Springfield

Before departure, the pilot performed fuel calculations and determined that he had enough fuel to fly to the intended destination. While enroute the pilot flew around thunderstorms. On arrival at his destination, the pilot executed the instrument landing system approach for runway 16. While on short final the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot switched the fuel flow from the right tank to the left tank. The left engine then experienced a total loss of power and the pilot made an emergency landing on a road. The airplane received substantial damage to the wings and fuselage when it struck a tree. A postaccident examination revealed only a few gallons of unusable fuel in the left fuel tank. The right fuel tank was breached during the accident sequence but no fuel smell was noticed. The pilot performed another fuel calculation after the accident and determined that there were actually 170 gallons of fuel onboard, not 230 gallons like he originally figured. He reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation and determined that he exhausted his entire fuel supply.

After takeoff, the pilot received progressive altitude clearances to FL200. While cruising at FL200, he reported 'moderate chop.' At about 1025 cdt, he requested and received clearance to FL220. About 3 minutes later, he inquired about cloud tops and said he was 'in a layer right now at about flight level 200 to 210.' Soon thereafter, the aircraft began altitude deviations and went above the assigned altitude of FL220 (22,000 feet). It then descended to about 20,500 feet, where it pitched up to an altitude of about 23,000 feet. The aircraft then went into a steep descent. Subsequently, an in-flight breakup of the aircraft occurred at about the time it emerged from the clouds near the 2,000 feet level. Pieces of wreckage were found over a wide area. The left wing was found about 0.2 mile from the fuselage; pieces of the rudder and stabilizers were found about 100 yards from the fuselage. An exam of the fractures on major structural components revealed features typical of overstress separation. No preexisting cracks were found. An area forecast had flight predictions for IFR, thunderstorms, icing in the vicinity of convective activity. The pitot heat switch was found in the 'off' position. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot received a weather briefing before starting a night cargo operation in known icing conditions. Before the flight, a line serviceman noticed ice on the aircraft's wings and suggested its removal, but the pilot declined. Approximately 45 minutes after takeoff, the pilot reported to ARTCC that a de-ice boot had 'blown' and he was having difficulty controlling the aircraft. He said the boot was 'going back and forth' and that full right aileron was required to keep the wings level. Also, he reported a continuous loss of altitude and said that full right aileron would not keep the aircraft from turning to the left. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on descending terrain while in a slightly nose down, left wing low attitude. Much of the aircraft (including much of the left wing) was demolished by impact and fire. Prop slash marks indicated the engines were providing power. Maintenance records had no information of replacement, repair or modification of the de-ice boots in the previous 10 years. The pilot's wife indicated he had previously been pressured to fly aircraft with discrepancies. Sigmets golf 3 and 4 warned of occasional severe mixed icing in clouds and precipitations. Both occupants were killed.

A company designated instructor and two f/o trainees were conducting a far 135 training flight. The third approach was terminated with a go-around initiated over the runway threshold at about 50 feet. After climbing to about 150 feet, the aircraft was observed to oscillate in yaw, followed by pitch, and then roll to the right. The aircraft impacted in a near-vertical descent attitude. The investigation revealed that the right engine was operating, but at reduced power. The left engine was at full power. There was no indication of aircraft system malfunction or failure. Company pilots indicated that the captain had a history of demeaning cockpit behavior and roughness with students. The f/o, was small in stature and had 100 hours of multi-engine time and no turboprop time. Company pilots reported the f/o trainee was consistently behind the aircraft in prior flights. Examination of the aircraft revealed the flaps in the retracted position contrary to aircraft handbook. Company pilots further indicated the captain had history of requiring low altitude 1-engine go arounds and delaying offers of assistance to students. All three crew members were killed.

Flight 710 departed Chicago, IL for a flight to Carbondale, IL via Springfield, IL. The flight was about 45 minutes behind schedule when it arrived at Springfield, about 20:05. At 20:11, the flightcrew were provided with the latest Carbondale weather: ceiling and visibility were 2,000 feet overcast and 2 miles, respectively, with light rain and fog. The crew then requested its IFR clearance, with 5,000 feet for its en route altitude. At 20:16, Flight 710 was cleared to taxi to runway 15 for takeoff. The aircraft took off at 20:20 and climbed to cruising altitude. At 20:21:34, Flight 710 informed the departure controller that it had experienced a "slight electrical problem..." and that it would keep the controller "advised." The flight then requested and was cleared to maintain 3,000 feet. At 20:23:54, the first officer told the captain that "the left (generator) is totally dead, the right (generator) is putting out voltage but I can't get a load on it." At 20:24:26, the first officer reported, "zero voltage and amps (amperes) on the left side, the right (generator) is putting out twenty-seven and a half (volts) but I can't get it to come on the line." The battery voltage further dropped to 22 volts. The crew a.o. shut off excess cabin lights because of the electrical problem. About 20:38, the first officer mistakenly isolated the right generator and right generator bus bar from the aircraft's dc electrical distribution system. Radio contact was lost when the flight was requested to change radio frequencies. At 20:52 the captain decided to descend to 2,400 feet and the voltage had further dropped to 13 volts. The aircraft continued to descend and struck the ground in an open pasture area.

