Piper PA-31 Cheyenne

While cruising at low height, the twin engine aircraft struck power cables, stalled and crashed in a pasture, bursting into flames. All six occupants were killed.

A flight plan for the flight from Cologne to Southend was filed on the evening of 12 March 1986. The pilot obtained by telephone details of the actual weather conditions at Southend at 0650 hrs on 13 March 1986. He took off from Cologne at 0714 hrs with a company colleague as his sole passenger. The aircraft flew without incident using the airways as FL220 until cleared by ATC to descend towards Southend. At 0820 hrs the pilot established radio communications with the approach controllers. He was passed details of the existing weather conditions and said that he would try the approach. He requested and was given radar guidance to land on runway 24 at Southend. The published operating minimum for an approach using the 3 cm surveillance radar is an Obstacle Clearance Limit (OCL) of 280 feet. radar guidance for the approach terminates at half a nautical mile from touchdown. The recommended Decision Height (DH) and Runway Visual Range (RVR) published in the UK Air PIlot (RAC 4-6-13) is 380 feet and 800 meters respectively. The approach was flown accurately in azimuth, and advisory heights to maintain a 3° glide path were passed to the pilot. The aircraft's flight path was observed on the London Air Traffic Control descent profile. The radar talkdown was terminated at half a mile and the aircraft was cleared to land. when the aircraft was not sighted from the control tower at the expected time of landing the alarm was raised. Members of the airfield fire service were already positioned on the airfield at 'weather standby'. They initiated a search for the aircraft. It was learned that it had crashed close to an industrial estate which lies about half a mile from the threshold of runway 24. The aircraft had been seen on the normal approach path but at a height judged to be lower than normal. Two eye withnesses saw the aircraft bank sharply to the left before it crashed into a small field. There was a minor post-impact fire in the area of the left engine, which was quickly extinguished by those first on the scene using a hand held extinguisher. The passenger was assisted in opening the main cabin door and he was escorted from the wreckage. The pilot was killed on impact. The passenger, who had been seated in a rearwards facing seat behind the copilot's station, stated that he had glimpsed the ground shortly before the accident but could give no information indicating the cause of the accident.

While being vectored for an ILS runway 07 approach, the pilot was told to maint 3,000 feet and advised he was following a Boeing 727. The minimum approach altitude before intercepting the ILS glide slope at the final approach fix/outer marker was 1,900 feet. As the aircraft was approaching the outer marker, the pilot was cleared for the approach and was handed off to the tower. After contacting the tower, the pilot was told to descend as published. At approximately that time, the tower controller and his supervisor discussed N700CM's altitude and proximity to the 727. The controller was going to discontinue the approach, but his supervisor suggested he wait and see if it would work out. Subsequently, N700CM crashed into trees approximately 5,800 feet short of the runway while descending in a wings level attitude. Radar data showed N700CM was well above the ILS glide slope when cleared for the approach. ATC procedures requested the aircraft to be below the glide slope before being cleared. Also, N700CM was approximately 2.57 miles behind the 727, but stayed well above the 727's flight path (and possible wake turbulence) until moments before impact. N700CM entered an excessive rate of descent before going below the glide slope. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot initiated an ILS approach in below minimum weather conditions shortly after night fall. He was given a low altitude alert, but continued the approach. He announced a missed approach, and indicated problems climbing to altitude. He then declared an unspecified emergency, and requested vectors to a larger airport, in spite of worsening weather conditions. He reached an altitude of 2,100 feet, but commenced another ILS approach despite previous difficulties. Radar data indicates excessive maneuvering to intercept the inbound course, with wide variations in ground speed and altitude. Following a steep climb at a low groundspeed, the aircraft disappeared below radar coverage. Witnesses indicated irregular engine sounds as the aircraft made a tight level turn at low altitude prior to impacting trees in a near level attitude. On-scene evidence shows power was being produced from both engines upon impact. Post-impact fire consumed the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot had been flying approximately 7 hours and was completing the flight at night when the accident occurred. He was using visual cues (the airport environment) to position the aircraft at a proper altitude for a visual approach and landing. The terrain south of the airport rises several hundred feet above the airport elevation. The terrain is sparsely lit. The aircraft touched down two miles short of runway 34R in an open pasture at an elevation of approximately 400 feet higher than the airport. The pilot had flown approximately one hour of night time in the last 90 days, according to his logbook. All three occupants were injured, two seriously.

Aircraft hit northwest side of ridge in level attitude, cruise speed, heading southeast. Conditions were dark night and the cloud ceiling was about 40 feet above the ridge. Pilot received weather brief before take off and en route which reported a ceiling of 10,000 feet at destination. Aircraft was flown at 17,500 feet en route. Pilot-in-command radioed GSP approach control, said he was VFR for landing, passing 6,000 feet. Two way communication not established but discrete tx code assigned. Controller saw tx code change northwest of crash site then radar target disappeared at accident site. All five occupants were killed.

The pilot attempted a VOR approach and missed. He advised ATC he was going to attempt the NDB and if he could not see the runway he would go to metro at Detroit or Pontiac. On the NDB approach the aircraft struck trees 960 feet below the MDA. The aircraft flipped over landing on the nose and top of the fuselage. Both occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft was returning to Paris following a charter flight from Torino-Caselle Airport, carrying four journalists, a member of the AFP Agency and two pilots. On final approach to Paris-Le Bourget runway 07 by night, the crew encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions. Apparently in an attempt to establish a visual contact with the approach lights, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the roof of a warehouse and crashed in Garges-lès-Gonesse, less than 2 km short of runway 07 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all seven occupants were killed.

On approach to Toronto-Lester Bowles Pearson Airport, the twin engine airplane struck the ground and crashed about 11 km short of runway threshold. All three occupants were killed.

The normal fuel load for the flight was 1,500 lbs, but with a forecast tail wind and an estimated flight time for only 1+10, the crew accepted the lower indicated (950 lb) fuel load. The flight was uneventful until an indication of 250 lbs per side, then the fuel 'seemed to dissipate faster.' With an indication of 150 lbs on downwind, the copilot recommended declaring an emergency. The captain's response was to ask ATC for the anticipated length of the downwind leg. He was told 20 miles. Priority handling was requested, but was only available for a declared emergency. The approach was continued with normal handling for approximately 10 minutes. At 1608:39, the crew declared an emergency, then reported the aircraft was out of fuel. It crash landed on rough terrain, short of runway 08. An exam revealed fuel sensors had been improperly installed (interchanged between the inboard and outboard tanks). Thus the gages indicated about 180 lbs more than the approximately 763 lbs that was actually aboard at takeoff. A special 500 hour inspection of the entire fuel system was made on 7/8/84 using the 'wet' method, but only the capacitance method checks each individual sensor. All 11 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.