United States of America

Shortly after takeoff, about 300 feet agl, the engine lost all power. The pilot activated the electric fuel pump, and moved the fuel selector several times. However, the engine did not regain power, and the pilot performed a forced landing into trees. After the accident, the pilot stated to a police officer that he might have departed with the fuel selector positioned to an empty tank. The pilot subsequently stated that both fuel gauges indicated "1/4" full, and he could not remember which tank was selected during the takeoff. Additionally, a passenger stated that he did not smell or observe fuel when he exited the airplane. The passenger added that in the past, the pilot had exhausted one fuel tank, then switched to the other tank and the engine re-started. Examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector revealed that fuel selector was positioned to the right tank. The right fuel tank contained some fuel, and left fuel tank had ruptured. Following the accident, a successful engine test-run was performed.

Two maintenance technicians where on board Northwest Airlines' Airbus A319 N313NB which was taxied from a maintenance area to Gate 10. When they arrived in the vicinity of gate 10, the mechanic who was steering the plane, activated the parking brake and waited for ground personnel and a jetway operator to arrive. After the ground personnel arrived he released the parking brake. The airplane did not move and he advanced the throttles out of their idle detents "a couple of inches, about halfway." The airplane began to move at a "fairly decent speed," and he realized the throttles were still out of the idle detent position. He pulled the throttle back and applied brakes; however, the airplane did not slow and continued until it struck the concrete support column of the jetway, and the left wing contacted the right side of a Boeing 757-251 (N550NW, parked at gate 9). The nose gear sheared off the Airbus, and the right side of the Boeing sustained a 6-foot long, 2-foot wide gash, just aft of the R1 door. The mechanic estimated that the airplane was about halfway down the parking line when he pulled back the throttles. Initial review of the flight data recorder for the time period surrounding the accident revealed that about 10 seconds after the parking brake was released, the thrust lever angles for both engines were increased to about 17 degrees for about 8 seconds, before they were returned to the idle position. During that time, the engines N1 and N2 speeds increased to about 71, and 85 percent, respectively.

The aircraft was under maintenance test at Columbus-John Glenn Airport (Port Columbus) and under the control of three technicians. While performing an engine run, the aircraft collided with a hangar and was damaged beyond repair. All three technicians escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On January 8, 2003, about 0847:28 eastern standard time, Air Midwest (doing business as US Airways Express) flight 5481, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 18R at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. The 2 flight crewmembers and 19 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, 1 person on the ground received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 5481 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport, Greer, South Carolina, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The commercial certificated pilot reported that just after takeoff in a wheel/ski equipped airplane, he heard a very loud bang, followed by a loud rattling noise. As he turned towards the departure airstrip, he had difficulty using the airplane's rudder pedals. Using a combination of aileron input and the remaining amount of rudder control, he was able to maneuver the airplane for a landing on the airstrip. He said that as the airplane passed over the approach end of the airstrip, it drifted to the right, and he initiated a go-around. The airplane subsequently collided with a stand of trees bordering the airstrip, and sustained structural damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. In a written statement to the NTSB, the pilot stated that he suspected that the right elevator's outboard and center hinges or hinge pins failed, allowing the right elevator to swing rearward and jam the airplane's rudder. An FAA airworthiness inspector traveled to the accident scene to examine the airplane. He reported that the right elevator was discovered about 150 feet behind the airplane, within the wreckage debris path through a stand of trees. He said that the right elevator sustained a significant amount of damage along the leading edge, which would normally be protected by the horizontal stabilizer. The FAA inspector examined the airplane's horizontal stabilizer in the area where the right and left elevators connect, and noted signs of new paint on the rivets that held the torque tube support assembly, indicating recent reinstallation or replacement of the torque tube support assembly. He indicated that the torque tube support assembly was installed at a slight angle to the right, which allowed the right elevator to eventually slip off of the center and outboard hinge pins. The inspector said that witness marks on the center and outboard hinge pins showed signs of excessive wear towards the outboard portion of each pin. The inspector noted that a review of the airplane's maintenance records failed to disclose any entries of repair/replacement of the elevator torque tube support assembly.

The pilot reported to Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDV) that his left engine had an oil leak and he requested to land at the nearest airport. ZDV informed the pilot that Akron (AKO) was the closest airport and subsequently cleared the pilot to AKO. On reporting having the airport in sight ZDV terminated radar service, told the pilot to change to the advisory frequency, and reminded him to close his flight plan. Approximately 17 minutes later, ZDV contacted Denver FSS to inquire if the airplane had landed at AKO. Flight Service had not heard from the pilot, and began a search. Approximately 13 minutes later, the local sheriff found the airplane off of the airport. Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the airplane flying westbound. They then saw the airplane suddenly pitch nose down, "spiral two times, and crash." The airplane exploded on impact and was consumed by fire. An examination of the airplane's left engine showed the number 2 and 3 rods were fractured at the journals. The number 2 and 3 pistons were heavily spalded. The engine case halves were fretted at the seam and through bolts. All 6 cylinders showed fretting between the bases and the case at the connecting bolts. The outside of the engine case showed heat and oil discoloration. The airplane's right engine showed similar fretting at the case halves and cylinder bases, and evidence of oil seepage around the seals. It also showed heat and oil discoloration. An examination of the propellers showed that both propellers were at or near low pitch at the time of the accident. The examination also showed evidence the right propeller was being operated under power at impact, and the left propeller was operating under conditions of low or no power at impact. According to the propeller manufacturer, in a sudden engine seizure event, the propeller is below the propeller lock latch rpm. In this situation, the propeller cannot be feathered. Repair station records showed the airplane had been brought in several times for left engine oil leaks. One record showed a 3/4 inch crack found at one of the case half bolts beneath the induction manifold, was repaired by retorquing the case halves and sealing the seam with an unapproved resin. Records also showed the station washed the engine and cowling as the repair action for another oil leak.

