Australia

After takeoff from Merimbula Airport, while climbing, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in the marina of Merimbula. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During a night takeoff from Weipa Airport, the single engine airplane went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest. There were no casualties.

The twin engine airplane departed Carnarvon on an ambulance flight to Mount Augustus to evacuate a sick child. On board were one nurse and one pilot. The approach to Mount Augustus was initiated in limited visibility due to a moonless night and six vehicles were dispatched on the ground with lights on. While turning on final, the airplane was too low, struck trees and crashed. Both occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was flown from Jandakot to Perth at approximately 08:00 hours on 3.5.81. However, the engineer who had agreed to meet the pilot sent a message that he could not attend. At times during the morning, persons observed the aircraft parked at the airport. The engine cowls had been removed and the pilot was seen to be working in the area of the propeller governors. At about 11:00 hours, the pilot started the aircraft's engines, taxied to a clear area and carried out a series of checks" at high power. Then, at 11:09 hours, he contacted Perth Surface Movement Control by radio and requested clearance for an air test at Flight Level 200. This was approved and the aircraft was instructed to taxi to Runway 20. After take-off, the aircraft turned right and tracked to the west on the 270 radial of the VHF omni-directional radio range (VOR), in accordance with departure instructions give n by Perth Tower. When asked for his intentions, the pilot advised that he wished to continue tracking to the west until further notice. Weather conditions in the Perth area were fine; there was no cloud and the surface wind was a light southwesterly. The aircraft as it climbed out appeared to be operating normally , except for a thin smoke trail which was observed coming from the right engine. At 11:19 hours, the pilot advised that his test was completed. He reported he was at 7,000 feet and 10 miles from the airport by distance measuring equipment (DME). During the next five minutes there were a series of routine exchanges between VH-CCW and Perth Tower as the aircraft was cleared to track visually, north of Perth city, to a right base position for Runway 20. During these exchanges the pilot did not indicate that any abnormality or emergency existed and his voice sounded normal. At 11:24 hours, he reported at right base and was cleared to land. The final transmission received from the aircraft was the usual acknowledgement of the landing clearance. The right base position for Runway 20 is over the suburb of Bassendean and local residents are used to aircraft overflying. However, attention was drawn to VH-CCW as it was lower than normal traffic, the engine noise was louder and smoke was trailing from its right engine. Otherwise, it appeared to be operating normally; both propellers were rotating and the landing gear was reported to be retracted. The aircraft had commenced an apparently normal right base turn when it suddenly rolled inverted. The nose of the aircraft may have pitched up just before the sudden roll. The aircraft then began to rotate and rapidly descend. At some stage, it rolled back to the normal upright attitude. After about two turns, the rotation stopped and the aircraft dropped vertically to the ground in the backyard of a private house. The left wing and tailplane struck the roof of the house just prior to ground impact. An intense fire immediately broke out and consumed most of the wreckage. Subsequent examination of the wreckage found no evidence of pre-existing defects or malfunctions, apart from loose attachment nuts on the left side of the propeller governor fitted to the right engine. Oil had leaked from the governor at this position, covering the engine and causing the smoke trail observed by witnesses. Internal inspection of the right engine established that all bearing surfaces were oil-wetted, but it could not be determined how much oil remained in the engine at the time of ground impact as any residual oil had leaked and been consumed by fire. Both engines had been operating at impact. The right engine was at a low power setting, probably idle. The left engine was at a higher power, although the exact power setting could not be determined. The left propeller was at a blade angle consistent with higher power output. The right propeller was at a blade angle outside the normal operating range but consistent with the propeller moving towards the feather position, either as a result of pilot selection or exhaustion of the engine oil supply. It was not possible to determine whether or not the pilot had initiated feathering. The stability augmentation system servo was at the maximum, elevator-down spring tension position. The automatic system would drive the servo to this position when the aircraft was flown at low airspeed. The elevator trim was set at 10 degrees nose-up, also consistent with low-speed flight. The rudder trim was at the full-left rudder position, indicating that the pilot had been operating the aircraft for some time with high power on the left engine and the right engine at a low power setting. The flaps were half extended and the landing gear was down at ground impact. Post-mortem examination found that the pilot had extensive coronary artery disease, such that he may have suffered a sudden incapacitating attack or death. Alternatively, he may have experienced severe chest pain, causing him to unintentionally apply coarse movements to the aircraft controls. The pilot had completed regular medical examinations for the renewal of his pilot's licence, but his condition had not been detected.

The pilot acted as a relief pilot for the Eastern Goldfields Section of the Royal Flying Doctor Service based in Kalgoorlie. On 30 April 1981 he had been rostered as the duty pilot from 1100 hours to 1700 hours. He was advised by the chief pilot soon after 1100 hours that a flight to Jameson and return was required. The flight was planned to include a refuelling stop at Warburton en-route to Jameson. The pilot expressed concern that the flight might not be completed in daylight, but after discussing the problem with the chief pilot, it was concluded that the flight should return to Kalgoorlie about ten minutes before last light. The aircraft subsequently departed Kalgoorlie at 1221 hours, and the flight proceeded uneventfully. However, delays en-route and in refuelling resulted in the aircraft not departing Jameson until 1609 hours. Based on the flight plan time intervals, the expected arrival time at Kalgoorlie was 1844 hours which was an hour after last light. The pilot did not hold the necessary qualification allowing him to operate a multiengined aircraft at night, although he held such a rating for single-engined aircraft. He elected to proceed as planned, and declared the last section of the flight a Mercy Flight. At 1828 hours, when 55 km from Kalgoorlie, the pilot contacted Kalgoorlie Flight Service Unit and received details of the weather, as recorded thirty minutes earlier. This information included an observation of lightning to the west-south-west and a line of thunderstorms from north-west to south of the aerodrome. At 1840 hours, when about 13 km from Kalgoorlie he advised that he would use runway 28. No further communication was heard from the aircraft. Witnesses at Boulder, 4 km east of Kalgoorlie, subsequently reported that a severe squall entered the area shortly before the aircraft was seen turning on to final approach for the runway. The strong wind had generated dust clouds and the aircraft was seen to enter one of these, whilst executing a number of sudden attitude changes. It then collided with a mineshaft headframe. The left wing was torn from the aircraft which then crashed to the ground nearby. A passenger was seriously injured while four other occupants were killed.

Due to industrial action, normal domestic airline services had been suspended. The pilot hired the aircraft to convey persons stranded by the strike between Hobart and Melbourne. He submitted a flight plan for the proposed return flight to Melbourne that nominated operations under the Instrument Flight Rules, although he did not hold an appropriate Instrument Rating. The flight to Melbourne was completed without known incident. After refuelling the aircraft and engaging five passengers, the return flight was commenced. A fare was paid by each passenger although the pilot did not hold either a Charter Licence or an appropriate pilot licence. There was considerable cloud in the vicinity of Hobart Airport which, at 1800 hours, was recorded as one okta stratus, base 800 feet; five oktas stratocumulus, base 3000 feet; five oktas altocumulus, base 11,000 feet. The surface wind was a light westerly, and the runway in use was Runway 30. There were rain showers in the area and the runway was wet. The end of daylight was at approximately 1748 hours. When the pilot of VH-EXQ contacted Hobart Tower at approximately 1800 hours, he reported on descent to 7000 feet and 50km from the airport. As the aircraft proceeded, the Aerodrome Controller cleared it for further descent in stages, to provide vertical separation from a preceding aircraft. The only Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach at Hobart Airport was aligned with Runway 12 and the tailwind for a landing in that direction was only two or three knots. In order to expedite their arrivals, the Aerodrome Controller offered the pilot s of both approaching aircraft the option of a straight-in ILS approach to Runway 12 instead of a circling approach to the into-wind Runway 30. Both pilots accepted. At 1803 hours, the preceding aircraft was cleared for an ILS approach. The pilot of VH-EXQ was then advised to expect the same clearance but, to ensure continued separation from the other aircraft, was instructed to make one circuit of the holding pattern at Tea Tree Locator, a navigational radio aid west of the airport. The pilot misunderstood this instruction and, on reaching Tea Tree at about 1805 hours, he continued towards the airport. At 1807 hours, the Aerodrome Controller cleared VH-EXQ for an ILS approach. The pilot acknowledged this instruction in the normal manner and did not advise that he had already commenced the approach. In descending towards the airport the pilot had maintained a high airspeed of nearly 200 knots. From overhead Tea Tree he could see the lights of the preceding aircraft and endeavoured to reduce his speed so as to maintain separation. As a result, the aircraft was still very high as it approached the runway. This was noted by the