Southend-on-Sea

The Lawrence Bay Airways Ltd. float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) departed from a lake adjacent to a remote fishing cabin near Buss Lakes for a day visual flight rules flight to Southend, Saskatchewan, about 37 nautical miles (nm) southeast. There were 4 passengers and 1 pilot onboard. The aircraft crashed along the shoreline of another lake located about 2 nm southeast of its point of departure. The impact was severe and the 5 occupants were killed on impact. The emergency locator transmitter activated, and the aircraft was found partially submerged in shallow water with the right wing tip resting on the shore. There was no post-crash fire. The accident occurred during daylight hours at about 1111 Central Standard Time.

The aircraft departed Southend at 06:59 UTC, about one hour before sunrise, on a Special VFR clearance. The aircraft flew to Wallasey via Daventry, White gate and the Liverpool Special Rules Zone at 2,400 feet. It could not be determined why the commander chose to fly this route however, some two weeks before the accident he had spent a short holiday at Haverigg which is close to the direct track from Wallasey to Glasgow. On leaving Wallasey, the aircraft tracked north towards Glasgow and, at 08:01 hrs, the crew called Warton aerodrome stating that they were descending to 1,000 feet and requesting a 'Radar Service'. At 08:10 hrs, an aircraft that had just taken off from Blackpool reported a cloud base of between 2,500 and 3,000 feet and a visibility greater than 20 km. At this time the radar transponder on the aircraft was operating but the height encoding facility had not been selected. Recordings of the Great Dunn Fell and the St Anne's ATC radar heads indicated that the aircraft had left Wallasey on a track of 007°M which was maintained until radar contact was lost at 08:13 hrs at a position one mile to the south west of Walney Island airfield near Barrow in Furness. Consideration of the obscuration due to terrain between the radar heads and the aircraft indicated that, at the time of loss of radar contact, the aircraft would have been no higher than 350 feet amsl and possibly lower. At 08:09 hrs, the time of local sunrise, the crew had called Walney Island stating that they were nine miles south of the airfield at 1,000 feet and requesting overflight of the airfield. At 08:12 hrs, the controller at Walney Island sighted the aircraft abeam the airfield at an estimated height of 800 feet and asked the crew to report at Millom which is about eight miles north of Walney Island. At about the same time, a witness on the beach near the airfield saw the aircraft heading north in and out of cloud at a height estimated to be not above 400 feet. The aircraft did not make the requested position report at Millom and, at 08:16 hrs, the controller advised the crew to call London Information for further service. There was no reply to this call. The last person to see the aircraft reported that it was flying steadily north towards Ponsonby Fell and that the cloud in the area of the Fell was covering the ground at 500 feet above sea level. At about 08:15 hrs a farmer, who was some 600 metres from the crash site, heard a bang from the direction of Ponsonby Fell. He stated that at the time that he heard the bang the weather was very bad with a strong wind, rain and mist covering the fell. The aircraft had flown into ground about 15 metres below the top of Ponsonby Fell. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and both occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a night charter flight from Southend to Helsinki, carrying seven passengers and one pilot. On final approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport runway 22, the pilot elected to reduce the speed when the aircraft lost altitude, descended below the MDA, struck the ground and came to rest inverted in a snow covered field located about one km short of runway threshold. A passenger was seriously injured while seven other occupants were killed.

While parked at Southend Airport, the four engine aircraft was struck by a Fairflight Short 330-200 registered G-BHWT and that would be convoyed from Southend to Biggin Hill for maintenance. After being parked at Southend Airport for a long time without any maintenance and due to hydraulic problems, the Short 330 was taxiing when the nosewheel steering system failed and the crew lost control of the aircraft that veered to the left and collided with the parked Viscount. Both pilots on board the Short escaped uninjured and both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.

After being parked at Southend Airport for a long time without any maintenance and due to hydraulic problems, it was decided to ferry the aircraft from Southend to Biggin Hill. While taxiing, the nosewheel steering system failed and the crew lost control of the aircraft that veered to the left and collided with a parked British Air Ferries Vickers 806 Viscount registered G-APIM. Both pilots escaped uninjured and both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed Southend Airport on a cargo flight to Bergamo, carrying newspapers and magazines. Two minutes and 30 seconds after liftoff, while climbing in limited visibility due to the night and low clouds, the airplane entered a dive and crashed on a garage, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

