Montgomery

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. There was no evidence of fire. Wreckage examinations and all recovered wreckage from the impact area revealed no evidence of an inflight collisionor breakup, or of external contact by a foreign object. An examination of the engine and the propeller indicated that the engine was producing power at impact. The recovered components showed no evidence of preexisting powerplant, system, or structural failures. Wreckage examinations showed crushing and bending consistent with a moderate angle of descent and a moderate right-wing-down attitude at impact. The amount of wreckage recovered indicates that all parts of the airplane were at the crash site. The wreckage was scattered over an area of about 600 feet. An examination of radar and airplane performance data indicated that the accident airplane initiated a descent from 3,000 feet immediately after the accident pilot was given a second traffic advisory by air traffic control. The pilot reported that the traffic was above him. At the time the pilot stated that he needed to deviate, data indicate that the accident airplane was in or entering an uncontrolled descent. Radar data indicated that, after departure from the airport, the closest identified airplane to the accident airplane was a DC-10, which was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet. The horizontal distance between the two airplanes was about 1.1 nautical miles, and the vertical distance between the airplanes was about 1,600 feet. The accident airplane was never in a location at which wake turbulence from the DC-10 would have intersected the Cessna's flightpath (behind and below the DC-10's flightpath). Given the relative positions of the accident airplane and the DC-10, wake turbulence was determined to not be a factor in this accident. Although the DC-10 was left of the position given to the pilot by Mobile Terminal Radar Approach Control, air traffic controllers do not have strict angular limits when providing traffic guidance. The Safety Board's airplane performance simulation showed that, beginning about 15 seconds before the time of the pilot's last transmission ("I needed to deviate, I needed to deviate"), his view of the DC-10 moved diagonally across the windscreen from his left to straight in front of the Cessna while tripling in size. The airplane performance simulation also indicated that the airplane experienced high bank and pitch angles shortly after the pilot stated, "I needed to deviate" (about 13 seconds after the transmission, the simulation showed the airplane rolling through 90° and continuing to roll to a peak of about 150° 3 seconds later) and that the airplane appeared to have nearly recovered from these extreme attitudes at impact. Performance data indicated that the airplane would had to have been structurally/aerodynamically intact to reach the point of ground impact from the point of inflight upset. There was no evidence of any other aircraft near the accident airplane or the DC-10 at the time of the accident. Soon after the accident, U.S. Coast Guard aircraft arrived at the accident scene. The meaning of the pilot's statement that he needed to deviate could not be determined. A review of air traffic control radar and transcripts revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation before the onset of the descent and loss of control. A sound spectrum study conducted by the Safety Board found no evidence of loud noises during the pilot's last three radio transmissions but found that background noise increased, indicating that the cockpit area was still intact and that the airspeed was increasing. The study further determined that the overspeed warning had activated, which was consistent with the performance study and extreme fragmentation of the wreckage. Radar transponder data from the accident airplane were lost below 2,400 feet. The signal loss was likely caused by unusual attitudes, which can mask transponder antenna transmissions. A garbled transponder return recorded near the DC-10 was likely caused by the accident airplane's transponder returns masking the DC-10's returns (since the accident airplane was projected to be in line between the DC-10 and the ground radar) or by other environmental phenomena. Red transfer or scuff marks were observed on many pieces of the airplane wreckage, and these marks were concentrated on the lower airframe skin forward of the main landing gear and the nose landing gear area. The Safety Board and four laboratories compared the red-marked airplane pieces to samples of red-colored items found in the wreckage. These examinations determined that most of the red marks were caused by parts of the airplane, cargo, and items encountered during the wreckage recovery. The marks exhibited random directions of motion, and none of the marks exhibited evidence of an in-flight collision with another aircraft. A small piece of black, anodized aluminum found embedded in the left wing was subsequently identified as a fragment from a cockpit lighting dimmer. The accident occurred at night, with the moon obscured by low clouds. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, although visual conditions were reported between cloud layers. The terminal aerodrome forecast reported a possible cloud layer at 3,000 feet. Weather data and observations by the DC-10 pilot indicated that, after flying about 100 to 500 feet above the cloud layer and soon after sighting the DC-10, the accident airplane would have entered clouds. A number of conditions were present on the night of the accident that would have been conducive to spatial disorientation. For example, no visible horizon references existed between the cloud layers in which the pilot was flying because of the night conditions. In addition, to initiate a visual search and visually acquire the DC-10, varying degrees of eye and head movements would have accompanied the pilot's shifting of attention outside the cockpit. Once the DC-10 was visually acquired by the pilot, it would have existed as a light source moving against an otherwise featureless background, and its relative motion across and rising in the Cessna's windscreen could have been disorienting, especially if the pilot had fixated on it for any length of time. Maneuvering the airplane during this search would likely have compounded the pilot's resultant disorientation.

