Brownsville-South Padre Island

The pilots reported that, during the approach, the main hydraulic system lost pressure. They selected the auxiliary hydraulic system "on," continued the approach, and extended the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. During the landing roll, about two-thirds down the runway, the pilots noticed that the brakes were not working normally and then turned onto a taxiway to clear the runway. The captain reported that, once on the taxiway, he was unable to stop or steer the airplane as it proceeded across a parallel runway and into an adjacent field where it subsequently struck a metal beam. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed brake system continuity with the cockpit controls. The tires, brake assemblies, and brake pads were intact and undamaged. The hydraulic lines from the hydraulic pump to the wheel brakes were intact. No hydraulic fluid was observed leaking on the exterior or interior portions of the airplane. The hydraulic fluid reservoir was found about 1/4 full. Further, testing of the two hydraulic pumps revealed that they were both functional, and no mechanical failures or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted. The airplane's hydraulic system failure emergency procedures state that, if hydraulic pressure is lost, the electrically driven hydraulic pump should be reset and that, if the hydraulic pressure was not restored, that the primary hydraulic system should be disengaged and the landing gear should be lowered using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. After the gear is extended, the auxiliary hydraulic system should be selected "on" for landing. However, the pilots stated that they did not attempt to reset the electric hydraulic pump and that they performed the emergency landing gear extension procedures with the auxiliary hydraulic pump engaged. It is likely that the pilots' failure to select the auxiliary hydraulic system "off" before extending the landing gear caused the hydraulic pressure in the auxiliary system to dissipate, which left only the emergency brake accumulator available for braking during the landing. The number of emergency brake applications that can be made by the pilots depends on the accumulator charge, which may be depleted in a very short time. The airplane's emergency braking procedures state that, as soon as the airplane is safely stopped, the pilots should request towing assistance. However, the pilots did not stop the airplane on the runway despite having about 3,900 ft of runway remaining; instead, they turned off the runway at an intersection, which resulted in a loss of directional control.

Witnesses observed the aircraft departing from runway 14 with a rolling start. They said the aircraft rotated at the departure end of the runway and remained in ground effect with an excessive, nose high attitude. It then struck the airport perimeter fence, a barrier wall, and power lines. Power line wires were dragged through a residential area, resulting in additional damage. The airplane then crashed in a pasture and burned. Investigation revealed the airplane had been loaded to a gross weight (GW) of 50,870 lbs. Its maximum GW was limited to 48,000 lbs at sea level with the use of antidetonation injection (ADI) fluid and 40,900 lbs without ADI. Density altitude at the airport was 6200 feet. For conditions at the airport, maximum GW for takeoff with ADI and 15° of flaps was 43,205 lbs; without ADI and with 13 degrees of flaps, maximum GW was 38,909 lbs. The airplane flaps were found in the retracted position, but there was no performance data for takeoff with the flaps retracted. No ADI fluid was found in the line to the right engine, although it was intact; the ADI tank was destroyed; the ADI line to the left engine was damaged. The airplane was being flown under provision of a ferry permit, which did not provide for the cargo or the two passengers that were aboard. The first pilot (PIC) had accrued about 8 hours of flight experience in the make and model of airplane.

The newly hired corporate pilot starved the right engine of fuel on the multi-engine airplane while on a local area self checkout in the airplane. He did not feather the right propeller. At the time of the non-mechanical loss of power, the airplane was in low level (600 feet agl) cruise. The pilot lowered the flaps to 45° and extended the landing gear to the down and locked position. The airplane's airspeed decreased below vmc and the airplane stalled, went out of control, and impacted open ranch land nose low, in a vertical descent angle. A post-impact fire occurred. The pilot lacked knowledge of the airplane systems and lacked experience in the Cessna 421. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot had just taken off at night on a flight to Mexico when he declared an intent to return and land with some unspecified emergency. While he was using his radio, the sound of both engines, running at high power, was audible. When asked if he required assistance, he gave an affirmative reply, but when asked if he required a crash crew, he gave a negative reply. Shortly after that, the aircraft collided with power lines about 1 mile from the runway, then impacted the ground and was demolished by fire. Impact with the power lines occurred at about 55 feet agl. A wire impact mark on the nose door indicated the aircraft was in a vertical bank when the collision occurred. An exam of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a preimpact/mechanical malfunction or failure; however, there was extensive damage from fire. There was evidence that the aircraft was loaded beyond its max certificated gross weight. The pilot had a temporary US license based on his canadian license. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Few minutes after a night takeoff from Brownsville Airport, while climbing in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in flames three miles from the airfield. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was en route to Springfield, Missouri, on a cargo flight.