A flight plan for the flight from Cologne to Southend was filed on the evening of 12 March 1986. The pilot obtained by telephone details of the actual weather conditions at Southend at 0650 hrs on 13 March 1986. He took off from Cologne at 0714 hrs with a company colleague as his sole passenger. The aircraft flew without incident using the airways as FL220 until cleared by ATC to descend towards Southend. At 0820 hrs the pilot established radio communications with the approach controllers. He was passed details of the existing weather conditions and said that he would try the approach. He requested and was given radar guidance to land on runway 24 at Southend. The published operating minimum for an approach using the 3 cm surveillance radar is an Obstacle Clearance Limit (OCL) of 280 feet. radar guidance for the approach terminates at half a nautical mile from touchdown. The recommended Decision Height (DH) and Runway Visual Range (RVR) published in the UK Air PIlot (RAC 4-6-13) is 380 feet and 800 meters respectively. The approach was flown accurately in azimuth, and advisory heights to maintain a 3° glide path were passed to the pilot. The aircraft's flight path was observed on the London Air Traffic Control descent profile. The radar talkdown was terminated at half a mile and the aircraft was cleared to land. when the aircraft was not sighted from the control tower at the expected time of landing the alarm was raised. Members of the airfield fire service were already positioned on the airfield at 'weather standby'. They initiated a search for the aircraft. It was learned that it had crashed close to an industrial estate which lies about half a mile from the threshold of runway 24. The aircraft had been seen on the normal approach path but at a height judged to be lower than normal. Two eye withnesses saw the aircraft bank sharply to the left before it crashed into a small field. There was a minor post-impact fire in the area of the left engine, which was quickly extinguished by those first on the scene using a hand held extinguisher. The passenger was assisted in opening the main cabin door and he was escorted from the wreckage. The pilot was killed on impact. The passenger, who had been seated in a rearwards facing seat behind the copilot's station, stated that he had glimpsed the ground shortly before the accident but could give no information indicating the cause of the accident.

En route from Shoreham to Southend, the pilot was forced to attempt an emergency landing for unknown reasons. The twin engine airplane crash landed in Orsett, Essex. All four occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft landed at Southend (SEN) from Antwerp (ANR) at 07:50 hrs on a day excursion. Following a 9 hour rest period, the crew reported for duty at 18:30 to prepare for the return flight. Start up and taxiing out were normal, and a limited power check was completed before takeoff. The Captain, had given a full pre-takeoff briefing before the aircraft left Antwerp that morning, and on this occasion only called for a 'standard briefing', but emphasized that the full abort procedures would be as given during his previous instruction. The First Officer was handling the aircraft from the right hand seat, and gave a shortened takeoff briefing which included the actions required for engine failure before and after V1. Both pilots were wearing headsets, (not fitted with boom microphones) but were not using these for flight deck intercommunication purposes; the Flight Engineer was not wearing a headset. The Captain, who controlled the only source of nose-wheel steering, lined up the aircraft at the beginning of runway 24. Brakes were released and, after stabilizing all four engines at 30 inches of manifold pressure, the First Officer advanced all the right hand throttle levers to takeoff power. The Flight Engineer followed this movement with his left hand on the left-hand group of throttle levers and, when takeoff power was achieved, held the throttle friction lever with his right hand. The captain 's left hand was on the nose steering wheel. At about 75-80 knots, shortly before V1, the captain instructed the Flight Engineer to adjust the power on engines 1 and 2 which were overboosting slightly. The Flight Engineer made this adjustment coincident with the captain calling V1 at about 88 knots, and very shortly afterwards the captain saw the red 'gear unsafe' warning light illuminate. Unknown to the captain or the First Officer the Flight Engineer had made an UP selection of the landing gear selector lever. He stated subsequently that he thought the captain had instructed him to do so shortly after calling V1. The pilots maintain that no such order was given and that nothing additional to the normal procedural calls was said by either of them. The aircraft subsided on to its nose and its propellers struck the runway; throttles were closed and the captain attempted to maintain directional control by use of rudder. The aircraft came to rest 3 metres from the end of the runway with its nose on the ground and with the main landing gear still extended. As soon as the aircraft came to rest the Flight Engineer, having closed the mixture controls to idle cut off and pulled the 'ganged switches' bar, left the aircraft through the right front exit door. On seeing exhaust fires in Nos. 2 and 3 engines he returned to the flight deck and carried out the appropriate engine fire drills. However Nor 3 engine continued to burn, and he extinguished this fire with a portable CO2 appliance. During this period, evacuation drills were initiated, and the passengers left the aircraft in an expeditious and reasonably orderly manner, mostly through the front exit, but some by chute from the rear exit, and a few from an overwing emergency exit.

The aircraft was engaged in a charter flight from Southend to Amsterdam, carrying 32 supporters of the Ajax football team back to The Netherlands. Following a fall in manifold pressure and the discovery of an oil leak in the starboard engine soon after a night takeoff, the pilot decided to return to Southend Airport for an emergency landing. In order to avoid an overshoot, he positioned the flaps to a 15° angle for the landing which resulted in a higher than normal airspeed at touchdown. The aircraft touched down about half-way down the runway in use, overran the paved area and collided with an earth bank. Of the 32 passengers and four crew on board, two passengers were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.