar controller. The controller directed the flight to turn to 060 degrees and told the flightcrew that they were being vectored to the ILS localizer for the ILS approach to runway 1. About 21:47 while the airplane was descending through about 6,500 feet, the first officer, who had been flying the airplane, turned the controls over to the captain. Buffalo Airways' regulations required captains to make all the approaches and landings whenever the ceilings and visibilities were less than 400 feet and 1 mile, respectively. At 21:50, after several intermediate descent clearances, flight 721 was cleared to descend to 2,400 feet. At 21:51, the controller told flight 721 that it was "five miles from DOTTE (the LOM), turn left zero four zero, maintain two thousand four hundred until established, cleared ILS runway one approach." The crew had completed the before-landing checklist, the landing gear was down and locked, and the flaps had been extended to 25 degrees, as required, for landing. At 21:52:40, the local controller advised flight 721 that it was No. 2 to land and that the winds were zero four zero at eight knots, and that the RVR on runway 1 was more than 6,000 feet. At 21:52:47, the first officer stated, "Localizer alive." The first office reported the airplane's altitude during the descent in 100-foot increments above "minimums (DH)" until the airplane reached the decision height. At 21:53:07, the first officer called, "Marker inbound." The flightcrew then received ATIS information "Sierra" which stated that the weather at the airport was in part: ceiling--100 feet, overcast; visibility 1/2 mile, fog; wind 40° at 8 knots. At 21:53:24, the captain remarked, "Already started the approach." At 21:53:32, 4 seconds after reporting that the airplane was 200 feet above minimums, the first officer told the local controller that, "Seven twenty-one is the marker inbound." The local controller acknowledged receipt of the message. At 21:53:41, after receiving a low-altitude alert generated by the Automated Radar Tracking System III (ARTS III) computer's Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) function, the local controller warned flight 721 to "check altitude immediately should be two thousand four hundred, altimeter two nine six one." Flight 721 did not respond. However, the captain said "Call the radar (radio) altimeter please." At 21:53:46, the first officer responded, "Okay, there's twelve hundred on the (radio) altimeter." At 21:53:50, the local controller again called the flight and warned, "I have a low altitude alert, climb and maintain two thousand four hundred." Again, the flightcrew did not acknowledge receipt of the warning. At 21:53:51, a crewmember called out "pull it up," and at 2153:52, the captain applied power followed almost simultaneously by sounds of initial impact. Flight 721 struck the tops of trees on a 950-foot-high ridge about 3 nmi short of the approach end of runway 1. The airplane cut a relatively level 750- to 800-foot-long swath through the tree tops about 20 to 30 feet above the ground. The swath ended as the ridge and tree tops sloped downward. The airplane then rolled and turned to the right as it descended into the main impact area 2,000 feet beyond the initial impact site. All four occupants were killed.

During a night approach to Kansas City Airport, while on a ferry flight from Lincoln, the airplane went out of control, rolled over and crashed in flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

On final approach to Kansas City Airport, while completing a night mail flight, the pilot encountered engine problems. Control was lost and the airplane crashed few miles short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

After a night takeoff from Kansas City Airport, while on a mail flight, the airplane encountered difficulties to gain height when it stalled and crashed near the runway end. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Kansas City-Mid-Continent Airport, Missouri, consisting of touch and go manoeuvres. During the takeoff roll, when the aircraft reached the speed of 146 knots, the pilot-in-command started the rotation when the airplane banked right to an angle of 25° then struck the runway surface. It went out of control, veered of runway and came to rest in flames. All four crew members were evacuated while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane departed Chicago Airport at 0954LT on a positioning flight to Kansas City with three crew members on board. Bound to the southwest, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located near Wedron, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed.