Australia

While flying over the Snowy Mountains on a cargo flight from Bankstown to Melbourne, the pilot reported icing conditions. Shortly later, the three engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a wooded area. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed. It was later reported that a cold front was coming across the area with low temperatures and icing conditions.

While flying at low height, the single engine airplane struck power cables and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. All occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The aircraft was engaged on the return segment of a flight from Perth to Teutonic Bore, with an intended refuelling stop at Leonora. After embarking the two passengers and their baggage, the pilot started the engines and taxied for a take-off into the north, on the 1350 metre long main strip. The weather conditions were fine with a northerly surface wind of about 7 knots. The initial part of the take-off run was apparently normal but, after travelling some 400 metres and at about the point of rotation, one of the passengers noted an engine power surge. The take-off was continued, the aircraft became airborne and shortly afterwards the landing gear was retracted. After the aircraft had slowly climbed straight ahead to an altitude of about 200-300 feet above ground level, the passenger heard a marked change in the engine noise and felt the aircraft decelerating. The extent of the power loss and the absence of any yawing force indicated both engines had lost power simultaneously. Level flight straight ahead was reportedly maintained for an estimated 10 seconds and then the aircraft entered a descending left turn. At about this time the pilot, in response to a query from the passenger, advised that he intended to return to the airstrip but then stated "we're going down", or words to that effect. The terrain in the area was generally firm and flat. It was lightly covered with scrub and there was occasional small trees but a safe landing with only minimal damage was possible. When VH-KXY struck the ground the gear and flaps were retracted and the rate of descent was high. The aircraft was in a level attitude but yawed approximately 45 degrees to the right. After the initial impact, the aircraft slid across the ground on a track of 220 degrees magnetic for 67 metres before coming to rest. There was no post-impact fire. One passenger was able to exit via the cabin door by his own efforts. The other occupants were trapped in the wreckage and were rescued some 30 minutes later by persons who attended the accident. The pilot died shortly after being removed from the aircraft.

Weather conditions at Esperance were fine; there was no cloud, visibility was in excess of 30 km and the surface wind was from the northwest at 5 to 10 knots. The aircraft entered the circuit on a left downwind leg for an approach to Runway 29. The flaps were lowered, firstly a quarter and then half-way, on the downwind leg and the landing gear was extended just before the aircraft turned onto a base leg. This configuration, and an airspeed of 133 knots (best single - engine rate of climb speed), was maintained until after the aircraft was straightened onto final approach. At an altitude of 1100 feet, the pilot considered he was at Decision Height and committed to land. He lowered full flaps and reduced the airspeed to 115 knots. At about this time, as he was retarding the power levers, the right engine flamed out. The pilot reported that he promptly sensed the engine failure and checked the engine instruments while re-opening both power levers. He noted both torque and fuel flow indication s for the right engine were zero. He briefly considered retracting the landing gear and flaps but decided to do neither. Left engine power was increased initially to the maximum available of 940°C ITT (Inter-turbine temperature) and then adjusted to the normal maximum limit of 923°C ITT. The right propeller was feathered. During this period the aircraft banked to the right and turned away from the runway. Its airspeed had reduced and the rate of descent increased. The turn had been opposed but the pilot found that the application of full left rudder and aileron would not enable him to maintain runway heading, although the airspeed was above the minimum control airspeed of 94 knots, specified in the aircraft flight manual. It was evident to the pilot that the aircraft would land short of the aerodrome, amongst trees to the right of the runway approach path. He therefore abandoned his efforts to regain the normal approach path and allowed the aircraft to turn further to the right, towards a large, clear paddock. Just before touchdown, he observed a power pole on his selected landing path and he again turned further right to avoid it. During this turn the right wing tip struck the ground. The nosegear then impacted heavily and collapsed . The aircraft slid and bounced across the ground for 188 metres before coming to rest. Fuel from ruptured line s ignite d under the left engine , but the fire was slow to develop and the occupants were able to make an orderly evacuation . By the time the fire brigade arrived from Esperance township, the fire had spread and most of the aircraft was consumed.

Crashed on takeoff for unknown reasons. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was engaged in a positioning flight.

The aircraft was engaged in a scheduled service, designated Flight DR 4210, from Sydney to Temora and Condobolin, within the State of New South Wales. The scheduled departure time was 1845 hours. At 1844 hours the pilot of VH-AAV contacted Sydney Airport Clearance Delivery by radio and requested his airways clearance. The airways clearance issued was a Standard Instrument Departure (SID), titled '25 Katoomba Two'. That SID specified that radar headings would be assigned after take-off from Runway 25. The pilot correctly acknowledged the airways clearance. At 1848 hours the pilot contacted Sydney Ground Control and requested clearance to· taxi. This was granted and the aircraft was taxied to the holding point for Runway 25. The pilot reported to Sydney Aerodrome Control at 1858 hours that he was ready for take-off. Due to other traffic. the aircraft was not cleared to line up until 1906 hours. VH-AAV then entered Runway 25 and stopped about 50 metres from the threshold. At 1907 hours VH-AAV was cleared to 'maintain runway heading, maintain 3000 (feet), clear for take-off. This was correctly acknowledged and VH-AAV commenced takeoff. The aircraft became airborne and crossed the intersection with Runway 16/34, at a height of about 100 feet above ground level (AGL) at 1908:19 hours. The landing gear was retracted. Observers then noted the aircraft level off at about 150 feet AGL and commence a shallow banked turn to the left. As this was contrary to the departure instructions, Aerodrome Control was about to query the pilot when, at 1908:33 hours. he advised: ' ... we've lost er, the left engine. Request landing, ah, landing on runway three four immediately please.' This was acknowledged and Aerodrome Control cleared VH-AAV for a visual approach to a left base for Runway 34. During these transmissions, VH-AAV continued its left turn through approximately 90 degrees, onto a southerly heading. It had maintained a height of about 150 feet AGL and the left propeller was probably in the process of feathering. At 1908:44 hours, Aerodrome Control queried' ... do you have the seven two seven in sight on short final.' At 1908:49 hours, the pilot of VH-AAV replied, 'Affirmative'. The other aircraft referred to by Aerodrome Control was an Ansett Airlines of Australia Boeing 727, VH-RMO, which was on approach for Runway 34. Shortly after passing over the shore of Botany Bay, VH-AAV entered a steady descent and then levelled off just above the water. The left turn was continued and the aircraft converged towards the western side of the sea wall enclosing the extension of Runway 16/34. At 1908:50 hours, Aerodrome Control asked,' ... will your approach and landing be normal.' The reply, eight seconds later, was 'Alpha Alpha Victor negative'. At 1909:08 hours, Aerodrome Control activated the crash alarm system. In addition, VH-RMO was directed' ... go around, correction, st ... stay on the runway and expedite. We have a landing, er, right behind you ... one engine out.' The initial direction was made prior to visually assessing the Boeing ?27's situation, but when, during the transmission, it was noted that the aircraft was on the ground and well established in its landing roll sequence, the 'expedite' instruction was substituted. At 1909:20 hours, Aerodrome Control cleared VH-AAV to land. This was not acknowledged. The final segment of the flight was at an extremely low altitude and in a nose-high attitude. The right propeller, on at least one occasion, probably contacted the water and the tail either furrowed the water or induced a wake. VH-AAV struck the sea wall in a nose-up attitude, banking to the left and skidding to the right. The left wing of the aircraft disintegrated. The resultant fuel spillage ignited and a 'fire ball' explosion occurred. The right engine and the outboard section or the right wing both separated and were thrown across the ground adjacent to the runway. The remainder of the aircraft bounced over the sea wall, landed inverted on a taxiway and slid backwards. The accident occurred in daylight at 1909:22 hours. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 13 occupants were killed.

Crashed in unknown circumstances while engaged in a crop spraying mission. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Point Cook Airport on a local flight, while climbing, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

While completing a local topdressing flight, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed in a field. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. It seems that the aircraft was working and part-way through an agricultural procedure turn, pulling probably 2G+ as normal, when the fin attachment bolts failed. The investigation concluded that apparently the fin and rudder had rolled through about 90 degrees and rested (horizontally) on the tailplane and elevator. The pilot would have been immediately deprived of vertical and directional control at that instant. Being at low altitude, there would have been no means of recovering, even if some vertical control could have been achieved. The wreckage was beyond economic repair and the aircraft was written off at that time. However, the investigation did lead to fleet-wide inspection of all fin attachment bolts and some worn/cracked bolts were revealed. An Airworthiness Directive was immediately issued and all the DHC-2 Beavers were grounded until the inspections and bolt replacements had been completed. While the Beaver was built as a rugged bush aircraft, it was subjected to repeated overload operations from rough agricultural airstrips and subjected to high aerodynamic G forces in every day of agricultural operations.
Source: Geoff Goodall.

