United States of America

The flight was executing the non-precision NDB runway 04 approach, had reported procedure turn inbound, and was cleared to change to advisory frequency. Witnesses observed the airplane descend out of the base of the overcast clouds in a 10° nose down, 45° left wing down attitude. The airplane impacted terrain about 3/4 mile south-southeast of the airport. Witnesses in the area reported that the weather was ceilings of about 100 feet and visibility of about 500 feet in light rain and fog. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 465 feet agl. Both pilots were killed.

Approximately 10 minutes after departure, the pilot was contacted by a company pilot flying in the opposite direction. During their conversation the pilot stated that he was 'looking for wolves.' Shortly thereafter, the company pilot told the pilot that his radio transmissions were breaking up. The pilot replied that it was probably because he was 'behind a ridge.' The company pilot temporarily went off frequency; however, when he switched back he was unable to contact the pilot. The aircraft was later located on the southwest side of a box canyon about 100 feet below the top of the ridge. The normal course line for the route typically flown by company pilots is 6 miles away. The pilot had no prior experience in mountain flying.

The airplane crashed immediately after liftoff during a three-engine takeoff. Flightcrew had shortened rest break; rest periods not required for ferry flights. Flight crew fatigue from lack of rest, sleep, and disruption of circadian rhythms. Flightcrew did not have adequate, realistic training in three-engine takeoff techniques or procedures. Flight crew did not adequately understand three-engine takeoff procedures, including significance of vmcg. Flight engineer improperly determined vmcg speed, resulting in value 9 knots too low. During first takeoff attempt, captain applied power to asymmetrical engine too soon, was unable to maintain directional control, and rejected the takeoff. Captain agreed to modify procedure by allowing flight engineer to advance throttle, a deviation of prescribed procedure. FAA oversight of operator was inadequate because the poi and geographic inspectors were unable to effectively monitor domestic crew training and international operations. Existing far part 121 flight time limits & rest requirements that pertained to the flights that the flightcrew flew prior to the ferry flights did not apply to the ferry flights flown under far part 91. Current one-engine inoperative takeoff procedures do not provide adequate rudder availability for correcting directional deviations during the takeoff roll compatible with the achievement of maximum asymmetric thrust at an appropriate speed greater than ground minimum control speed. All three crew members were killed.

The single engine airplane departed with two pilots, two passengers, baggage and equipment. At takeoff, the airplane was 955 pounds over the maximum allowable gross weight, and 2 inches beyond the aft c.g. Limit. After 4 hours of flying, the pilot elected to divert to another airport, due to icing conditions. During the descending left turn from base leg to final approach to runway 22, the airplane dropped, struck the ground, and slid 250 feet. The wings were separated from the airplane during the ground slide by two trees. A satisfactory postaccident engine run was completed. The airplane was calculated to be about 600 pounds over the maximum landing weight, and 2 inches beyond the aft c.g. Limit. The air induction lever was in the primary position, and not the required alternate position for icing conditions. The propeller and stall warning heat switches were off. The airplane had been flying in light freezing rain, which the poh stated should be avoided. Severe mixed icing was reported 25 miles northwest of the airport. Winds at the airport were from 150 degrees at 10 knots, gusting to 16 knots. Both pilots were killed and both passengers were seriously injured.

The pilot was cleared for the VOR runway 17 approach. Field elevation and the minimum descent altitude were 590 and 980 feet respectively. The missed approach point was 10.4 miles outbound from the Waco VOR, which coincided with the runway threshold. The pilot stated that the passenger seated in the right front seat established visual contact with the airport. After confirming that the airport was in sight and the runway environment identified, the pilot continued his descent towards the runway to land on runway 17. The pilot further stated that 'I realized that there would not be adequate runway to safely land, and initiated a right turn to execute a missed approach.' The right wing of the airplane impacted the top of the trees. The FAA inspector at the scene reported that after impacting the trees, the airplane continued through the trees for approximately 400 feet on a track of 344 degrees prior to coming to rest on a heading of 230 degrees.

