Reading

The air traffic controller, with both ground and local (tower) responsibilities, cleared the accident airplane to land when it was about 8 miles from the runway. Another airplane landed in front of the accident flight, and the controller cleared that pilot to taxi to the hangar. The controller subsequently cleared a tractor with retractable (bat wing) mowers, one on each side, and both in the “up” position, to proceed from the terminal ramp and across the 6,350-foot active runway at an intersection about 2,600 feet from the threshold. The controller then shifted his attention back to the airplane taxiing to its hangar, and did not see the accident airplane land. During the landing rollout, the airplane’s left wing collided with the right side of the tractor when the tractor was “slightly” left of runway centerline. Calculations estimated that the airplane was about 1,000 feet from the collision point when the tractor emerged from the taxiway, and skid marks confirmed that the airplane had been steered to the right to avoid impact. Prior to the crossing attempt, the tractor operator did not scan the runway, and was concentrating on the left side bat wing. Federal Aviation Administration publications do not adequately address the need for ground vehicle operators to visually confirm that active runways/approaches are clear, prior to crossing with air traffic control authorization, thus overlooking an additional means to avoid a collision.

The twin-engine corporate jet impacted terrain while maneuvering to land after a global positioning system (GPS) approach. The pilot reported that the airplane entered icing conditions during the approach and that the airplane descended out of instrument meteorological conditions between 300-400 feet above ground level (agl). The pilot reported that his windshield had become obscured by ice accumulation during the approach and that he "had difficulty seeing the runway." The pilot elected to land the airplane instead of executing the published missed-approach procedure. The airplane impacted terrain 439 feet short of the runway threshold while in a right turn. After the accident, there was ice accumulation on all booted airframe surfaces measuring 2-4 inches wide and 1/4 to 3/8 inch thick. The upper portions of the windscreens were contaminated with ice measuring about 3/8 inch thick. The remaining airframe portions, including the heated surfaces, were free of ice accumulation. The windshield bleed air switch was selected on "High" with the pilot's side windshield heat control knob approximately mid-range. Windshield alcohol was selected "On", but the alcohol reservoir was still full upon inspection. At the time of the accident, there was an overcast ceiling of 500 feet agl, 1-3/4 statute mile visibility with mist, and an outside temperature of -08 degrees Celsius. The published minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the GPS runway 17 approach is 500 feet agl, for an airplane equipped with a lateral navigation only GPS receiver. The pilot held a private pilot certificate with multi-engine land, instrument airplane, and Cessna 500 type rating. The pilot reported having 2,200 hours total flight time and 475 hours in the same make/model as the accident airplane.

After takeoff, the pilot reported "an engine problem," but did not elaborate. A witness on the ground saw that the left engine was trailing smoke, but the engine was still operating, and did not sound like it was "missing". When asked by the tower controller if he required assistance, the pilot answered "no". The controller cleared the pilot for left traffic to a landing, and provided the current weather. There were no further transmissions from the pilot. Smoothed radar tracking data revealed that the airplane turned toward a left downwind, and leveled off at 1,400 feet msl (about 1,050 feet agl) and 156 knots. During the next 14 seconds, the airplane descended to 1,100 feet and increased airspeed to 173 knots. Then radar contact was lost. Witnesses observed the airplane variously in a right snap roll and a left wingover, followed by a sharp dive to the ground. The airplane had just undergone maintenance. During maintenance, unused oil was found in the left engine cowling, which the pilot admitted he had previously spilled. Following maintenance, the pilot was observed adding 3 additional quarts of oil to the left engine. The engine oil dipsticks were calibrated on both sides, with each side pertaining to the oil level in a specific engine. The side for the right engine was calibrated to read 1 3/4 quarts lower than the left engine. The airplane's wreckage was fragmented. No evidence of mechanical defect was found, nor was there any evidence of an extreme out-of-trim condition. There was also no evidence of engine failure, detonation, or pre-impact failure. The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate. He reported 3,210 hours of flight time to the operator, and had recently been cleared to fly the airplane on 14 CFR Part 91 flights. The flight to the maintenance facility was the pilot's first solo flight in the airplane. An autopsy of the pilot revealed the presence of a prostate adenocarcinoma; however, according to his physician, the pilot was unaware of it.