During the morning of August 9, 1979, the aircraft was refuelled to capacity and three drums, each with a capacity of 20 litres, were also filled with fuel and placed in the baggage compartment. The aircraft, loaded with freight, subsequently departed Essendon at 1335 hours and proceeded to Cambridge where it arrived at 1536 hours. The freight was unloaded and, at 1621 hours, the aircraft departed for Launceston where it arrived at 1653 hours. It was again loaded with freight and departed Launceston at 1720 hours bound for Flinders Island. The aircraft landed at Flinders Island several minutes after the end of daylight, which was at 1745 hours, and the freight was unloaded. On the following day, the aircraft was again loaded with freight and the pilot subsequently reported departure from Flinders Island at 1329 hours, bound for Essendon. The take-off run was observed to be longer than usual for this type of aircraft and its rate of climb appeared to be less than normal. The IFR flight plan notified by the pilot before departure indicated his intention to cruise at an altitude of 4500 feet but, at 1410 hours, he reported to Melbourne Flight Service Unit "request traffic for a descent to proceed VFE we're getting 50 knot head wind here". On being advised that there was no traffic information, the pilot reported leaving 4500 feet. At 1502 hours, the pilot established communication with Essendon Tower, reported approaching Channel 0 at 1500 feet, and "request expedite clearance". He was issued with a clearance to enter controlled airspace at 1500 feet tracking from Channel 0 to Essendon via Clifton Hill. At 1506 hours he reported at Clifton Hill and, at 1507:38 hours, he advised "I'm sorry have a Mayday appear to have a fuel problem we'll have to land on a golf course". On being asked "which golf course?, the pilot replied "oh right where we are now". No further communications were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was observed by witnesses in the Northcote area initially on a north-westerly heading towards Essendon. E was seen to be descending and the sound of the engines was not normal. After flying over the northern section of the Northcote Municipal Golf Course, the aircraft commenced a descending left turn and [passed over a power transmission line which ran in a north-south direction near the western boundary of the golf course. As the turn continued towards an easterly heading, the aircraft again passed over the power line, at a very low height, and in strong tail wind conditions struck trees bordering a fairway while in a slightly left wing down, nose down, attitude. It struck the ground heavily just beyond the trees and the main wreckage travelled a further 73 metres before it came to rest on the edge of a green in the south-eastern corner of the golf course. Detailed examination of the wreckage of the aircraft revealed no evidence of any defect or malfunction which may have contributed to the accident. There was no significant fuel in the fuel systems of the two engines and there was negligible fuel in those cells of the fuel storage system which were undamaged. There was no fire. The pilot was in full time employment as an airline captain with a major operator. He was also involved financially and managerially in Norfish Pty. Ltd. and both he and the Company had financial difficulties at that time. The flight plan submitted by the pilot before departure from Essendon on August 9 contained false names in respect of both the pilot and the operator. Neither the pilot nor Norfish Pty Ltd held a Charter or Aerial Work Licence. The maximum specified take-off weight for the aircraft was 3357 kg. for VFR operations and 3243 kg. for IFR operations. It has been calculated that the gross weight of the aircraft was 3775 kg. when it departed Essendon for Cambridge on 9.8.79 and 3746 kg. when it departed Launceston for Flinders Island on the same day. The calculated gross weight was 4061 kg. when it departed Flinders Island on the day of the accident. Although fuel was available at Cambridge and Launceston, the aircraft was not refuelled after it 'departed from Essendon. The three 20 litre drums were located in the aircraft wreckage and, although all were damaged, detailed examination indicated that they ruptured under the action of hydraulic shock and that they wert filled at the time of the accident. The total operating time of the aircraft from departure Essendon until the time of the accident was consistent with a fuel endurance which could be expected in the circumstances leading to this accident.