At 0029, the pilot contacted Norfolk Approach and stated he was ready for takeoff on runway 01 at Elizabeth City. The controller instructed the pilot to fly runway heading and climb to 3,000 feet. At 0032, the controller advised the pilot that the flight was radar contact and for the pilot to fly heading 160 degrees. At 0034, the Norfolk Approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the FAA Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center. At 0034, the pilot of N1122Y contacted the controller at Washington Center, stating he was coming up on 3,000 feet. The controller acknowledged, and the pilot requested the non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to runway 5 at Dare County Airport, Manteo. At 0036, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 145 degrees for Manteo and fly direct to the NDB when he receives the signal. The pilot acknowledged and the controller also asked the pilot if he had the current weather for Manteo. The pilot responded that he did have the current weather. At 0043, the controller cleared the pilot for the NDB runway 5 approach at Manteo and to maintain 2,000 feet until the flight crossed the beacon outbound. The pilot acknowledged. At 0046, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact with the flight was lost and for the pilot to report a cancellation or a downtime on his radio frequency. The pilot acknowledged. At 0057:21, the controller called the pilot and the pilot responded by reporting the flight was procedure turn inbound. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. When the pilot did not report that he was on the ground, and further radio contact could not be established, controllers initiated search and rescue efforts. The wreckage of the airplane was located in the waters of Croatan Sound, about 1.5 miles west of the Dare County Regional Airport about 1000. The pilot was not located in the airplane. The body of the pilot was located in the waters of Croatan Sound on February 11, 2003. Post crash examination of the airplane, flight controls, and engine showed no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction. The propeller separated from the airplane and was not located after the accident. Damage to the mounting bolts for the propeller was consistent with the propeller separating due to impact with the water. Postmortem examination of the pilot showed no findings which could be considered causal to the accident.

The airplane collided with trees and terrain following a loss of control during an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach at night. The impact occurred approximately 2.1 miles from the approach end of the runway. A witness reported hearing the airplane at "mid-throttle" as it flew over. He then heard the power increase followed by the impact. The witness stated there was no precipitation at the time of the accident and there were "severe winds, mostly from the south, shifting volatile directly from the east." He also stated the visibility was "extremely poor." Statements were received from five pilots who landed in transport category airplanes around the time of the accident. Three of these pilots reported experiencing a crosswind that varied from 15 to 50 knots during the approach. Four of the pilots reported airspeed fluctuations that varied between +/- 8 knots to +/- 10 knots during the approach. Three of the pilots reported breaking out of the clouds between 200 and 300 feet agl. Radar data indicates the airplane was high on the glideslope until it entered a rapid descent from an altitude of about 2,300 feet. Examination of the airframe, engine, and propeller governors failed to reveal any failures/malfunctions that would have resulted in the loss of control.

The Co-Pilot was the flying pilot with the Captain giving directions throughout the approach phase. The Captain stated that he extended the flaps and the landing gear. When the aircraft touched down, the landing gear was not extended. The Co-Pilot reported that she did look down at the landing gear lever and at "three green lights" on the approach. The CVR was read out which indicated that the Co-Pilot directed the Captain to call inbound. The Captain acknowledged this and stated "fifteen flaps." The Co-Pilot then stated "fifteen flaps, before landing." The Captain did not respond to the Co-Pilot but instead made a radio transmission. The Captain shortly thereafter, stated that he was extending the flaps to 25 degrees. The Captain made another radio transmission to the tower when the Co-Pilot stated "final, sync, ignitions." The Captain responded "ignitions on." Full flaps were then extended. The Captain gave the Co-Pilot continued directions while on the approach for heading, speed and altitude. At approximately 300 feet, the Captain stated, "yaw damper's off, air valves are off, ready to land." The Captain reported that it was obvious that touchdown was on the flaps and keel. The Captain stated that he raised the flaps, shutdown the engines, and confirmed that the landing gear handle was down. During the gear swing test the landing gear cycled several times with no difficulties. All red and green lights illuminated at the proper positions. During the test, it was found that the gear not extended horn did not function with the gear retracted, the flaps fully extended and the power levers at idle. Later a bad set of contacts to the relay was found. When the relay was jumped, the horn sounded. Inspection of the damage to the aircraft revealed that the outer rims of both outer tires displayed scrape marks around the circumference of the rim. The outer surface of the gear door fairings were scraped and the flap hinge fairings was ground down.

The aircraft collided with mountainous terrain in a level descent during a visual approach to the destination airport. According to recorded radar data, 10 minutes after descending from 15,000 feet, the flight impacted about 200 feet below the top of the partially obscured ridgeline (elevation of 2550 feet), and 8 miles from the destination. The data indicates the flight path was similar to the global positioning satellite (GPS) approach to the airport. Six minutes before the accident, and the pilot's last transmission to air traffic control, he was informed and acknowledged that radar service was terminated. The flight was 12.4 miles from the accident site when radar contact was lost. Reduced visibility due to fog hampered search & rescue efforts, and the aircraft wreckage was located the next day. The aircraft was equipped with a GPS navigation system; however the installation was incomplete, restricting its use to visual flight rules (VFR) only. The investigation did not determine if the GPS was being used at the time. A non-enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System was also installed. The maximum elevation figure listed on the sectional aeronautical chart covering the area of the accident site and destination airport was 3000 feet mean sea level. The chart also shows an advisory for the area to use caution due to rapidly rising.