During the takeoff roll at Cedar Rapids Airport, the crew lost control of the aircraft that ground looped, swerved and crashed in flames. Both pilots were killed.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a night cargo flight from Cedar Rapids to Springfield with an intermediate stop in Memphis. Cleared by ATC to align on runway for takeoff, the pilot increased engine power and entered the runway when the aircraft was struck by a Federal Express (FedEx) Dassault Falcon 20 registered N36FE that just landed on the same runway. The right wing of the Falcon struck the Beechcraft that caught fire instantly. The crew of the Falcon 20 was able to stop normally and the aircraft was slightly damaged. The Beech 18 was destroyed by fire and its pilot evacuated with minor injuries.

Few minutes after a night takeoff from Brownsville Airport, while climbing in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in flames three miles from the airfield. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was en route to Springfield, Missouri, on a cargo flight.

In the morning, the four engine airplane departed Alameda NAS, California, for Wilmington, with an intermediate stop in Indianapolis, carrying cargo on behalf of the US Air Force. While cruising over Colorado, the crew modified his route to avoid a thunderstorm area. Few minutes later, while cruising in better weather conditions, the left wing detached by section 162. The aircraft rolled and yawed sharply and after the left wing completely failed, the right wing failed outboard of the n°4 engine. Out of control, the airplane entered a dive and crashed in an open field. All four crew members were killed.

Flight 476 of August 4 was a scheduled operation between Tulsa, Oklahoma, and La Guardia Field, New York, with several intermediate stops including Joplin, Springfield, and St. Louis, Missouri. The flight departed Tulsa at 1006 (one minute behind schedule) with Captain Hugh C. Barren, First Officer William G. Gates, and Stewardess Thelma R. Ballard as crew. En route stops were made at Joplin and Springfield, and no discrepancies were reported or noted at either point. However, a traffic delay in the Joplin area resulted in the flight arriving and departing Springfield 21 minutes behind schedule. Two of the eight passengers deplaned at Springfield, 21 passengers boarded the flight there. Gross weight of the aircraft at takeoff was 38,663 pounds, 2,302 pounds under that allowable, and the center of gravity was located within prescribed limits. Flight 476 departed Springfield VFR for St. Louis, its next scheduled stop, at 1153 via Victor Airway 14 to cruise at 7,000 feet. It was off the ground at 1156. Twenty-one minutes later (1217) the crew initiated a general call asking, "Does anyone read 476?" Springfield company radio acknowledged but received no reply. Two other American Airlines flights, one cruising in the vicinity of Springfield at 7,000 feet, the other 30 miles north-northeast of St. Louis, heard a transmission from Flight 476 that No. 2 engine was on fire. This message was also heard by American's ground station at St. Louis. Three minutes later the American flight in the Springfield area intercepted the following message, "Springfield, are you reading 476? We have bad engine fire." This was the last message heard from the flight. All transmissions were on company frequency. During this interval numerous witnesses on the ground back along the flight path saw the aircraft with smoke and flame coming from the right engine. The aircraft was also tracked by a military radar installation near Springfield until it disappeared from the scope in the vicinity of Fort Leonard Wood. At approximately 1222 the operations officer on duty at Forney Field, Fort Leonard Wood, received a radio message from an Army pilot flying nearby that a two-engine aircraft with a fire in the right engine was on final approach to runway 14. The tower operator at Forney Field saw the approaching aircraft and gave it clearance to land. Before the operations officer could alert the crash crew another call from the Army pilot informed him that the airplane had crashed short of the runway. The time was 1223. Army personnel with portable fire-fighting equipment reached the wreckage on foot. There were no survivors. Heavy fire-fighting equipment and ambulances could not reach the scene until the Army engineers had bulldozed a road through the densely wooded area in which the crash occurred.