Columbus-John Glenn (Port Columbus)

On July 19, 2024, about 1904 eastern daylight time, a Beech B-60 airplane, N23553, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Vienna Center, Ohio. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Preliminary radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) track data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the flight departed runway 17 at Plattsburgh International Airport (PBG), Plattsburgh, New York at 1651, destined for John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio. The airplane proceeded to the southwest, and climbed to 16,500 ft. About 50 miles northeast of Youngstown/Warren Regional Airport (YNG), Vienna Center, Ohio, the pilot informed air traffic control that the airplane’s left engine had lost power and he could not maintain altitude. The arrival east radar controller (YNG tower) offered information on close by airports; however, the pilot requested YNG and its longer, 9,003-ft-long runway. While descending to YNG, the airplane circled near the approach end of runway 32, then it proceeded along the centerline of runway 32 while continuing to descend. About 3,000 ft from the departure end of the runway, the data indicated that the airplane was close to field altitude at a ground speed of 131 knots. At the end of the runway, the airplane turned left while at a ground speed of 95 knots. The airplane impacted terrain about ¼ mile west of the departure end of runway 32. A witness, who was on YNG taxiway D, observed the airplane in flight prior to the accident. He stated that the airplane circled near the approach end of runway 32, then proceeded with the approach down runway 32. The airplane was higher than normal when beginning the approach. As the airplane proceeded down the runway, it descended toward the runway; however, it did This information is preliminary and subject to change. not touch down. At the end of runway 32, the airplane pitched up rapidly to the left and began to “flip.” The airplane then descended below his field of view and crashed. The wreckage was located on airport property, outside the confines of the airport’s perimeter fence. The wreckage was found upright and oriented on a 310° heading. A postaccident fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. All structural components of the airplane were found within the wreckage debris path. The landing gear were found in the extended (down) position. The pilot, who owned and operated the airplane, possessed both Canadian and U.S. Federal Aviation Administration private pilot certificates with airplane single engine land and airplane multiengine land ratings. Recorded weather near the time of the accident included wind from 050° at 5 knots, 10 miles visibility, and few clouds at 5,500 ft above ground level.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 18 at Little Rock-Bill & Hillary Clinton (Adams Field) Airport, while in initial climb in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located about 1,500 metres past the runway end, near a stone quarry, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed. Employees of the CTEH Company, they were en route to Columbus responding to an emergency response plan. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with a visibility of 2 SM due to rain. Four minutes prior to the accident, the wind was 19 knots gusting to 27 knots and five minutes after the accident, the wind was gusting to 40 knots.

Shortly after departure to pick up a passenger at their destination airport about 75 nm away, the pilots climbed and turned onto a track of about 115° before leveling off about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl), where the airplane remained for a majority of the flight. Pilot and controller communications during the flight were routine and there were no irregularities reported. As the airplane descended into the destination airport area, the airplane passed through areas of light to heavy icing where there was a 20 to 80% probability of encountering supercooled large droplets (SLD) during their initial descent and approach. While level at 4,000 ft msl, the flight remained in icing conditions, and then was cleared for the instrument approach to the runway. The flight emerged from the overcast layer as it crossed the final approach fix at 2,800 ft msl; the flight continued its descent and was cleared to land. The controller informed the flight that there was a vehicle on the runway but it would be cleared shortly, which was acknowledged; this was the final communication from the flight crew. Multiple eyewitnesses and security camera footage revealed that the airplane, while flying straight and level, suddenly began a steep, spinning, nearly vertical descent until it impacted a commercial business parking lot; the airplane subsequently collided with several unoccupied vehicles and caught fire. The airplane was certified for flight in known icing conditions and was equipped with pneumatic deice boots on each of the wings and tail surfaces. The pneumatic anti-icing system was consumed by the postimpact fire; the control switches were impact and thermally damaged and a reliable determination of their preimpact operation could not be made. Further examination of the airframe and engines revealed no indications of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation or performance. During the approach it is likely that the airframe had been exposed to and had built-up ice on the control surfaces. It could not be determined if the pilots used the pneumatic anti-icing system, or if the system was inoperative, based on available evidence. Review of the weather conditions and the airplane’s calculated performance based on ADS-B data, given the speeds at which the airplane was flying, and the lack of any discernable deviations that might have been expected due to an extreme amount of ice accumulating on the airframe, it is also likely that the deice system, if operating at the time of the icing encounter, should have been able to sufficiently remove the ice from the surfaces. Although it is also uncertain when the pilots extended the landing gear and flaps, it is likely that the before-landing checklist would be conducted between the final approach fix and when the flight was on its 3-mile final approach to land. Given this information, the available evidence suggests that the sudden loss of control from a stable and established final approach was likely due to the accumulation of ice on the tailplane. It is likely that once the pilots changed the airplane’s configuration by extending the landing gear and flaps, the sudden aerodynamic shift resulted in the tailplane immediately entering an aerodynamic stall that maneuvered the airplane into an attitude from which there was no possibility to recover given the height above the ground. Postaccident toxicological testing detected the presence of delta-8 THC. Delta-8 THC has a potential to alter perception and cause impairment, but only the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-8-THC was present in the pilot’s liver and lung tissue. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s delta-8-THC use contributed to the accident.