The charter flight was on a return tour trip after landing at the Grand Canyon National Park Airport. No fueling or maintenance was performed on the airplane while it sat on the ground for three hours. Shortly after takeoff from runway 21, the pilot transmitted that he had a problem and was declaring an emergency. He then stated '...I'm single engine right now....' The airplane was observed to be 100-200 feet above the terrain at the time. It continued flying for about 6 minutes, turning onto a crosswind, downwind, and then a right base leg for runway 21 before colliding with trees about 2.5 miles northeast of the airport. The airport is located in terrain that slopes upward from south to north and west to east. Winds were gusting to 29 knots. The density altitude was 6,870 feet. Examination of the suspect left engine did not reveal any evidence of failures or malfunctions. The investigation revealed deficiencies in the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of the airline's maintenance program, and in the airline's extension of the time-in-service interval of the engines. The airline's AAIP does not require a maximum rated power check of the engines as required by the engine manufacturer's service instruction. In addition, the TBO of the engines had been extended from 1,800 to 2,400 hours.

The airplane impacted terrain approx 14 miles from the destination during a descent. According to radar data and meteorological information, the airplane descended from 16,700 feet to 3,700 feet agl through clouds and icing conditions. During the descent, the airplane decelerated from 268 kts to 92 kts ground speed. The pilot reported to approach that he 'broke out' of the clouds at 5,400 feet. He subsequently informed approach that he had accumulated 'some clear and rime ice' during the descent. 13 seconds later the pilot made a distress call and stated, 'we're in trouble, we're going down.' The last radar track showed the airplane descending through 3,700 feet at a ground speed of 92 kts. A witness reported he observed that the airplane 'appeared to be doing tricks', and 'then headed straight down in a spin.' An airmet for icing conditions was in effect along the airplane's route of flight. Also, there were several pilot reports of icing encountered in the area of the accident. The pilot did not request a weather briefing prior to, or during the flight.

The pilot departed Knoxville on a local pleasure flight to the Gatlinburg area. A few minutes into the flight, the pilot requested the ILS approach to Knoxville. About two minutes after the initial request, he requested immediate radar vectors. The controller requested the flight's altitude, but there was no reply from the pilot. The aircraft collided with trees at the 3,500 foot level of rising terrain seven miles southwest of gatlinburg. A hiker reported hearing, the sound of the engines running until the airplane collided with trees. The hiker also stated that clouds obscured the tops of the mountains. Examination of the accident site disclosed that wreckage debris was scattered over an area 650 feet long and 75 feet wide. The wreckage examination failed to disclose a mechanical problem. Sole on board, the pilot was killed.

The instrument-rated private pilot intended to land at an uncontrolled airport at night. The airport had no instrument approaches. The airplane was flying on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan above an overcast layer of clouds. The pilot informed air traffic control (ATC) that he was going to try to find a 'hole' in the overcast and attempt a visual approach into the uncontrolled airport. The pilot then stated that he could not find a hole; he requested and received an IFR clearance to a larger controlled airport. On his way to the controlled airport, he stated that he found a 'hole' and attempted a visual approach to the uncontrolled airport. He received a cruise clearance from atc for 12,000 feet msl, and then descended at 2,280 feet per minute before impacting mountainous terrain at an elevation of 6,200 feet msl. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed near the accident site. No distress calls from the airplane were recorded. An examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Both occupants were killed.

While performing an ILS approach at night and in IMC, the airplane collided with trees in mountainous terrain prior to the IAF. The MDA prior to the IAF is 10,600 feet. The descent altitude at the outer marker is 7,713 feet. The wreckage was located under the localizer path at an elevation of 7,600 feet. Damage to tree tops along the wreckage distribution path indicates that the airplane travelled through the trees on a level plane until contact with the ground approximately 300 feet into the path. Light snow was falling at the time of the accident and visibility was deteriorating due to fog. During the post crash investigation, there was no evidence found to indicate a mechanical failure or malfunction.