Guatemala

It was determined that the aircraft stalled during initial climb because the passengers seats were not properly allocated, causing the center of gravity to be outside the permissible limit. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The Atlantic Airlines company, at the date of the accident, did not have sufficiently trained administrative and operational personnel for a safe operation.
- The poor allocation of the passengers inside the cabin affected lift, causing the aircraft to stall. Due to its low height, it was impossible to expect a stall recovery. This shows that the aircraft collapsed completely without move on the ground and being destroyed by the weight of the engines and their wings that were full of fuel.
- Lack of crew training, especially the copilot who was not rated on this type of aircraft. Thus, he was not able to assist the captain in an emergency situation but only reading the checklist.
- The engines were operating normal at the time of impact and they were running in normal takeoff conditions.
- No evidence of mechanical failure was found.
- The accident shows that the aircraft was operating normally, but that due to aerodynamic circumstances, it entered a stall and crashed on the ground abruptly and uncontrollably.

Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who landed too far down the runway with an excessive speed, between 1,220 and 1,320 metres past the runway threshold. Runway 29 is 2,767 metres long and it was calculated that the landing distance available was reduced by 1,450 to 1,500 metres. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure while the landing procedure was obviously missed,
- An indicated airspeed (IAS) of the aircraft greater than the specified one, with an increase due to elevation and temperature,
- The initial gradient of the track that requires a vertical speed descent, during leveling, May than usual,
- The flotation of the aircraft during the leveling phase (flare), facilitated by the use of the “CWS” mode of the autopilot (procedure approved by the aircraft flight manual), without corrective action by the Commander,
- A probable tailwind component over which there was no exact information provided by the control tower and that was not monitored by the crew, as it was not in their procedures nor did he feel the need to,
- The failure of the crew to immediately start the braking procedure after touchdown, probably caused by a false visual impression of the crew which was facilitated by their lack of prior experience for the approach and landing on runway 19 at the Aurora Airport with this type of aircraft,
- The runway surface condition,
- A tailwind component.

The crew was approaching the airport under VFR mode in IMC conditions.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew descended below the MDA for unknown reasons.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the descent below the MDA in IMC conditions.