Country
code

New South Wales

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AT Merlin IVA in Tamworth: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 9, 1994 at 1734 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-SWP
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Inverell – Glen Innes – Armidale – Tamworth – Sydney
MSN:
AT-033
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2782
Captain / Total hours on type:
335.00
Circumstances:
VH-SWP was operating on a standard company flight plan for the route Bankstown-Tamworth-Armidale-Glen Innes-Inverell and return, and the flight plan indicated the flight would be conducted in accordance with IFR procedures. The classification of the flight was shown as non-scheduled commercial air transport although the aircraft was operating to a company schedule, and departure and flight times for each route segment were indicated on the flight plan. The aircraft departed Bankstown at about 0640 and proceeded as planned to Inverell where the pilot rested until his departure that afternoon for the return journey. The schedule required an Armidale departure at 1721. At 1723 the pilot reported to Sydney Flight Service that he was departing Armidale for Tamworth. The planned time for the flight was 17 minutes. Although the flight-planned altitude for this sector was 6,000 ft, the pilot was unable to climb immediately because a slower aircraft, which had departed Armidale for Tamworth two minutes earlier, was climbing to that altitude. In addition, there was opposite direction traffic at 7,000 ft. The next most suitable altitude was 8,000 ft, but separation from the other two aircraft, which were also IFR, had to be established by the pilot before further climb was possible. The published IFR lowest safe altitude for the route was 5,400 ft. The pilot subsequently elected to remain at 4,500 ft in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and at 1727 requested an airways clearance from Tamworth Tower. A clearance was issued by ATC to the pilot to track direct to Tamworth at 4,500 ft visually. At about 1732 the pilot requested a descent clearance. He was cleared to make a visual approach with a clearance limit of 5 NM by distance measuring equipment (DME) from Tamworth, and was requested to report at 8 DME from Tamworth. The pilot acknowledged the instructions and reported leaving 4,500 ft on descent. Transmissions from ATC to the pilot less than two minutes later were not answered. The aircraft was not being monitored on radar by ATC, nor was this a requirement. At about 1740, reports were received by the police and ATC of an explosion and possible aircraft accident near the mountain range 8 NM north-east of Tamworth Airport. The aircraft wreckage was discovered at about 2115 by searchers on the mountain range.Soon after the aircraft was reported missing, a search aircraft pilot, who had extensive local flying experience, reported to ATC that the top of the range (where the accident occurred) was obscured by cloud, and that there was very low cloud in the valley nearby.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
- The pilot was making a visual approach in weather conditions unsuitable for such an approach.
- The pilot had not flown this route before.
- The aircraft was flown below the lowest safe altitude in conditions of poor visibility.

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 690 off Sydney: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 1994 at 0114 LT
Registration:
VH-BSS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Canberra - Sydney
MSN:
690-11044
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1800
Captain / Total hours on type:
50.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7975
Circumstances:
On 14 January 1994 at 0114, Aero Commander 690 aircraft VH-BSS struck the sea while being radar vectored to intercept the Instrument Landing System approach to runway 34 at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport, NSW. The last recorded position of the aircraft was about 10 miles to the south-east of the airport. At the time of the accident the aircraft was being operated as a cargo charter flight from Canberra to Sydney in accordance with the Instrument Flight Rules. The body of the pilot who was the sole occupant of the aircraft was never recovered. Although wreckage identified as part of the aircraft was located on the seabed shortly after the accident, salvage action was not initially undertaken. This decision was taken after consideration of the known circumstances of the occurrence and of the costs of salvage versus the potential safety benefit that might be gained from examination of the wreckage. About 18 months after the accident, the wing and tail sections of the aircraft were recovered from the sea by fishermen. As a result, a detailed examination of that wreckage was carried out to assess the validity of the Bureau’s original analysis that the airworthiness of the aircraft was unlikely to have been a factor in this accident. No evidence was found of any defect which may have affected the normal operation of the aircraft. The aircraft descended below the altitude it had been cleared to by air traffic control. From the evidence available it was determined that the circumstances of this accident were consistent with controlled flight into the sea.
