United States of America

The pilot was aware of thunderstorms along his route of flight. He paralleled a line of storms for about 20 minutes looking for a hole in the storms to penetrate, without any success. He turned, and climbed to an altitude of 13,500 feet. He noticed what seemed to be an opening to the south, and turned southbound, through the hole, for about 2 or 3 miles, and then the hole closed. He turned the airplane to the right to reverse course, when he inadvertently penetrated a cell. At this point he said he "lost control of the airplane, and was turned upside down…...heading straight down towards the ground...…traveling at a high rate of speed..….the airspeed indicator was pegged." At an altitude of about 2,000 feet, he was able to level the wings, reduce power and raise the nose. He said he was then able to slow the airplane for a "controlled crash landing," straight a head in a sugar cane field. According to the Sheriff's Report, he struck the field in which the aircraft was lying in immediately after slowing the airplane. The distance from the initial impact area to where the airplane came to rest was about 75 yards.

After a normal taxi and takeoff, the airplane's landing gear would not retract after liftoff. After unsuccessfully attempting to raise the landing gear manually, the flight crew elected to return to the airport. During the landing flare, the ground spoilers deployed when the throttles were brought to idle. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, and the right main landing gear collapsed. The investigation determined that a mechanic had wedged wooden sticks into the airplane's weight-on-wheels (WOW) switches to force them into the ground mode while the airplane was on jacks during maintenance. The mechanic said that he used the sticks to disable the WOW switches to gain access to the maintenance data acquisition unit, which was necessary to troubleshoot an overspeed alert discrepancy. After the maintenance was performed, the sticks were not removed, and the airplane was returned to service. No notation about the disabled WOW switches was entered in the work logs. Postaccident ground testing of the accident airplane's cockpit crew alerting system and examination of flight data recorder (FDR) data determined that the system was functioning properly and that it produced a blue WOW fault message, an amber WOW fault message, and a red GND SPOILER warning message when the accident flight conditions were recreated. The messages produced were consistent with FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information. Ground spoilers will deploy when the throttles are brought to idle if the spoilers are armed and the WOW switches are in the ground mode. The G-V Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) cautions flight crews not to move thrust reverser levers and to switch the GND SPOILER armed to off following an amber WOW FAULT message. A red GND SPOILER message calls for the flight crew to disarm the ground spoilers and pull the circuit breakers to make sure the spoilers are not rearmed inadvertently. Based on CVR information, there was no indication that the flight crew followed checklist procedures contained in the G-V's QRH that referenced WOW faults or GND SPOILER faults. Preflight checklist procedures also called for the flight crew to conduct a visual inspection of the WOW switches.

A witness heard the airplane's engines make "sputtering" engine noises that cut out and quit prior to its impact with the wooded terrain. A sheriff's deputy who responded to the scene heard the pilot state the airplane ran out of fuel. The propeller blades of both engines displayed minor damage, and both propeller spinners were found intact and in place. No evidence of fuel odor nor fuel leakage was observed at the accident site. During examination, both engines were supplied fuel and a source of electricity. Each engine operated smoothly during testing at rpm ranging from idle to 1900.

The crew departed Twentynine Palms on a local training flight. Shortly after takeoff, the engine n°1 failed. The aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height when the engine n°4 lost power. The crew attempted an emergency landing in a sandy area located about 4,5 km past the runway end. All eight crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

As the airplane was descending to the airport, the pilot-in-command (PIC) calculated that the required distance to land on a dry runway would be 2,720 feet. The second-in-command (SIC) stated to the PIC, "all right if I touch down and there's no brakes I'm going around." The ILS Runway 23 approach was in use, and the braking action was reported "poor" by a Hawker Jet, which had landed prior to the accident flight. All runway surfaces were covered with a thin layer of snow. The airplane touched down with about 2,233 feet of runway remaining, of the 5,101-foot long runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway, and proceeded into an overrun grassy area, where the nose landing gear assembly collapsed. The tower controller advised the flightcrew prior to landing that the wind conditions were from 330 degrees at 18 knots. According to the airplane's Pilot's Operating Manual, the estimated landing distance on a dry runway, for the conditions at the time of the accident, was about 2,750 feet. No charts were available in the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual, to compute a landing distance incorporating a contaminated runway. Review of 14 CFR Part 25.1, which prescribed airworthiness standards for the issue of type certificates, and changes to those certificates, for transport category airplanes, revealed, "For landplanes and amphibians, the landing distance on land must be determined on a level, smooth, dry, hard-surfaced runway." There were no requirements for the applicant to determine landing distances on a wet or contaminated runway. The latest weather recorded at the airport, included winds from 330 degrees at 12 knots, gusts to 22 knots; visibility 3/4 statute mile, light snow; and overcast clouds at 300 feet.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in trees while completing a local training flight at Fort Bliss AFB. All four crew members were rescued, among them two were injured.