After takeoff, the pilot reported "an engine problem," but did not elaborate. A witness on the ground saw that the left engine was trailing smoke, but the engine was still operating, and did not sound like it was "missing". When asked by the tower controller if he required assistance, the pilot answered "no". The controller cleared the pilot for left traffic to a landing, and provided the current weather. There were no further transmissions from the pilot. Smoothed radar tracking data revealed that the airplane turned toward a left downwind, and leveled off at 1,400 feet msl (about 1,050 feet agl) and 156 knots. During the next 14 seconds, the airplane descended to 1,100 feet and increased airspeed to 173 knots. Then radar contact was lost. Witnesses observed the airplane variously in a right snap roll and a left wingover, followed by a sharp dive to the ground. The airplane had just undergone maintenance. During maintenance, unused oil was found in the left engine cowling, which the pilot admitted he had previously spilled. Following maintenance, the pilot was observed adding 3 additional quarts of oil to the left engine. The engine oil dipsticks were calibrated on both sides, with each side pertaining to the oil level in a specific engine. The side for the right engine was calibrated to read 1 3/4 quarts lower than the left engine. The airplane's wreckage was fragmented. No evidence of mechanical defect was found, nor was there any evidence of an extreme out-of-trim condition. There was also no evidence of engine failure, detonation, or pre-impact failure. The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate. He reported 3,210 hours of flight time to the operator, and had recently been cleared to fly the airplane on 14 CFR Part 91 flights. The flight to the maintenance facility was the pilot's first solo flight in the airplane. An autopsy of the pilot revealed the presence of a prostate adenocarcinoma; however, according to his physician, the pilot was unaware of it.

During the takeoff roll and initial climb both engines were producing normal power. As the airplane climbed through 150 feet, the left engine lost power. The pilot reported that he feathered the left propeller. He further stated that following the securing of the left engine, the right engine began to 'power down.' The pilot reported that he was unable to maintain a climb attitude and was forced to land on the airport in a grassy area. The subsequent examination of the cockpit disclosed that the left engine throttle was in the full forward position, and the right throttle lever was in the mid-range position. Both propeller levers were found full forward. The left engine mixture lever was in the full forward position, and the right mixture lever full aft, or lean, position. The functional check of both engines was conducted. Initially the left engine would not start, but after troubleshooting the fuel system, the left fuel boost pump was determined to have been defective. The 'loss of engine power after liftoff' checklist requires that the pilot identify the inoperative engine and to feather the propeller for the inoperative engine.

The pilot reported that loss of power occurred in both engines after he entered the traffic pattern for a full stop landing. The airplane collided with trees during an emergency landing in a cotton field near the airport. Subsequent review of the aircraft maintenance logs disclosed that Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin (SB) 130A had not been accomplished on this airplane. According to the manufacturer, an inadvertent failure or the improper installation of a filler cap after refueling may cause an air pressure differential between the center and outboard portions of the main integral fuel tank. Air leakage from the filler cap may result in failure of the fuel transfer system to move fuel from the outboard tank section to the center tank section. To eliminate this possible malfunction, the operator was to remove vent check valves from the bulkhead between the tanks in accordance with SB 130A. The operator's maintenance policies required that, company jet and turbo propeller aircraft be maintained under a maintenance program in accordance with FAR Parts 135.415, 135.417, 135.423, 135.443, and a corporate flight management approved aircraft inspection program (AAIP). The maintenance inspection program also included compliance with manufacturers' service bulletins and service letters.

The crew arrived at the airport about 20 minutes before the planned midnight takeoff time, after the pilot-in-command had spent the day moving furniture. A night watchman noted that the preflight inspection and takeoff roll to rotation/lift-off was normal. There was no post-takeoff radio call to either unicom or ATC, although the crew had filed an IFR flight plan. After taking off from runway 36, the aircraft crashed about 1.8 mile north of the runway. The wreckage was found after interruption of electrical power to a nearby city. Initial impact was with trees, while in a shallow/left/descending turn. An area of trees about 1/2 mile long was damaged by impact and fire. Before coming to rest, the aircraft hit a powerline support tower. There was evidence the aircraft was traveling at about 260 knots, when it crashed. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was found that would have resulted in the accident. Both pilots were killed.

The pilot attempted a VOR approach and missed. He advised ATC he was going to attempt the NDB and if he could not see the runway he would go to metro at Detroit or Pontiac. On the NDB approach the aircraft struck trees 960 feet below the MDA. The aircraft flipped over landing on the nose and top of the fuselage. Both occupants were killed.

Pilot cleared for night NDB runway 19 approach to Folsom Field. Erratic radar track during procedure turn and inbound intercept. Witnesses described 200 feet ceiling and reduced visibility in fog at airport. Other witnesses observed aircraft on northbound course, followed by turn to west at rooftop height, well below MDA, at a point one mile northeast of airport. Engine operation sounded normal. Aircraft contacted trees at about airport elevation, one mile north of airport. Wreckage produced 632 feet path. Severed limbs, prop damage and engine examination revealed evidence of power at impact. 62 year old pilot had not flown with cfi in years, instrument currency unknown. Pilot found to have severe coronary atherosclerosis with near total occlusion of right coronary artery and evidence of past total occlusion of left circumflex coronary artery. Ceiling lower than forecast for area. Flight purpose to carry employees to meet truck, go job site. Limitation on pilot medical certificate, not for night flight. Sunset at 1745 cst, 51 minutes before accident. All six occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a demo flight from Montgomery, Alabama, to Tulsa, Oklahoma, carrying seven passengers and a pilot. While cruising at an altitude of 14,000 feet in icing conditions, the pilot informed ATC about an engine failure and was cleared to divert to Jackson-Municipal Airport. On descent, the aircraft went out of control and crashed few miles from Jackson Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

On final approach to Tuscaloosa Airport by night, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck trees and crashed few hundred yards short of runway 04 threshold. The pilot was seriously injured while the passenger was killed.

While cruising by night under VFR mode, the pilot's attention diverted from operation and he failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck trees and crashed near Troy. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.