Jacksonville-Intl

During arrival, the pilot was cleared for an ILS runway 07 approach. Also, he was advised of a DC-9 that was 4 miles ahead and was told to use caution for wake turbulence. As the aircraft was on final approach, it descended below the ILS glide slope and subsequently hit trees and crashed about 1.8 mile short of the runway. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft or engines was found that would have resulted in an accident. Also, there were no reported problems with the ILS system and it tested normal after the accident. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate which was good for single engine land aircraft; his multi-engine privileges were authorized as a private pilot, only. An NTSB performance study showed the aircraft was 2 minutes and 57 seconds behind the DC-9. Radar data indicated the aircraft did not exceed a bank angle of 32° and no excessive g-values were evident during the approach. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Radar data indicated the aircraft climbed normally to 9,200 feet at which time some maneuver was performed with the aircraft. The aircraft then entered a near vertical dive and the last radar hit was at 6,900 feet. Examination of the aircraft revealed it experienced an inflight structural breakup and there was no evidence to indicate prebreakup failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engines, engine mounts, autopilot, or systems. The operator reported one employee overheard the pilot and passenger talk about rolling the aircraft prior to departure, and two company employees reported being onboard when the pilot had rolled it on prior occasions. One of these was at night. Both occupants were killed.

While in cruise flight, the pilot noted that the left engine began losing power and oil pressure. He stated that he then shut down the engine and feathered the propeller. He declared an emergency and descended to land. While on final approach, he lowered the landing gear and selected full flaps to slow the aircraft. He stated the airspeed decayed and the aircraft began to roll and yaw to the left. Subsequently, it contacted the ground in a left wing low attitude, then partially cartwheeled before coming to rest. A post accident examination of the left engine revealed that a turbocharger oil seal had deteriorated & failed, allowing oil to escape through the turbocharger exhaust. There was evidence of the beginning of progressive failure of the turbocharger. Also, there were indications that the left propeller was not fully feathered and that it was windmilling at impact. The pilot believed that he may have moved the left prop control out of the feather position by mistake. Both occupants were slightly injured.

While being vectored for an ILS runway 07 approach, the pilot was told to maint 3,000 feet and advised he was following a Boeing 727. The minimum approach altitude before intercepting the ILS glide slope at the final approach fix/outer marker was 1,900 feet. As the aircraft was approaching the outer marker, the pilot was cleared for the approach and was handed off to the tower. After contacting the tower, the pilot was told to descend as published. At approximately that time, the tower controller and his supervisor discussed N700CM's altitude and proximity to the 727. The controller was going to discontinue the approach, but his supervisor suggested he wait and see if it would work out. Subsequently, N700CM crashed into trees approximately 5,800 feet short of the runway while descending in a wings level attitude. Radar data showed N700CM was well above the ILS glide slope when cleared for the approach. ATC procedures requested the aircraft to be below the glide slope before being cleared. Also, N700CM was approximately 2.57 miles behind the 727, but stayed well above the 727's flight path (and possible wake turbulence) until moments before impact. N700CM entered an excessive rate of descent before going below the glide slope. Both occupants were killed.

At 18:12, flight 1039 was cleared for takeoff from runway 31. At 18:13, while over the departure end of the runway and climbing through 600 feet, the crew acknowledged a frequency change. Thirty seconds later, the airplane was seen in a steep a descent near the extended centerline of the runway. The Bandeirante struck the ground 7,800 feet beyond the departure end of runway 31 and 85 feet to the right of the extended runway centerline in an inverted nose down attitude, after which it caught fire and burned. Before ground impact, the horizontal stabilizer, including bulkhead No. 36, had separated from the fuselage. Both elevators and elevator tips, the tail cone assembly, and the aft portion of the ventral fin also had separated in flight. All 13 occupants were killed.