Raleigh-Durham

On final approach to Raleigh-Durham Airport, while on a positioning flight from Wilmington-New Hanover Airport, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed nearby the runway. Both occupants were quickly rescued and the airplane was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that the pilot was attempting a go around procedure when the accident occurred.

The pilot of N9143B had asked the controller if he could deviate about 12 miles west, because he thought he saw "a hole" in the weather. The radar ground track plot showed the pilot had observed a 3 to 5 mile gap between two thunderstorm clusters and attempted to fly through an area of light radar echoes between the two large areas of heavier echoes. N9143B departed level flight, and radar showed that a cluster of thunderstorms, level three to four were present in the vicinity of N9143B's ground track position. Radar data showed that N9143B started an uncontrolled descent from FL260 (about 27,500 feet msl). Witnesses reported hearing the engine make a winding noise, then observed the airplane come out of the clouds about 300 feet above the ground, in a nose low spiral, and the right wing was missing. The right wing was not found at the crash site, but was located 1.62 miles from the main wreckage. The pilot of N9143B had requested and received a weather briefing. He was advised that the weather data indicated that an area forecast for his route of flight predicted thunderstorm activity and cumulonimbus clouds with tops as high as FL450 (flight level 45,000 feet), and a weather system impacting the Florida Gulf Coast, consisted of "looming thunderstorms" in that area. The pilot had contacted the Enroute Flight Advisory Service (EFAS, commonly known as "Flight Watch") for enroute weather advisories, and advised of "cells" east of St. Augustine, advised of convective SIGMET 05E in effect for southern Florida, and was advised that a routing toward the Tampa/St. Petersburg area and then southward, would avoid an area of thunderstorms.

The flight was cleared for the ILS approach to runway 5R. The flight was at mid runway, at 2,100 feet, heading 049 degrees, at a speed of 163 knots, when the pilot stated "...missed approach." He was instructed to maintain 2,000, and to fly runway heading. Radar showed N41003 started a right turn, was flying away from the airport/VOR, descending. At a point 0.57 miles from the airport/VOR, the flight had descended to 1,500 feet, was turning right, and increasing speed. The flight had descended 400 feet, and had traveled about 0.32 miles in 10 seconds. When radio and radar contact were lost, the flight was 2.35 miles from the airport/VOR, level at 1,600 feet, on a heading of 123 degrees, and at a speed of 169 knots. The published decision height (DH) was 620 feet mean sea level (msl). The published minimum visibility was 1/2 mile. The published Missed Approach in use at the time of the accident was; "Climb to 1,000 [feet], then climbing right turn to 2,500 [feet] via heading 130 degrees, and RDU R-087 [087 degree radial] to ZEBUL Int [intersection] and hold." A witness stated that the aircraft was flying low, power seemed to be in a cruise configuration, and maintaining the same sound up until the crash. The reported weather at the time was: Winds 050 at 5 knots, visibility 1/2 statute mile, obscuration fog and drizzle, ceiling overcast 100, temperature and dew point 11 C, altimeter 30.30 in HG. At the time of the accident the pilot had 10 total flight hours in this make and model airplane; 33 total night flight hours; and 59 total instrument flight hours.

The flight had proceeded without incident until a visual approach was made to the destination airport, but a landing was not completed because of poor visibility due to ground fog. The pilot then requested vectors to another airport, and was advised by ATC that he was below radar coverage, and he could not be radar identified. The pilot stated he would proceed to a third airport; he was given a heading, instructed to proceed direct to the airport, and report the field in sight. He was told to over-fly the airport, and might be able to descend through a clearing in the clouds. An inbound air carrier flight reported instrument meteorological conditions on the final approach to a parallel runway. At a location of 1.13 miles east of the airport, the flight, for no apparent reason, turned south, away from the airport. The last radio contact with pilot was after ATC told him his heading was taking him away from the airport and he said he was turning back. The last known position of N201RH was 1.95 miles southeast of the airport, at 500 feet MSL. According to the statement of the passenger that was sitting in the co-pilot's seat, "...all we could see were city lights and darkness underneath us. We were in a right turn, when I saw the trees and subsequently hit it." According to the pilot's log book and FAA records revealed a limitation on his commercial pilot certificate prohibited him from carrying passengers for hire at night and on cross-country flights of more than 50 nautical miles. The records did not show any instrument rating. As per the entries in his personal flight logbook, he had accumulated a total of 1,725.2 total flight hours, 1,550.9 total single engine flight hours, and 184.3 total flight hours in multi-engine aircraft of which 145.6 hours were in this make and model airplane. In addition, the logbooks showed that he had a total of 487.3 cross country flight hours, 61.9 total night flight hours, and 21.6 simulated instrument flight hours.

Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9,000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6,000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3,000 feet. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2,100 feet for a runway 05L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the n°1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1,800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10,000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4 nm southwest of the runway 05L threshold. Five passengers survived while 15 other occupants were killed.

The pilot had cancelled his ifr flight plan, and was proceeding to the airport visually. During his approach, the left engine quit, followed by the right engine. He then realized that he had failed to switch from the auxiliary fuel tanks to the main fuel tanks prior to the approach, and exhausted the auxiliary fuel supply. With insufficient altitude to attempt a restart, he force landed the airplane in a bean field short of the airport. After the airplane came to a stop, the occupants egressed, and the fuselage was consumed in a post-crash fire.

During arrival, the pilot made an ILS localizer back course approach to runway 16 and was cleared to land. He reported he was initiating a missed approach. Approximately 10 seconds later, he reported the runway in sight and requested a visual approach to land on runway 34. The pilot was cleared to land and the aircraft was observed to maneuver to the right (west of the runway), then turn back left to a final approach. However, it crashed short of runway 34. An exam of the crash site revealed evidence that the aircraft was in a normal upright attitude on a heading of 340°, when it crashed. Initial impact was with the approach lighting system short of runway 34. A King Air pilot, who landed on runway 16 before the accident, estimated the cloud bases were about 400 feet agl. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the back course approach was 460 feet msl. MDA for a circling approach to runway 16 was 550 feet msl. The airport elevation was 32 feet. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed during low ceiling, low visibility, and night conditions. Shortly after takeoff the aircraft impacted a reservoir. Analysis of radar data indicated the aircraft was in a 45° descending turn. Examination of the aircraft trim system showed that the aircraft was trimmed for level flight. There was no voice or flight data recorder on board. A review of ATC communications indicated that the captain was communicating with ATC allowing the first officer to accomplish the flying duties. Examination of the wreckage revealed no indications of powerplant or system failures. However, there was evidence that the sas warning light was illuminated, the sas switch was in the off position, and no sas system malfunction could be found. Witnesses stated that before the flight the captain had complained of illness but he decided to report for duty. Company records showed instances of substandard performance by the first officer. The investigation found company oversight of training, operations, and inadequate faa supervision. All 12 occupants were killed.

The pilot was issued runway 05, 7,500 feet, for IFR departure with favoring 4 knots quartering headwind. Pilot requested runway 14, 4,498 feet, for takeoff with a 4 knots quartering tailwind. Ground witness and control tower observed aircraft use nearly all of the runway on takeoff roll. After an abrupt rotation, the controller observed aircraft yaw to left and make a low altitude left turn. Seconds later the aircraft rapidly descended into trees and caught fire. The left propeller was found in the feathered position and the left engine was consumed by a ground fire. There was no evidence of any internal engine failure. The engine time smoh was 43 hours. Witness heard the aircraft takeoff with a series of loud backfires 25 days prior to the accident. Injector nozzles on the right engine were learned to correct the problem after 6 hours of operation one week later. The pilots log failed to show any recent training in single engine procedures. Both occupants were killed.

On final approach to Raleigh-Durham Airport, the twin engine airplane stalled and crashed. The pilot and three passengers were killed while two others were seriously injured.