Cairo-Intl

The aircraft departed Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 2321LT on May 18 on an international schedule flight to Cairo. carrying 56 passengers and 10 crew members. The crew maintained radio contacts with the Greek ATC and was transferred to the Egyptian ATC but failed to respond. Two minutes after the airplane left the Greek Airspace, the aircraft descended from FL370 to FL220 in few seconds, apparently making a first turn to the left and then a 360 turn to the right before disappearing from the radar screen at 0229LT while at an altitude of 10'000 feet. It is believed that the aircraft crashed in the Mediterranean sea about 200 km north of Egyptian coast. The crew did not send any mayday message, thereby all assumptions remains open. It appears that some various debris such as luggage were found on May 20 about 290-300 km north of Alexandria. Two days after the accident, it is confirmed that ACARS messages reported smoke on board, apparently in the lavatory and also in a technical compartment located under the cockpit area. Above that, several technical issues were reported by the ACARS system. The CVR has been recovered on June 16, 2016, and the DFDR a day later. As both recorder systems are badly damaged, they will need to be repaired before analyzing any datas. On December 15, 2016, investigators reported that traces of explosives were found on several victims. Egyptian Authorities determined that there had been a malicious act. The formal investigation per ICAO Annex 13 was stopped and further investigation fell within the sole jurisdiction of the judicial authorities. Contradicting the Egyptian finding, the French BEA considered that the most likely hypothesis was that a fire broke out in the cockpit while the aircraft was flying at its cruise altitude and that the fire spread rapidly resulting in the loss of control of the aircraft.

The crew was performing a cargo flight from Ostend to Mogadishu with an intermediate stop in Cairo with perishable goods on board on behalf of the AMISOM, the African Mission in Somalia. The final approach to Mogadishu-Aden Abdulle International Airport was performed by night. As the crew was unable to localize the runway, he abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. A second attempt was also interrupted and the crew initiated a new go-around then continued towards the north of the capital city. Eventually, the captain decided to attempt an emergency belly landing near Afgooye, about 25 km northwest of Mogadishu. Upon landing, the aircraft lost its both engines and came to rest in the bush. Two crew members were taken to hospital while four others were uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. According to Somalian Authorities, the International Airport of Mogadishu is open to traffic from 0600LT till 1800LT. For undetermined reason, the crew started the descent while the airport was already closed to all traffic (sunset at 1747LT). Also, an emergency landing was unavoidable, probably due to a fuel exhaustion. It is unknown why the crew did not divert to the alternate airport.

On July 29, 2011, the said Boeing 777-200, Egyptian registration SU-GBP, operated by EgyptAir, arrived from Madina, Saudi Arabia (Flight No 678) and stopped at Gate F7, terminal 3, Cairo international airport almost at 0500 UTC time. Necessary maintenance actions (After Landing Check ALC, Transit Check) have been performed by EgyptAir engineers and technicians, to prepare the aircraft for the following scheduled flight (Cairo/Jeddah, scheduled at 0730 UTC, same day 29 July 2011, flight number 667). The cockpit crew (Captain and F/O) for the event flight (Cairo/Jeddah), started the cockpit preparation including checking the cockpit crew oxygen system as per normal procedures. The F/O reported that the oxygen pressure was within normal range (730 psi). At almost 0711 UTC, and while waiting for the last passengers to board the aircraft, the F/O officer reported that a pop, hissing sound originating from the right side of his seat was heard, associated with fire and smoke coming from the right side console area below F/O window #3 (right hand lower portion of the cockpit area) [The aircraft was still preparing for departure at Gate F7, Terminal 3 at Cairo Airport at the time the crew detected the fire]. The Captain requested the F/O to leave the cockpit immediately and notify for cockpit fire. The captain used the cockpit fire extinguisher bottle located behind his seat in attempt to fight and extinguish the fire. The attempt was unsuccessful, the fire continued in the cockpit. The F/O left the cockpit, he asked the cabin crew to deplane all the passengers and crew from the aircraft, based on captain’s order. He moved to the stairs and then underneath the aircraft in attempt to find anyone with a radio unit but he could not. He returned to the service road in front of the aircraft and stopped one car and asked the person in the car to notify the fire department that the aircraft is burning on the stand F7 using his radio unit. The cabin crew deplaned the passengers using the two doors 1L and 2L. The passenger bridge was still connected to the entry doors that were used for deplaning. The first fire brigade arrived to the aircraft after three minutes. The fire was extinguished. Extinguishing actions and cooling of the aircraft were terminated at 0845 UTC (1045 Cairo local time). The aircraft experienced major damage resulting from the fire and smoke. Passengers deplaned safely, some (passengers, employees) suffered mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation. Passengers and crew were as follows: Passengers 307, Cockpit Crew 2, Cabin Crew 8.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Cairo to Jeddah. During the takeoff roll, the engine n°4 experienced an uncontained failure. The takeoff procedure was rejected and the aircraft came to a halt and later transferred to a hangar. All 22 crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Cairo-Intl Airport in the morning on a training flight to Port Said. Following four successful touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew completed a 5th circuit. On approach, the aircraft apparently caught fire (engine explosion?), lost height and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