At the conclusion of a dark night IMC cross-country flight, the pilot was being vectored onto the ILS approach. After stabilizing, the approach "was normal." At decision altitude, the pilot indicated that he could see the approach lights and the runway, but was not in a position to land so he executed a missed approach. After being vectored around for another approach, he stated that he was on the localizer but was "high" on the glide slope. After giving "a little" nose down pitch, he became distracted when the autopilot became "accidentally disengaged." The pilot stated that he "inadvertently descended through the glide slope and impacted the ground short of the runway." He further stated that the "first indication" that he was low was when the aircraft "struck the ground." The aircraft was destroyed on impact. A facility check conducted by the FAA of the ILS found all parameters within normal specifications.

The mishap aircraft, call sign Pacer 43, was conducting pattern work operations during an off-station training mission at Ellsworth AFB, SD (RCA). Shortly before impact, the mishap crew was conducting a simulated single-engine approach to runway 31 at Ellsworth AFB. Subsequent analysis showed that there was a significantly greater amount of fuel in the left wing and left wing tip tank than the right. The gross fuel imbalance resulted from an unmonitored transfer of fuel from the right wing and right wing tip tank to the left that was initiated by the crew approximately nine and one-half minutes before impact. As the aircraft approached the point when it would normally transition to a flare, it leveled off and began a climbing turn to the west, toward the tower. It did not touch down prior to the turn, but veered left immediately during the flare, and then rolled back to wings level momentarily as it climbed. The heavier left wing, and application of power to the right engine for the go-around, caused the aircraft to roll back into a steeper left turn, stayed in a climbing left turn with the bank continuing to increase until il rolled through more than 90 degrees of bank. As the aircraft reached the highest point of the climb (approximately 450 feet), the bank angle was more than 90 degrees, and perhaps slightly inverted as the nose dropped and the aircraft began to descend. The aircraft impacted the ground in a grassy field.

The pilot said he was on the glide slope for an ILS approach. The pilot said, "The autopilot was coupled on to the approach. The autopilot also coupled on to the Glide slope. Approximately 2-1/2 to 3 miles out, we visually had approach lights and runway lights. I then disconnected the autopilot and yaw damper, and hand flew a visual approach using the glide slope indicator as a cross check for a correct glide path to the airport. Continuing visually on the approach, I checked the GS (glide slope) and it indicated we were slightly above glide path, but was corrected, and seconds later hit a pole going through electrical wires, coming to rest short of the approach lights and to the right." An examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. An examination of the ILS approach to the runway showed the facility operated satisfactorily.

Impact forces and fire destroyed the airplane when it impacted the terrain after a loss of control during cruise flight. The pilot received a weather brief by AFSS prior to departure concerning the IFR conditions along the route of flight, which included, rain, freezing rain, icing, turbulence, and snow. The cloud tops were forecast to be 25,000 feet. The pilot filed a flight plan with a cruise flight level of 28,000 feet. About 32 minutes after takeoff, at 1345:58, the pilot reported he had an attitude gyro problem and that he was hand flying the airplane. The airplane's altitude remained at about 28,000 feet for the next seven minutes. At 1352:46, the pilot stated he had an emergency, but at 1352:53, the pilot stated, "Uh it came back on never mind." At 1353:26, the pilot stated, "I need to get to uh anywhere I can get a visual." At 1353:56, the airplane was cleared to climb to 31,000 feet, and radar data indicated the airplane was currently at 27,000 feet. The radar data indicated the airplane went into a series of steep descents and climbs over the next 4.5 minutes until radar contact was lost at 2,500 feet. The pilot of a commercial airline who was flying in the same sector as the accident airplane reported that he heard the accident pilot state that he was in a spin. The commercial airline pilot stated they were flying at 33,000 feet and were "barely above the tops" of the clouds. The airplane impacted the terrain in a steep nose down attitude and burst into flames. The engines, flight controls, and flight instruments did not exhibit any pre-existing anomalies. A witness reported that two days prior to the accident, the pilot had advised him that the airplane's attitude gyro was having problems. There was no record that the pilot had the attitude gyro inspected prior to the accident. A witness reported the pilot routinely flew with the autopilot engaged soon after takeoff. He reported that he had never observed the pilot hand-fly the airplane in instrument conditions.