Sharm el-Sheikh | Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives

Crash of an Airbus A321-231 near Hasna: 224 killed

Date & Time: Oct 31, 2015 at 0613 LT

Type of aircraft:

Airbus A321

Operator:

Registration:

EI-ETJ

Flight Phase:

Flight

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Site:

Desert

Schedule:

Sharm el-Sheikh - Saint Petersburg

MSN:

663

YOM:

1997

Flight number:

KGL9268

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

217

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

224

Captain / Total flying hours:

12000

Captain / Total hours on type:

3800.00

Aircraft flight hours:

55772

Aircraft flight cycles:

21175

Circumstances:

The aircraft departed Sharm el-Sheikh at 0549LT bound for Saint Petersburg-Pulkovo Airport and was cleared to climb to FL350. On board were 217 passengers and a crew of seven. Some 23 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft entered a steep descent and reached a descent rate of 6,000 feet per minute with a simultaneous reduction of speed before all radar and radio contact were lost at 0613LT. The aircraft crashed in a desert area located about 50 km southeast of Hasna, in the Sinai. None of the 224 occupants survived the accident. It appears the aircraft crashed in a slightly flat attitude and was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire (the central part of the fuselage and wings). Based on the debris scattered on a zone of 16 km2, it is now understood that the engines and the tail have been found few hundred metres from the main wreckage. It is believed the aircraft partially disintegrated in the air but probably during the last phase of the descent and not at high altitude.

Probable cause:

On November 17, 2015, Alexander Bortnikov, Chief of the Russian Secret Services, confirmed to Vladimir Putin that the crash was caused by the detonation of a small 'home made' bomb equivalent to one kilo of TNT that was placed on board the airplane in a beverage can. This was confirmed by the Egyptian Presidency on 24 February 2016.

Crash of a Boeing 737-38J in Bucharest

Date & Time: Dec 30, 2007 at 1127 LT

Type of aircraft:

Boeing 737-300

Operator:

Registration:

YR-BGC

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Yes

Site:

Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Schedule:

Bucharest – Sharm el-Sheikh

MSN:

27181/2662

YOM:

1994

Flight number:

RO3107

Location:

Bucharest-Otopeni-Henri Coandă

București

Country:

Romania

Region:

Europe

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

117

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

13497

Captain / Total hours on type:

5671.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

2260

Copilot / Total hours on type:

1531

Circumstances:

Around 1100LT, an airport maintenance team consisting of four people in two cars (Kia minivan) was cleared to enter runway 08R to perform maintenance work on the runway lighting system. Two of the men were working at about 600 meters from the threshold and the two other men were working at about 1500 meters from the threshold. Visibility at the time was poor due to thick fog. At 11:04 the runway was vacated by both vehicles due to landing traffic. At 11:06 they were recleared to enter the runway. At 11:25:13 flight ROT3107, a Boeing 737-300, was cleared to enter runway 08R for takeoff. The flight was cleared for takeoff at 11:26:07. Between 11:26:40 and 11:26:50 the control tower asked the maintenance workers if the runway was clear but got no reply. During the takeoff roll, at a speed of 90 knots, the aircraft collided with one of the van that was 'parked' about 600 metres from the threshold with its left engine and left main gear. The van was totally destroyed upon impact and the aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest 137 metres to the left of the centerline and 950 metres from the threshold. All 123 occupants evacuated safely and there were no injuries with ground maintenance personnel.

Probable cause:

The accident occurred due to incorrect authorization of the turnover and aircraft takeoff RO3107 , without runway clearance. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Error to allow the taking off of ROT 3107 was possible because of disruption in the activity of CTA EXE TWR, misperceptions regarding the clearance status of the runway and cumulative lack of coordination between CTA EXE TWR and CTA GND/TAXI to release the track,
- Provisions RCAST and LVO were incompletely applied by the traffic controllers involved . Team supervisor who was responsible for direct supervision of applying this procedure did not notice this fact and did not take corrective action,
- Progressive evidence bands used were inconsistent with the procedures and regulations,
- When they realized that the track is not free, CTA EXE TWR and CTA GND / TAXI focused on calling on the radio frequency of beaconing team instead of initiating immediate cancellation of the takeoff by,
- Transmission to crew aircraft "stop the takeoff",
- Stop & start the runway lights,
- Previous findings highlight gaps in the training of CTA personnel and the full and correct knowledge of procedures,
- Mismanagement of human resources at TWR OTP , which led to an insufficient number of CTA personnel present in the shift and absence of the supervisor from operating room at the time the accident occurred, given that accepted shift personnel number was 4,
- "Rules of movement of vehicles and people ," "Rules of organizing and development of ground-to-ground radio communications system with multiple access" and "Low Visibility Procedures Operations (LVO)" were not strictly applied. They contain unrelated or unclear provisions that can be interpreted differently and make it difficult to apply them rigorously.

Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-3Q8 off Sharm el-Sheikh: 148 killed

Date & Time: Jan 3, 2004 at 0445 LT

Type of aircraft:

Boeing 737-300

Operator:

Registration:

SU-ZCF

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Site:

Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

Schedule:

Sharm el-Sheikh - Cairo - Paris

MSN:

26283

YOM:

1992

Flight number:

FSH604

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

135

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

148

Captain / Total flying hours:

7443

Captain / Total hours on type:

474.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

788

Copilot / Total hours on type:

242

Aircraft flight hours:

25603

Aircraft flight cycles:

17976

Circumstances:

Following a night takeoff from runway 22R at Sharm el Sheikh-Ophira Airport, the plane climbed and maneuvered for a procedural left turn to intercept the 306 radial from the Sharm el Sheikh VOR station. When the autopilot was engaged the captain made an exclamation and the autopilot was immediately switched off again. The captain then requested Heading Select to be engaged. The plane then began to bank to the right. The copilot then warned the captain a few times about the fact that the bank angle was increasing. At a bank angle of 40° to the right the captain stated "OK come out". The ailerons returned briefly to neutral before additional aileron movements commanded an increase in the right bank. The aircraft had reached a maximum altitude of 5,460 feet with a 50° bank when the copilot stated 'overbank'. Repeating himself as the bank angle kept increasing. The maximum bank angle recorded was 111° right. Pitch attitude at that time was 43° nose down and altitude was 3,470 feet. The observer on the flight deck, a trainee copilot, called 'retard power, retard power, retard power'. Both throttles were moved to idle and the airplane gently seemed to recover from the nose-down, right bank attitude. Speed however increased, causing an overspeed warning. At 04:45 the airplane struck the surface of the water in a 24° right bank, 24° nose-down, at a speed of 416 kts and with a 3,9 G load. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris sank by a depth of 900 metres. All 148 occupants were killed, among them 133 French citizens, one Moroccan, one Japanese and 13 Egyptian (all crew members, among them six who should disembark at Cairo). Weather at the time of accident was good with excellent visibility, outside temperature of 17° C and light wind. On January 17, the FDR was found at a depth of 1,020 metres and the CVR was found a day later at a depth of 1,050 metres.

Probable cause:

No conclusive evidence could be found from the findings gathered through this investigation to determine the probable cause. However, based on the work done, it could be concluded that any combination of these findings could have caused or contributed to the accident. Although the crew at the last stage of this accident attempted to correctly recover, the gravity upset condition with regards to attitude, altitude and speed made this attempt insufficient to achieve a successful recovery.
Possible causes:
- Trim/Feel Unit Fault (Aileron Trim Runaway),
- Temporarily, Spoiler wing cable jam (Spoiler offset of the neutral position),
- Temporarily, F/O wheel jam (Spoilers offset of the neutral position),
- Autopilot Actuator Hardover Fault.
Possible contributing factors:
- A distraction developing to Spatial Disorientation (SD) until the time the F/O announced 'A/C turning right' with acknowledgment of the captain,
- Technical log copies were kept on board with no copy left at departure station,
- Operator write up of defects was not accurately performed and resulting in unclear knowledge of actual technical status,
- There are conflicting signals which make unclear whether the captain remained in SD or was the crew unable to perceive the cause that was creating an upset condition until the time when the F/O announced that there was no A/P in action,
- After the time then the F/O announced 'no A/P commander' the crew behavior suggests the recovery attempt was consistent with expected crew reaction, evidences show that the corrective action was initiated in full, however the gravity of the upset condition with regards to attitude, altitude and speed made this attempt insufficient to achieve a successful recovery.
Additional findings:
- The ECAA authorization for RAM B737 simulator was issued at a date later than the date of training for the accident crew although the inspection and acceptance test were carried out at an earlier date.
- Several recorded FDR parameters were unreliable and could not be used for the investigation.

Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 500 in Cairo: 23 killed

Date & Time: Jun 10, 1986 at 1900 LT

Type of aircraft:

Fokker F27 Friendship

Operator:

Registration:

SU-GAD

Flight Phase:

Landing (descent or approach)

Flight Type:

Scheduled Revenue Flight

Survivors:

Yes

Site:

Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Schedule:

Sharm el-Sheikh - Cairo

MSN:

10659

YOM:

1983

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Aircraft flight hours:

2063

Aircraft flight cycles:

2378

Circumstances:

On approach to Cairo-Intl Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions due to sandstorm. On final, the aircraft descended below the glide when it struck the roof of a building and crashed in an industrial estate located short of runway. Three passengers were seriously injured while 23 other occupants were killed.

Probable cause:

The crew descended below the minimum descent altitude in low visibility.