Aerodrome Controller and, at 1810 hours, he asked the pilot whether he would be able to land on Runway 12 or would prefer to make an approach for Runway 30. The pilot chose the latter and was cleared to a right base leg for Runway 30. The approach to Runway 12 was abandoned and the aircraft turned left onto a close right downwind leg for Runway 30. The landing gear, which had been extended, and the flaps, which had been set at 1/4 down, were not moved from these positions. The pilot reported that at some stage of the approach to Runway 30 he moved the throttles forward to increase power and maintain height. In response the aircraft yawed slightly to the right. Both propeller levers were then pushed fully forward, both throttles were fully opened and the mixture controls were checked in the full-rich position. The aircraft again swung to the right. Identifying this as evidence that the right engine had failed, and after checking from the tachometer that the right propeller was windmilling at about 1500 RPM, the pilot feathered the right propeller and selected the landing gear and flaps up. He believed that he carried out the feathering action at a height of about 300 feet and an airspeed of about 100 knots. At this time the aircraft was heading southwest, towards Single Hill (elevation 680 feet) on the shore of Frederick Henry Bay. The pilot reported that the aircraft would not maintain height or airspeed and he therefore turned left to avoid the hill. The wings were then held level until the aircraft touched down in the bay. After the aircraft turned right at a close base leg position, but then straightened on a southwesterly heading instead of continuing the turn onto final approach, the Aerodrome Controller asked the pilot to confirm that he was tracking for Runway 30. This transmission was not answered and the Aerodrome Controller again called the aircraft. The pilot then reported that he was having trouble with the right engine and he was going to feather. This transmission was made as the aircraft was approaching Single Hill, just before it turned left and descended from view. There were no further transmissions from the aircraft despite a number of calls by the Aerodrome Controller. The Distress Phase of Search and Rescue (SAR) procedures was declared at 1815 hours. The appropriate emergency services were alerted including a helicopter that was on standby for SAR operations. All six occupants were rescued while the aircraft sank and was lost.

At liftoff, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed on runway. The pilot, sole on board, was injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The operator had undertaken to carry out a ship's crew exchange programme that consisted of transporting 16 persons and their baggage from Portland to Essendon and the same number back to Portland. Similar programmes had been carried out previously and it was known that the passengers usually carried considerable baggage. However, only two Piper PA-31-350 aircraft, VH-POC and VH-RNH, were assigned to the task. Prior to departure Essendon, both pilots attended the Briefing Office and prepared flight plans, intended to operate under the Instrument Flight Rules and the pilots calculated it would be necessary to load 208 minutes fuel for the first return flight to Portland. This included an additional 30 minutes fuel for holding, as was required because of forecast thunderstorm activity, with associated reduced visibility in rain, in the Essendon area. Both pilots elected to have their aircraft refuelled to capacity which, they indicated on their flight plans, would give them a total of 280 minutes endurance; 72 minutes more than required. The aircraft proceeded to Portland without known incident, arriving at about 14:00 hours. After a break for refreshments, the pilots returned to their aircraft at about 1500 hours and carried out pre-flight checks. The passengers arrived at the aerodrome in a number of vehicles. Initially the pilots began to weigh the baggage and record the weights on a manifest. The passengers were in a light-hearted mood, however, and with an atmosphere of some confusion, not all of the baggage was weighed, the manifest was not completed and no individual weights were marked on the bags.The baggage was then transported by trolleys to the aircraft and shared between them without consideration of weight. The baggage in the rear baggage area of the cabin of VH-POC was not restrained to prevent movement. The pilots decided that, by inspection, the average baggage weight per passenger was 20 kg. The accepted standard weight of 77 kg per adult passenger was also assumed. Each pilot then completed a load sheet for his aircraft, on the basis of carrying eight passengers. The sheet for VH-POC indicated that the aircraft fuel load was 290 kg. The total weight calculated for VH-POC was 3,080 kg. This was less than the maximum allowable all-up-weight of 3,178 kg. However, an incorrect aircraft