During a night takeoff from Cairo-Intl Airport runway 23L, the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the right and came to rest few hundred metres further with both right engines n°3 & 4 torn off. All seven occupants escaped uninjured.

Following a night takeoff from runway 22R at Sharm el Sheikh-Ophira Airport, the plane climbed and maneuvered for a procedural left turn to intercept the 306 radial from the Sharm el Sheikh VOR station. When the autopilot was engaged the captain made an exclamation and the autopilot was immediately switched off again. The captain then requested Heading Select to be engaged. The plane then began to bank to the right. The copilot then warned the captain a few times about the fact that the bank angle was increasing. At a bank angle of 40° to the right the captain stated "OK come out". The ailerons returned briefly to neutral before additional aileron movements commanded an increase in the right bank. The aircraft had reached a maximum altitude of 5,460 feet with a 50° bank when the copilot stated 'overbank'. Repeating himself as the bank angle kept increasing. The maximum bank angle recorded was 111° right. Pitch attitude at that time was 43° nose down and altitude was 3,470 feet. The observer on the flight deck, a trainee copilot, called 'retard power, retard power, retard power'. Both throttles were moved to idle and the airplane gently seemed to recover from the nose-down, right bank attitude. Speed however increased, causing an overspeed warning. At 04:45 the airplane struck the surface of the water in a 24° right bank, 24° nose-down, at a speed of 416 kts and with a 3,9 G load. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris sank by a depth of 900 metres. All 148 occupants were killed, among them 133 French citizens, one Moroccan, one Japanese and 13 Egyptian (all crew members, among them six who should disembark at Cairo). Weather at the time of accident was good with excellent visibility, outside temperature of 17° C and light wind. On January 17, the FDR was found at a depth of 1,020 metres and the CVR was found a day later at a depth of 1,050 metres.

The aircraft departed Cairo-Intl Airport at 1140LT on a regular schedule flight to Tunis-Carthage Airport with 56 passengers and six crew members on board. It entered the Tunis FIR at 1450LT, under control of the Tunis Regional CCR. After being transferred to the approach control at 1500LT, the crew was cleared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 11. On approach at 3,000 feet, the crew was informed he was number one for landing. The crew informed ATC that he departed 3,000 feet for 2,100 feet at 12 NM and wa later cleared to land. Wind was from 130 at 30 knots. At 1516LT, on final, the crew was transferred from the approach control to the tower and received a second clearance to land. In limited visibility, the aircraft struck a fence located on the top of a mountain and crashed in hilly terrain 6,6 km from the runway 11 threshold. Three crew members and 11 passengers were killed while 48 other people were injured. On board were 33 Egyptians including the six crew members, 16 Tunisians, three Algerians, three Jordans, two Chinese, two British, one Libyan, one Saudi and one Palestinian.

On 23 August 2000, at about 1930 local time, Gulf Air flight GF072, an Airbus A320-212, a Sultanate of Oman registered aircraft A4O-EK, crashed at sea at about 3 miles north-east of Bahrain International Airport. GF072 departed from Cairo International Airport, Egypt, with two pilots, six cabin crew and 135 passengers on board for Bahrain International Airport, Muharraq, Kingdom of Bahrain. GF072 was operating a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the provisions of the Sultanate of Oman Civil Aviation Regulations Part 121 and was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. GF072 was cleared for a VOR/DME approach for Runway 12 at Bahrain. At about one nautical mile from the touch down and at an altitude of about 600 feet, the flight crew requested for a left hand orbit, which was approved by the air traffic control (ATC). Having flown the orbit beyond the extended centreline on a south-westerly heading, the captain decided to go-around. Observing the manoeuvre, the ATC offered the radar vectors, which the flight crew accepted. GF072 initiated a go-around, applied take-off/go-around thrust, and crossed the runway on a north-easterly heading with a shallow climb to about 1000 feet. As the aircraft rapidly accelerated, the master warning sounded for flap over-speed. A perceptual study, carried out as part of the investigation, indicated that during the go-around the flight crew probably experienced a form of spatial disorientation, which could have caused the captain to falsely perceive that the aircraft was ‘pitching up’. He responded by making a ‘nose-down’ input, and, as a result, the aircraft commenced to descend. The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) voice alarm sounded: “whoop, whoop pull-up …”. The GPWS warning was repeated every second for nine seconds, until the aircraft impacted the shallow sea. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces, and all 143 persons on board were killed.

