Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 690B in the Pacific Ocean: 9 killed

Date & Time: Oct 2, 1994 at 1315 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-SVQ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sydney - Williamtown - Lord Howe Island
MSN:
690-11380
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
CD111
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
2915
Captain / Total hours on type:
60.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6014
Circumstances:
At 1018 hours EST, on Sunday 2 October 1994, the pilot submitted a flight plan by telephone to the Melbourne Regional Briefing Office of the Civil Aviation Authority. The flight plan indicated that Aero Commander 690 aircraft VH-SVQ would be conducting a regular public transport service, flight CD 111, from Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport to Lord Howe Island with an intermediate landing at Williamtown. The flight was planned to operate in accordance with instrument flight rules with a nominated departure time from Sydney of 1100 hours. The aircraft was crewed by one pilot. The aircraft departed Sydney at 1117, carrying baggage that had been off-loaded from another company service which was to operate direct from Sydney to Lord Howe Island that day. The flight to Williamtown apparently proceeded normally and the aircraft arrived at about 1140. The company had no ground-based representatives at Williamtown but the pilot was observed by other persons in the terminal building to converse with passengers before proceeding to the aircraft. No other person saw the pilot and the passengers board the aircraft. At 1206 the pilot informed Sydney Flight Service that the aircraft was taxiing at Williamtown for Lord Howe Island and that he intended climbing to flight level (FL) 210. Departure was subsequently reported as 1208 when the pilot reported tracking 060 on climb to FL230 which was the original planned cruising level. The pilot reported passing 20,000 feet on climb to FL210 at 1229 and shortly afterwards asked if VH-IBF, a company aircraft flown by the chief pilot and operating from Sydney direct to Lord Howe Island, had departed. The pilot was advised that it had departed. The radar trace showed that the climb was discontinued at 20,400 ft at 1231:22. Three seconds later the aircraft commenced descent. The last recorded radar trace for SVQ was at 19,800 ft at 1232:54. The pilot of SVQ did not report at the position ‘Shark’ at 1232 as scheduled in his flight plan, and at 1235 he notified that the aircraft had commenced a descent to FL130. At 1238, the pilot of SVQ asked Sydney Flight Service if IBF was listening on high frequency and was advised that the aircraft was not due on frequency for another 30 minutes. He requested that the pilot of IBF call him on the company VHF frequency and reported that the aircraft had just passed ‘Shark’ and he would shortly provide an estimate for the next position, ‘Shrimp’. At 1245, he provided an estimate for ‘Shrimp’ of 1310 and stated that the aircraft was maintaining FL160. No explanation of the amended level was given by the pilot or sought by Sydney Flight Service. The chief pilot subsequently stated that he contacted SVQ on company frequency at about 1240 and that the pilot of that aircraft reported a severe vibration which he thought was caused by airframe or propeller icing. He also confirmed that he had turned the propeller heat on. The chief pilot recalled that he asked the pilot of SVQ if the cockpit indication showed that the propeller heat was working normally, to which he replied ‘yes its working’. During this period, the chief pilot and the pilot of SVQ had also discussed crew rostering. Prior to contact with the chief pilot, the pilot of SVQ contacted the pilot of VH-SVV, another company aircraft which was operating a flight from Coffs Harbour to Lord Howe Island. At 1316, after SVQ had not reported at the ‘Shrimp’ position, Sydney Flight Service commenced communications checks but was unable to establish communications with SVQ directly or through any other aircraft. At 1325 an uncertainty phase was declared and the Melbourne Rescue Coordination Centre was subsequently notified at 1331. At 1401 the duty officer at the Melbourne Rescue Coordination Centre contacted the Lord Howe Island aerodrome terminal and left a message for the pilot of IBF to telephone the Centre. After the arrival of IBF at Lord Howe Island, the company managing director, who was also on board the aircraft, called the Melbourne Search and Rescue Centre at 1410 to inquire about SVQ. Arrangements were made by the company and Civil Aviation Authority search and rescue to organise search aircraft and a distress phase was declared at 1411. Subsequently, the crews of IBF and SVV reported hearing a radio transmission from the pilot of SVQ, stating that he had ‘lost it’. Attempts at the time by the chief pilot to contact SVQ were unsuccessful.
Probable cause:
The factors that directly related to the loss of the aircraft could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 501 Citation I/SP in Lord Howe Island