Probable cause:
Findings
1. The pilot held a valid pilot licence, endorsed for Aero Commander 690 aircraft.
2. The pilot held a valid multi-engine command instrument rating.
3. There was no evidence found to indicate that the performance of the pilot was adversely affected by any physiological or psychological condition.
4. The aircraft was airworthy for the intended flight, despite the existence of minor anomalies in maintenance and serviceability of aircraft systems.
5. The aircraft carried fuel sufficient for the flight.
6. The weight and balance of the aircraft were estimated to have been within the normal limits.
7. Recorded radio communications relevant to the operation of the aircraft were normal.
8. Relevant ground-based aids to navigation were serviceable.
9. At the time of impact the aircraft was capable of normal flight.
10. The aircraft was fitted with an altitude alerting system.
11. The aircraft was not fitted with a ground proximity warning system.
12. The aircraft was equipped with a transponder which provided aircraft altitude information to be displayed on Air Traffic Control radar equipment.
3.2 Significant factors
1. The pilot was relatively inexperienced in single-pilot Instrument Flight Rules operations on the type of aircraft being flown.
2. The aircraft was being descended over the sea in dark-night conditions.
3. The workload of the pilot was significantly increased by his adoption of a steep descent profile at high speed, during a phase of flight which required multiple tasks to be completed in a limited time prior to landing. Radio communications with another company aircraft during that critical phase of flight added to that workload.
4. The pilot probably lost awareness of the vertical position of the aircraft as a result of distraction by other tasks.
5. The aircraft was inadvertently descended below the altitude authorized by Air Traffic Control.
6. The secondary surveillance radar system in operation at the time provided an aircraft altitude readout which was only updated on every sixth sweep of the radar display.
7. The approach controller did not notice a gross change of aircraft altitude shortly after a normal radio communication with the pilot.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Young: 7 killed

Date & Time: Jun 11, 1993 at 1918 LT
Registration:
VH-NDU
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sydney – Cowra – Young – Cootamundra
MSN:
31-8152083
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
OB301
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
1822
Captain / Total hours on type:
337.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
954
Copilot / Total hours on type:
43
Aircraft flight hours:
3936
Circumstances:
At about 1500 hours EST, 11 June 1993, a standard company flight plan held by the CAA at the Melbourne flight briefing facility was activated. The plan indicated that Piper PA-31-350 aircraft VH-NDU would be conducting flight OB 301, a regular public transport service from Sydney (Kingsford Smith) airport to Cootamundra NSW, with intermediate landings at Cowra and Young. The flight was planned to be operated in accordance with IFR procedures, with a scheduled departure time from Sydney of 1720. The aircraft was to be crewed by two pilots. Prior to departure, the company scheduled a second aircraft to operate the Sydney–Cowra sector. Consequently, VH-NDU was required to land only at Young and Cootamundra. At that time of the year, the 1720 departure time meant that the flight would be conducted entirely at night. VH-NDU departed Sydney at 1738 carrying five passengers, with a fuel endurance of about 253 minutes. The pilot-in-command occupied the left cockpit seat. The aircraft initially tracked via the direct Sydney to Cowra route and climbed to a cruising altitude of 8,000 feet. At 1801 the pilot reported to Sydney FIS that the aircraft was now tracking direct to Young, and would report at Riley, an en route reporting point located 62 NM from Young on the Katoomba– Young track. FIS advised the area QNH was 1003 hPa. At 1814 the pilot reported the aircraft was at Riley and estimated arrival at Young at 1835. By 1820 the pilot had reported on descent to Young, with in-flight conditions of cloud and heavy rain. Recorded radar data later showed that the aircraft passed 13.5 NM to the south-east of Riley, south of the direct Katoomba–Young track. At about 18.5 NM north-east of Rugby, the aircraft turned right and initially tracked about 280° before turning left to track direct to Young. When queried by FIS at 1836, the pilot amended the estimate for his arrival at Young to 1838. At 1842, after prompting from FIS, the pilot reported at Young that he was commencing an NDB approach, and would call again on the hour or in the circuit. Shortly after 1845 witnesses at Young aerodrome saw the lights of an aircraft, which they believed to be VH-NDU, pass low overhead after approaching from the east. Some minutes later the same aircraft was seen to pass over the aerodrome from the opposite direction and appear to climb away towards the east. On both occasions the runway and aerodrome lights were not illuminated, although the aerodrome was equipped