EgyptAir Flight 990 departed Los Angeles International Airport, destined for Cairo, with a scheduled intermediate stop at New York-JFK. The aircraft landed at JFK about 23:48 EDT and arrived at the gate about 00:10 EDT. Two designated flight crews (each crew consisting of a captain and first officer) boarded the aircraft at JFK. The aircraft taxied to runway 22R and was cleared for takeoff at 01:19. Shortly after liftoff, the pilots of EgyptAir flight 990 contacted New York Terminal Radar Approach (and departure) Control (TRACON). New York TRACON issued a series of climb instructions and, at 01:26, instructed the flight to climb to FL230 and contact New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). At 01:35, New York ARTCC instructed EgyptAir flight 990 to climb to FL330 and proceed directly to DOVEY intersection. About 01:40 the relief first officer suggested that he relieve the command first officer at the controls. The command first officer agreed and left the flightdeck. The airplane leveled at FL330 four minutes later. At 01:48, the command captain decided to go to the toilet and left the flightdeck. At 01:48:30, about 11 seconds after the captain left the cockpit, the CVR recorded an unintelligible comment. Ten seconds later, the relief first officer stated quietly, "I rely on God." There were no sounds or events recorded by the flight recorders that would indicate that an airplane anomaly or other unusual circumstance preceded the relief first officer's statement. At 01:49:18, the CVR recorded the sound of an electric seat motor and 27 seconds later the autopilot was disconnected. At 01:49:48, the relief first officer again stated quietly, "I rely on God." At 01:49:53, the throttle levers were moved from their cruise power setting to idle, and, one second later, the FDR recorded an abrupt nose-down elevator movement and a very slight movement of the inboard ailerons. Subsequently, the airplane began to rapidly pitch nose down and descend. Between 0149:57 and 0150:05, the relief first officer quietly repeated, "I rely on God," seven additional times. During this time, as a result of the nose-down elevator movement, the airplane's load factor decreased from about 1 to about 0.2 G (almost weightlessness). Then the elevators started moving further in the nose-down direction. Immediately thereafter the captain entered the flightdeck and asked loudly, "What's happening? What's happening?". As he airplane's load factor reached negative G loads (about -0.2 G) the relief first officer stated for the tenth time, "I rely on God." At 01:50:08, as the airplane exceeded its maximum operating airspeed (0.86 Mach), a master warning alarm began to sound and the relief first officer stated quietly for the eleventh and final time, "I rely on God," and the captain repeated his question, "What's happening?" At 0150:15, as the airplane was descending through about 27,300 feet the airplane's rate of descent began to decrease. About 6 seconds later the left and right elevator surfaces began to move in opposite directions. The engine start lever switches for both engines then moved from the run to the cutoff position. At 01:50:24 the throttle levers started to move from their idle position to full throttle, and the speedbrake handle moved to its fully deployed position. The captain again asked "What is this? What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?" At 01:50:26, the captain stated, "Get away in the engines ... shut the engines". The relief first officer replied "It's shut". Between 01:50:31 and 01:50:37, the captain repeatedly stated, "Pull with me." However, the elevator surfaces remained in a split condition (with the left surface commanding nose up and the right surface commanding nose down) until the FDR and CVR stopped recording. at 0150:36.64 and 0150:38.47, respectively. The height estimates based on primary radar data from the joint use FAA/U.S. Air Force (USAF) radar sites indicated that the airplane's descent stopped about 01:50:38 and that the airplane subsequently climbed to about 25,000 feet msl and changed heading from 80º to 140º before it started a second descent, which continued until the airplane impacted the ocean.