Date & Time: Apr 22, 1990 at 1225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-LCL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sydney - Lord Howe
MSN:
501-0145
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was being used for a pleasure flight for the owner and some friends. The Captain calculated the landing distances required for both runway 28 and 10, based on weather reports obtained at briefing, which indicated a strong northerly wind component. An updated report received some 30 minutes before descent confirmed the wind as 290 degrees at 7 knots. Approaching the island and becoming visual, the crew noted the windsock near the western end of the runway to be indicating a slight headwind component in the 10 direction and decided on a straight in approach to runway 10, to avoid an approaching squall/shower. The aircraft touched down firmly a short distance beyond the threshold. Speed brakes were immediately extended and wheel braking applied. About four seconds later the Captain called for the drag chute to be deployed. Although the co-pilot correctly activated the handle, it became obvious that the chute had not deployed as no increase in retardation occurred. When the Captain realised that the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway remaining he attempted to turn the aircraft towards a clear grass area to the right. However, the aircraft was aquaplaning on the wet surface and did not respond to steering inputs for some distance. The aircraft left the bitumen tracking to the right. It collided with a gable marker, passed through a fence, continued down an embankment, across a road, through a second fence and came to rest approximately 90 metres from the runway end and 70 metres to the right of the extended centreline. The left main and nose gear legs were torn off. Witnesses to the accident said that when the aircraft landed, the runway was very wet and the wind was westerly at 5 to 10 knots.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the Captain had made some miscalculations in his pre-flight assessments. He had noted the landing distance available as being the same for both runways, whereas runway 28 has a reduced length due to terrain clearance requirements on the approach. Under the conditions both forecast and prevailing, and using the criteria applicable at the time for an aircraft fitted with an alternate means of retardation, i.e. drag chute, the landing distances required for both runways were greater than the landing distances available. The Captain had also evidently applied incorrect techniques during the landing. He had not attempted to deploy the drag chute immediately the nose wheel was on the ground, and had not applied unmodulated pressure to the anti-skid braking system. These measures are required by the manufacturer to obtain maximum performance. It was found that the drag chute canister lid had been sealed with tank sealant and painted over. The latch assembly had operated but the drogue chute spring was insufficiently strong to break the seal. When the sealant was prised away from around the lid, the system operated normally. This error had not been found during a check of the aircraft immediately following repainting. The lid had the appearance of an oblong radio antenna and was not marked in any distinguishing manner. The problem should also have been noticed during a subsequent inspection of the drag chute for moisture. The inspection is required every 90 days if the drag chute has
not been deployed, and requires the removal of the lid and drogue chute in order to feel the main chute for moisture. The condition of the sealant would indicate that this had not been carried out.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
- Inadequate pre-flight planning and preparation by the flight crew. The runway distance required was in excess of the distance available on either runway.
- Adverse runway and weather conditions - wet surface and downwind component.
- Improper sealing of drag chute canister.
- Inadequate maintenance of the drag chute system.
- Improper operation of wheel brakes.
Final Report:

Crash of a Consolidated PB2B-2 Catalina on Lord Howe Island: 7 killed

Date & Time: Sep 28, 1948 at 1930 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
A24-381
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Lord Howe Island - Lord Howe Island
MSN:
61163
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
Rathmines-based No 11 Squadron suffered the loss of a Catalina amphibian and seven crewmen in a night crash on Lord Howe Island on this day. The aircraft had completed the outward leg of a navigation exercise to the island and altered course for home when a serious fuel leak began filling the compartment with petrol vapor 20 minutes into the return leg. The captain decided to turn back to Lord Howe and attempt a landing on the island’s sheltered lagoon. After crossing the island west to east, the aircraft turned back before clipping the ridge line below Malabar Hill at about 1930LT. The Catalina careered down the slope before exploding in flames. Local residents who rushed to the scene extracted two seriously injured crew from the wreck. The death toll was the highest suffered by the RAAF in a peacetime accident up until that time.
Crew (11th Squadron):
F/Lt Malcolm D. Smith, †
F/Lt James McCoy, †
F/Lt William D. Keller, †
F/Lt Alex McKenzie, †
Sydney L. Piercey, pilot, †
W/O Sydney H. Bacon, †
W/O Donald E. Salis, †
F/LT Bert R. Bradley,
W/O John D. Lea.
Source:
http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/HistoryRecord/HistoryRecordDetail.aspx?rid=534