with PAL and it was the responsibility of the pilot-in-command to activate it. At 1850 FIS advised VH-NDU of the proximity of Cessna 310 aircraft, VH-XMA, which was estimating arrival at Young at 1900. VH-XMA subsequently reported holding in visual conditions at about 8 NM north of Young. The pilot of VH-NDU reported at 1903 that he was on another overshoot at Young, about to commence another approach, and would report again at 1915. FIS provided additional traffic on Piper PA31 aircraft, VH-XML, which was also estimating Young at 1915. At about this time witnesses reported seeing the runway lights illuminate. VH-XMA then proceeded to Young and landed on runway 01 at about 1912. At 1916 VH-NDU reported in the Young circuit area and cancelled SARWATCH. A pilot witness said that the aircraft passed over the northern end of the aerodrome from a westerly direction before turning right and taking up a heading consistent with a right downwind leg for a landing on runway 01. The aircraft was then seen to turn right and pass to the south of the aerodrome before entering what appeared to be a right downwind leg for runway 19. When abeam the aerodrome the aircraft again turned right and overflew the aerodrome to enter a second right downwind leg for runway 01. Another witness thought the aircraft (VH-NDU) was significantly lower than another aircraft approaching from the east (VH-XML). Shortly after VH-NDU turned onto an apparent base leg the navigation lights were lost to sight. Almost immediately a fireball was observed, consistent with the final position of the aircraft (see figure 2). At 1918 the pilot of VH-XMA telephoned the 000 emergency services number and reported the accident to the Goulburn Ambulance Control Centre. By 1920 this information had been relayed to the Young Ambulance Service, the Young Police, and the Young SES. An off-duty Fire Brigade officer, who was waiting at the aerodrome, drove into Young and alerted the Fire Brigade at 1930. The emergency services initially travelled to Young Aerodrome but were unable to gain immediate access to the accident site, which was located on a hill some 2.2 km to the south-south-east of the aerodrome, in an area remote from roads and lighting. Access was finally gained from a road located south of the accident site. An ambulance reached the aircraft wreckage at 1952 and the crew were able to rescue and resuscitate the only survivor, who was critically injured, and transport her to the Young Hospital. She died at Camperdown Children’s Hospital at 0510 the next morning.
Probable cause:
Significant factors
1. The cloudbase in the Young circling area was below the minimum circling altitude, associated with dark night conditions and limited ground lighting.
2. The workload of the pilot-in-command was substantially increased by the effects of aircraft equipment deficiencies, with a possible consequent degrading of his performance as a result of skill fatigue.
3. The instrument approach and landing charts did not provide the flight crew with terrain information adequate for the assessment of obstacle clearance during a circling approach.
4. The Monarch operations manual did not provide the flight crew with guidance or procedures for the safe avoidance of terrain at Young during a night-circling approach.
5. The aircraft descended below the minimum circling altitude without adequate monitoring of obstacle clearance by the crew.
6. The visual cues available to the flight crew were insufficient as a sole source of height judgement.
7. There were organisational deficiencies in the management and operation of RPT services by Monarch.
8. There were organisational deficiencies in the safety regulation of Monarch RPT operations by the CAA.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fletcher FU24-954 in Coogah: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 16, 1992
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-EOG
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
3
YOM:
1954
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances in a hilly terrain while engaged in a superphosphate spraying mission. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B1-H2 Turbo Porter in Jaspers Brush: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 12, 1991
Operator:
Registration:
A14-683
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jaspers Brush - Jaspers Brush
MSN:
683
YOM:
1968
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Aircraft flight hours:
7415
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances after takeoff from Jaspers Brush Airfield. Two occupants were killed and eight others were injured.

Crash of a GAF Nomad N.22B near Tenterfield: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 9, 1991
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
A18-303
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Oakey - Melbourne
MSN:
003
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a training mission consisting of touch-and-go at Ag Strip located 20 km east of Tenterfield. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft struck a tree, stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. All four crew members were killed.