On January 16, 1989, Machen nacelle mounted induction air intercoolers were installed on N6894Y. On December 14, 1989, an annual inspection was performed, and a Machen superstar i-680 kit was installed. On December 21, 1989, N6894Y was at 6,000 feet when the pilot reported a problem with the right engine. The pilot reported a fire in the right engine. A couple of minutes later, he radioed he could not shut down the right engine. At 1034:37 the pilot advised his 'right engine just tore off' and that he was 'in a spin heading down.' The exhaust tailpipe of the left turbocharger on the right engine was found to have separated. Metallurgical examination revealed the tailpipe failed due to fatigue cracking. Records showed that part I of piper service bulletin 920 (engine tailpipe inspection) had been completed, while part II (addition of fire detection system) had not been accomplished due to the lack of available kits. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft crashed while making a visual approach to runway 27R at Philadelphia International Airport. The aircraft, a scheduled commuter flight from Reading, Pennsylvania, arrived in the Philadelphia Approach Control area as a VFR 'pop up' flight and was sequenced to land behind United flight 555, a Boeing 727 IFR arrival, on runway 27R. Witnesses stated that, when flight 501 was about 1/2 mile on final approach, it rolled from side to side, pitched up, rolled inverted to the left, and flew into the ground nose first. All three persons aboard the aircraft were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew was completing a ferry flight from Philadelphia to Reading. 54 seconds after being cleared for an approach to runway 31 at Reading-General Spaatz Airport, while flying at an altitude of 4,500 feet, the twin engine airplane collided with a Cessna 195 registered N4377N and owned by the Hagerstown Cash Register Company. His pilot was performing a private flight from Lincoln Park to York, Pennsylvania. Following the collision, both aircraft went out of control, entered a dive and crashed. All four occupants on both aircraft were killed.

The approach to Reading Airport was initiated in marginal weather conditions with fog and low clouds. On final, the airplane struck the ground and crashed 3,6 miles south of Reading LOM while cleared for an ILS approach to runway 36. The pilot was killed while both passengers were seriously injured.

While cruising by night at an insufficient altitude, the twin engine airplane crashed in a field near Bloserville. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was completing a cargo flight from Reading to Altoona.

On approach to Philadelphia International Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and turbulences. On short final, the captain decided to make a go-around when the airplane struck the ground and crashed few miles short of runway. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft climbed to an altitude of 3,000 feet to an area approximately four miles east of the Reading Airport at which time, at the instruction of Captain Brown, Captain Nilsen leveled off to begin practice of instrument approach procedures. Shortly thereafter, the flight crew detected an odor resembling burning insulation, but did not immediately determine the source. At approximately 1137, the slight engineer went aft in order to determine the origin of the smoke. Upon opening the galley door, he observed that the entire cabin was filled with a very dense smoke and he returned to the cockpit and reported to Captain Brown that "the whole cabin is on fire". The crew immediately attempted to combat the fire with the cockpit fire-extinguisher but were unable to enter the cabin because of the dense smoke and intense heat. The smoke quickly filled the cockpit through the open galley door, rendering visibility extremely poor and making it difficult for the pilots to observe the instruments. The student flight engineer opened the cockpit crew hatch in an attempt to clear the cockpit of smoke, however, the opening of the hatch increased the flow of smoke from the cabin toward the cockpit and shortly thereafter it became impossible for Captain Brown to observe any of the instruments or to see through the windshield. Captain Brown opened the window on the right side of the pilot compartment and attempted to fly the aircraft back to the Reading Airport for an emergency landing while descending with the engines throttled and with his head out of the side window. With the increased intensity of the heat and denseness of the smoke in the cockpit, it became impossible for the pilots to maintain effective control of the aircraft. At an altitude of approximately 100 feet, two miles northwest of the airport, Captain Brown withdrew his head from the window and attempted to "ditch" the aircraft "blind". The aircraft contacted two electric power wires strung about 25 feet above the ground, and the left wing tip glanced against scattered rocks and struck the base of the large tree. The aircraft settled to the ground, slowly rotating to the left, as it skidded approximately 1,000 feet across a hay field, causing disintegration of the left wing panel, flaps and aileron. The aircraft continued to yaw to the left and, after having rotated more than 90 degrees, it plunged through a row of trees and telephone poles lining a road bordering the field, coming to rest in a pasture at a point approximately 150 feet beyond the road and pointing approximately 160 degrees from its original heading at the time of initial impact. Gasoline was spilled from the ruptured tanks and fire broke out consuming the major portion of the wreckage. When local farm workers arrived at the scene approximately one minute after the aircraft had come to rest, Captain Brown was observed walking away from the wreckage and Captain Nilsen was seen lying on the ground to the rear of the trailing edge of the right wing approximately six feet from the fuselage Both pilots were taken to the Reading Hospital where Captain Nilsen died shortly afterward. The remaining four crew members died in the wreckage.