operating weight had been used and an arithmetical error had occurred in the calculation. Correcting for these, the aircraft weight should have been recorded as 3,256 kg. When ready to embark, the passengers were only directed towards the two aircraft. No effort was made to split the party into two even groups and in the event, nine passengers boarded VH-POC. On boarding VH-POC, the pilot did not correct the passenger imbalance. He started both engines and proceeded to taxi for a take-off on Runway 22. Pre-take-off checks were carried out as the aircraft taxied. The weather conditions at the time were fine; visibility 15 km, temperature 22° Celsius, sea level barometric pressure 1007 millibars and surface wind from 210° to 220° magnetic, gusting from 25 to 35 knots. In such wind conditions, and because of the location near a coastal headland, there was significant turbulence present. The pilot of VH-POC had operated into Portland on numerous prior occasions and had experienced this common situation previously. The take-off run was commenced and the pilot reported that full power was obtained from both engines. He stated that at 95 kts the aircraft was rotated and, when a positive rate of climb had been established, the landing gear was retracted. Then, at a height of 60 to 70 feet, just after he had reduced power to the climb setting, the left engine suddenly lost power. Ground witnesses who observed the take-off reported that the aircraft appeared slow to accelerate. Once airborne, it maintained a low climb profile and, at one stage, slewed to the right. Irregular engine noise was heard but it was not identified to a particular engine. The pilot reported that he confirmed a left engine failure by closing the left throttle. On fully re-opening the throttle, however, he noted a slight power response and hence he elected not to shut down the engine and feather the left propeller. Several of the passengers were aware of an abnormal situation but none was aware of the nature of the problem nor could confirm which engine was malfunctioning. They reported that the landing gear audio warning was sounding throughout most of the flight, which indicated a throttle was at or near the closed position. The pilot reported that the aircraft began to lose height and, as a forced landing was imminent, he turned to the right to avoid the sea. Control had been difficult in the gusty conditions but he had managed to reduce speed, lower the landing gear and guide the aircraft to a landing in a reasonably suitable area. The aircraft touched down on undulating-, sandy scrub-covered terrain. The landing gear and engines were torn out and the aircraft came to rest after travelling only some 26 metres. The fuselage broke open near the rear door during the ground slide. Some passengers were able to evacuate the cabin without assistance and they rendered help to the pilot and other passengers. A small fire, which had ignited in the vicinity of the left engine as the aircraft came to rest, then suddenly spread and engulfed the fuselage before the final passenger could be extricated. Subsequent examination of the wreckage was hampered by the extensive fire damage. No pre-existing fault was found in those components that were recovered. An inspection of the left propeller found that it had been feathered at ground impact. It was not possible to establish precisely the aircraft's weight and centre of gravity at the time of the accident as the contents of the nose and engine nacelles baggage compartments were destroyed. The available evidence, however, indicated that the aircraft weighed at least 3400 kg and its centre of gravity was probably beyond the aft limit. Piper PA31-350 performance data indicated that, for a new aircraft, the maximum attainable single-engine rate of climb at the limit weight of 3,178 kg was 220 feet per minute. At a weight of 3,400 kg this would be reduced by about 40 percent to 134 feet per minute. At the higher weight, detracting factors such as aircraft age, turbulence and less than optimum airspeed would have precluded the aircraft from achieving a positive rate of climb. The pilot was briefly interviewed in hospital on 27.1.81. At that time he also submitted a written notification of the accident. Subsequently, he has declined, through industrial counsel, to either attend for an interview under procedures of the Air Safety Investigation Branch or to supply answers to written questions. Hence it has not been possible to fully resolve a number of safety aspects of the accident, such as aircraft loading, the nature of the power loss and subsequent aircraft handling considerations.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in Yass while engaged in a crop spraying mission. The pilot, sole on board, was injured.

Shortly after takeoff from Bankstown Airport, while climbing, the twin engine airplane stalled and crashed in a camping lot. The pilot, sole on board, was injured. There were no injuries on ground.