Crew:
Maj Lynn Hummerston,
Cpl Peter McCarthy +2 PNGDF pilots.
Probable cause:
As the aircraft was totally destroyed and due to lack of evidences, the exact cause of the accident could not be determined.

Crash of a Rockwell Turbo Commander 681 in Tamworth: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 14, 1991 at 1025 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-NYG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Brisbane - Moree - Tamworth
MSN:
681-6004
YOM:
1969
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3022
Captain / Total hours on type:
37.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3717
Circumstances:
VH-NYG had departed Tamworth three days before the accident on an extended passenger charter through Sydney, Moree, Emerald, Brisbane, Moree, and Tamworth. On the day of the accident, the pilot had submitted a flight plan nominating a charter category, single pilot, Instrument Flight Rules flight from Brisbane to Moree, then Tamworth. The flight plan indicated that the aircraft carried 1400 Ib (635 kg) of fuel and had an endurance of 211 min. The aircraft, with four passengers on board, departed Brisbane at 0902 hours and landed at Moree at 1010 after an uneventful flight. All four passengers left the flight at Moree. The pilot reported taxiing at Moree to Dubbo Flight Service at 1047 and called airborne at 1050. At 1117 hours the aircraft was given a clearance to enter the Tamworth Control Zone on descent from 10000 ft. The pilot was told to expect a right downwind leg for runway 30. At 1125 the pilot requested a change of runway to runway 18, stating that there was a fuel flow problem with the left engine. The aerodrome controller (ADC) issued a change of runway (runway 18) to the aircraft, asking the pilot whether emergency conditions existed. The pilot answered in the negative and about 30 sec later informed the ADC that he was conducting one left orbit. The orbit was commenced at about 300 ft above ground level (agl) and approximately above the threshold of runway 18. The orbit was flown with an angle of bank of about 60°. The aircraft developed a high rate of descent during the orbit and rolled wings level in a pronounced nose-down attitude after turning through almost 360°. The aircraft then struck the ground in a grassed paddock about 350 m short of the threshold of runway 18 and in line with the right edge of the flight strip. The aircraft, largely intact, slid in the direction of the runway for 53 m before coming to rest. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
- The pilot was misled by erroneous fuel consumption data from the aircraft trend monitoring sheet, the endorsing pilot, and the company fuel planning figures.
- The pilot did not ensure that sufficient fuel was carried in the aircraft to complete the planned flight.
- The pilot made an improper in-flight decision to change runways during a forced landing attempt.
- The pilot misjudged the forced landing approach.
- The pilot was unable to recover the aircraft from the high rate of descent which developed during the approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-30 Marquise in Bathurst: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 7, 1990
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-WMU
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bankstown - Bathurst
MSN:
512
YOM:
1970
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Crashed on approach in foggy conditions while performing a cargo flight from Bankstown with bank notes on board. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Cessna 501 Citation I/SP in Lord Howe Island

Date & Time: Apr 22, 1990 at 1225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-LCL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sydney - Lord Howe
MSN:
501-0145
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was being used for a pleasure flight for the owner and some friends. The Captain calculated the landing distances required for both runway 28 and 10, based on weather reports obtained at briefing, which indicated a strong northerly wind component. An updated report received some 30 minutes before descent confirmed the wind as 290 degrees at 7 knots. Approaching the island and becoming visual, the crew noted the windsock near the western end of the runway to be indicating a slight headwind component in the 10 direction and decided on a straight in approach to runway 10, to avoid an approaching squall/shower. The aircraft touched down firmly a short distance beyond the threshold. Speed brakes were immediately extended and wheel braking applied. About four seconds later the Captain called for the drag chute to be deployed. Although the co-pilot correctly activated the handle, it became obvious that the chute had not deployed as no increase in retardation occurred. When the Captain realised that the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway remaining he attempted to turn the aircraft towards a clear grass area to the right. However, the aircraft was aquaplaning on the wet surface and did not respond to steering inputs for some distance. The aircraft left the bitumen tracking to the right. It collided with a gable marker, passed through a fence, continued down an embankment, across a road, through a second fence and came to rest approximately 90 metres from the runway end and 70 metres to the right of the extended centreline. The left main and nose gear legs were torn off. Witnesses to the accident said that when the aircraft landed, the runway was very wet and the wind was westerly at 5 to 10 knots.