The copilot was flying an ILS approach at an airspeed of Vref plus 10 knots, and the captain made visual contact with the runway about 350 feet agl. The airplane then drifted high on the glideslope, and the copilot decreased engine power. The sink rate subsequently became too great. By the time the captain called for a go-around, the airspeed had deteriorated, and the stick shaker activated. Although power was applied for the go-around, the airplane impacted the runway in a level attitude before the engines spooled up. The airplane came to rest in snow, about 20 feet off the left side of the runway, near mid-field.

The pilot was on a circling approach for landing in instrument icing conditions. The landing gear were extended and the flaps were lowered to 15°. The alternate air induction system was not activated. The surviving passenger stated when the airplane came out of the clouds and the airplane started to buffet and shake. The pilot was heard to state on the UNICOM frequency by the fixed base operator and a lineman, "Emergency engine ice." The airplane was observed to make a 60-degree angle of bank and collided with trees and terrain. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the airplane will stall at 129 miles per hour with the landing gear and flaps down at 15-degrees. The maximum landing weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,430 pounds. The total aircraft weight at the crash site was 6,568.52 pounds. Witnesses who knew the pilot stated the pilot had flown one other known flight in icing conditions before the accident flight.

The aircraft was under maintenance test at Columbus-John Glenn Airport (Port Columbus) and under the control of three technicians. While performing an engine run, the aircraft collided with a hangar and was damaged beyond repair. All three technicians escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll and initial climb both engines were producing normal power. As the airplane climbed through 150 feet, the left engine lost power. The pilot reported that he feathered the left propeller. He further stated that following the securing of the left engine, the right engine began to 'power down.' The pilot reported that he was unable to maintain a climb attitude and was forced to land on the airport in a grassy area. The subsequent examination of the cockpit disclosed that the left engine throttle was in the full forward position, and the right throttle lever was in the mid-range position. Both propeller levers were found full forward. The left engine mixture lever was in the full forward position, and the right mixture lever full aft, or lean, position. The functional check of both engines was conducted. Initially the left engine would not start, but after troubleshooting the fuel system, the left fuel boost pump was determined to have been defective. The 'loss of engine power after liftoff' checklist requires that the pilot identify the inoperative engine and to feather the propeller for the inoperative engine.

The airplane stalled and crashed 1.2 nautical miles east of runway 28L during an ILS approach. The captain initiated the approach at high speed & crossed the FAF at a high speed without first having the airplane properly configured for a stabilized approach. The airspeed was not monitored nor maintained by the flightcrew. The airline had no specified callouts for airspeed deviations during instrument approaches. The captain failed to apply full power & configure the airplane in a timely manner. Both pilots had low flight time and experience in in the airplane and in any EFIS-equipped airplane. Additionally, the captain had low time and experience as a captain. Inadequate consideration was given to the possible consequences of pairing a newly upgraded captain, on a new airplane, with a first officer who had no airline experience in air carrier operations, nor do current FAA regulations address this issue.

The PA-32, N82419, had been receiving atc radar services en route to the Greenwood Municipal Airport. Radar services were terminated 3 miles from the airport. The MU-2, N74FB, had just taken off from the airport, and had reported to ATC in anticipation of receiving his IFR clearance. The flight had not yet been identified on radar. The two airplanes collided approximately 2 miles from the airport at 2,100 feet msl. The collision took place just outside and to the east of the Indianapolis airport radar service area (arsa). The MU-2 track was 066°, and the PA-32 track was 174°. The pax/pilot on the PA-32 took control of the airplane and was able to make a controlled landing. Guidance for traffic pattern operations and recommended arrival and departure procedures is found in the airman's information manual. All five occupants on board the MU-2 were killed.

On final approach the pilot reported an engine failure. He said he was putting the landing gear down. The airplane crashed 3 miles from the airport. Examination of the engines revealed no discrepancies. The pilot did not feather the propeller after the engine failure. He had no training in this airplane or any other multi-engine airplane in over 5 years. His last before was in a Cessna 172. It was reported that the pilot did not manage the airplane fuel system in the recommended manner. A witness said the pilot used fuel from the main tanks until they were nearly empty. He ignored forecasts of light icing conditions and during his flight he reported ice accumulation. All five occupants were killed.