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the Captain had made some miscalculations in his pre-flight assessments. He had noted the landing distance available as being the same for both runways, whereas runway 28 has a reduced length due to terrain clearance requirements on the approach. Under the conditions both forecast and prevailing, and using the criteria applicable at the time for an aircraft fitted with an alternate means of retardation, i.e. drag chute, the landing distances required for both runways were greater than the landing distances available. The Captain had also evidently applied incorrect techniques during the landing. He had not attempted to deploy the drag chute immediately the nose wheel was on the ground, and had not applied unmodulated pressure to the anti-skid braking system. These measures are required by the manufacturer to obtain maximum performance. It was found that the drag chute canister lid had been sealed with tank sealant and painted over. The latch assembly had operated but the drogue chute spring was insufficiently strong to break the seal. When the sealant was prised away from around the lid, the system operated normally. This error had not been found during a check of the aircraft immediately following repainting. The lid had the appearance of an oblong radio antenna and was not marked in any distinguishing manner. The problem should also have been noticed during a subsequent inspection of the drag chute for moisture. The inspection is required every 90 days if the drag chute has
not been deployed, and requires the removal of the lid and drogue chute in order to feel the main chute for moisture. The condition of the sealant would indicate that this had not been carried out.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
- Inadequate pre-flight planning and preparation by the flight crew. The runway distance required was in excess of the distance available on either runway.
- Adverse runway and weather conditions - wet surface and downwind component.
- Improper sealing of drag chute canister.
- Inadequate maintenance of the drag chute system.
- Improper operation of wheel brakes.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fletcher FU24-950 in Frogmore: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 29, 1989 at 1150 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-HTB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Frogmore - Frogmore
MSN:
174
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in superphosphate spreading operations. An aerial survey of the property had been conducted by the pilot in company with the property owner. Power poles in the valley ahead and to the left of the airstrip were marked. When operations started the wind was a light north-easterly and ambient temperature was 16° Celsius. By the time the aircraft had refuelled and was ready for the thirty-sixth flight of the day, the ambient temperature had increased to 28° Celsius and the wind direction had changed to a south-westerly. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft was observed to sink after overflying the high-voltage power lines between the marked poles. On the next flight the aircraft was observed to make a tight left turn and fly down the valley adjacent to the left marked powerpole. On the next and final flight, the aircraft was apparently attempting to follow the track of the previous flight. While crossing the power lines south-west of the marked power pole, the aircraft's landing gear and left wing tip struck the powerlines. With the broken powerline jammed behind the left aileron washout plate, the aircraft impacted the ground 100 metres beyond the powerpole. Ground impact forces destroyed the aircraft and reduced the cockpit area to non-survivable dimensions.
Probable cause:
On-site examination of the aircraft and subsequent laboratory examination and testing of components did not reveal any pre-existing mechanical defects or abnormalities which could be considered as factors in, or contributory to, this accident. Powerline impact marks on the aircraft were consistent with the aircraft being in a left banked attitude when it struck the wire. The investigation revealed that the loader driver's truck bucket load gauge had no conversion/calibration chart, and that the aircraft was being operated in excess of the maximum allowable weight for takeoff. It is considered probable that the pilot had elected to fly down the valley, (thus taking advantage of the downslope), to compensate for a degradation of aircraft performance whilst operating overweight in the changed ambient conditions. The absence of a superphosphate trail before wire impact indicates that the pilot did not dump any of the load and was either unaware
of, or had forgotten about, the existence of powerlines to the south-west of the marked powerpole.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The aircraft was being operated in an overweight configuration for takeoff.
2. The pilot did not adjust the takeoff weight of the aircraft to give an acceptable climb performance.
3. The pilot was unaware of, or had forgotten about, the powerlines to the south-west of the marked pole; or,
4. the pilot misjudged the clearance between the powerlines and the aircraft whilst trying to overfly them.
Final Report: