Georgia

About 26 minutes after takeoff while at 21500 feet, the pilot requested a non existent route. Seven minutes later, the passenger stated the pilot was light headed and fading then he had passed out. The passenger had once held a student pilot certificate and about 5 years earlier she had accrued 73 hours of flight time in Cessna 150/152 aircraft. The air traffic controller, and other pilots on the radio frequency tried to assist the passenger. The passenger was advised to provide oxygen for herself and the pilot, but she was unable. The airplane climbed to 34,200 feet where the airplane departed controlled flight, recovered, then departed controlled flight several more times before beginning a nose low descent. Witnesses reported hearing the airplane orbiting several times while flying above a cloud layer then observed the airplane orbiting beneath the clouds. While in a descending right wing low attitude, the airplane impacted the ground and came to rest submerged in a pond. Examination of the flight controls, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. A discrepancy with the regulating valve was noted. Two small holes were noted in the cabin door seal. The left wing pressurization duct had been replaced about 8 years earlier but the right wing pressurization duct, had not been replaced. The ducts are on-condition components. There was no preimpact failure or malfunction noted with the barometric pressure switch, the cabin altitude annunciator bulbs, the safety valve, solenoid valve, or differential pressure/cabin altitude gauge. Testing for carbon monoxide for both was negative.

The pilot was cleared for a localizer approach by Atlanta Center and told to maintain 5,000 feet until crossing the final approach fix (FAF). Normal altitude at the FAF was 2,700 feet. The pilot was unable to land from this approach and performed a missed approach. He was handed off to Chattanooga Approach, then was cleared to cross the FAF at 3,000 feet and perform another localizer approach. About one mile from the FAF, the pilot was told to change to the airport advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged, then there was no further communication with the aircraft. A short time later, witnesses heard the aircraft crash near the approach end of the runway. Examination of the crash site showed the aircraft had touched down in a grass area about 1,100 feet from the end of the runway, while on the localizer. Propeller slash marks showed both engines were operating at approach power and the aircraft was at approach speed. No evidence of precrash mechanical failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, systems, engines, or propellers was found. The 0621 weather was in part: 300 feet overcast and 1/2 mile visibility with fog. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the localizer approach was 1,180 feet msl; airport elevation was 710 feet. The pilot had flown 8 flight hours, was on duty for 13.6 hours the day before the accident, was off duty for about 6 hrs, and had about 4 hours of sleep before the accident flight.

The crew departed Hunter AFB on a local training mission when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances on Ossabaw Island, south of Savannah. Both pilots were killed.

During the airplane's takeoff roll, about 3/4 down the 3,700 foot runway, a witness reported that the color of the #1 exhaust flame changed from blue to yellow, accompanied by an audible change in the engine power level. The nose of the airplane yawed left and the left wing dipped. Directional control was regained and the takeoff continued. Skid marks were found about 650 feet before the departure end of the runway that continued about 1360 feet to an abandoned grocery store impacted by the plane. About 315 feet before the building, the left wing contacted a privacy fence, and a utility pole, resulting in a fire at the disrupted left wing main fuel tank. A pilot/mechanic who helped dispatch the airplane observed that the elevator was free as it taxied. Fire damage to all engines precluded a detailed post crash examination of essential fuel and ignition systems. The toxicological report regarding the second pilot indicated that 1.110 mcg/ml (ug/ml, ug/g) of Diphenhydramine, was detected in the blood. According to NTSB medical personnel, Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine often found in over-the-counter allergy medications. A single oral dose of medication containing Diphenhydramine, at twice the recommended maximum of over-the-counter dosage, resulted in maximal blood levels of between 0.08 and 0.16 mcg/ml. The level of Diphenhydramine found during the toxicology examination of the second pilot approximated ten times the levels found following a dosage at twice the recommended strength. Diphenhydramine was also found in the urine. Additional prescription and nonprescription medications were also found during the toxicological examination of the second pilot.

About two minutes into the flight, the pilot noticed a high cylinder head temperature on the right engine. The pilot opened the cowl flap doors and the cylinder head temperature dropped 200 degrees. When the pilot noticed a reduction in right engine power, he elected to shut down the engine. The copilot was instructed to secure the right engine in accordance with the emergency procedures. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot selected an emergency landing to a large open field, and the landing gear collapsed during the landing. Examination of the airplane at the accident site disclosed that the engine cowl flaps on both engines were in the open position. Examinations of the right engine subsystems failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction or component failure. A review of the normal and emergency procedures for the aircraft disclosed that the cowl flaps normal position for the shutdown engine is closed. A review of the aircraft performance data revealed that the airplane was capable of maintaining flight and a climb attitude with one engine. There was no cargo on the airplane. During the pilot's subsequent type rating reexamination in the Convair 240-27, the pilot failed to demonstrate a satisfactory level of knowledge in emergency procedures during the oral examination. The pilot subsequently surrendered the Convair 240-27 type rating to the FAA.

During the preflight briefing, the pilot was informed of reduced visibility and low ceiling in the vicinity of the destination airport, at the approximate time of the planned arrival. Upon arriving in the Atlanta area, the pilot was issued radar vectors to a final for the localizer runway 31 approach. The pilot was also given the current Atlanta altimeter setting, and was cleared for the localizer runway 31 approach. The airplane collided with a 60-foot tall light pole at a nearby baseball complex 2 miles short of the runway. The weather observation from the Hartsfield International Airport indicated that visual weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. However, according to a witness at the accident site, the weather conditions were foggy with reduced visibility. The wreckage distribution path was 2,467 feet right of the localizer course. The minimum descent altitude for this approach, using Atlanta's altimeter setting, was 1260 feet. The ground check of the localizer and DME facility was within normal operating range. Examination of the aircraft navigational radios also tested within normal ranges. The average field elevation in the vicinity of the accident site is 800 feet. The pilot's toxicological examinations detected pseudoephedrine (decongestant), phenylpropanolamine (decongestant), and chlorpheniramine (antihistamine). No samples were available to quantify the blood levels of these medications.

Atlantic Southeast Airline Flight 529 was climbing through 18,000 feet, when a blade from the left propeller separated. This resulted in distortion of the left engine nacelle, excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control. The degraded performance resulted in a forced landing. While landing, the airplane passed through trees, impacted the ground, and was further damaged by post impact fire. An exam of the left propeller revealed the blade had failed due to a fatigue crack that originated from multiple corrosion pits in the taper bore surface of the blade spar. The crack had propagated toward the outside of the blade and around both sides of the taper bore. Due to 2 previous blade failures (separations), a borescope inspection procedure had been developed by Hamilton Standard to inspect returned blades (that had rejectable ultrasonic indications) for evidence of cracks, pits and corrosion. The accident blade was one of 490 rejected blades that had been sent to Hamilton Standard for further evaluation and possible repair. Maintenance technicians, who inspected the blade, lacked proper NDI familiarization training and specific equipment to identify the corrosion that resulted in fatigue. The captain and seven passengers were killed.

As ValuJet Flight 597 began its takeoff roll, a 'loud Bang' was heard by the occupants, the right engine fire warning light illuminated, the crew of a following airplane reported to the ValuJet crew that the right engine was on fire, and the takeoff was rejected. Shrapnel from the right engine penetrated the fuselage and the right engine main fuel line, and a cabin fire erupted. The airplane was stopped on the runway, and the captain ordered evacuation of the airplane. A flight attendant (F/A) received serious puncture wounds from shrapnel and thermal injuries; another F/A and 5 passengers received minor injuries. Investigation revealed that an uncontained failure of the right engine had occurred due to fatigue failure of its 7th stage high compressor disc. The fatigue originated at a stress redistribution hole in the disc. Analysis of fatigue striation measurements indicated that the fatigue crack had originated before the disc was last overhauled at a repair station (Turk Hava Yollari) in 1991, but was not detected. Also, investigation of the repair station revealed evidence concerning a lack of adequate recordkeeping and a failure to use 'process sheets' to document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures.

The flight was executing the non-precision NDB runway 04 approach, had reported procedure turn inbound, and was cleared to change to advisory frequency. Witnesses observed the airplane descend out of the base of the overcast clouds in a 10° nose down, 45° left wing down attitude. The airplane impacted terrain about 3/4 mile south-southeast of the airport. Witnesses in the area reported that the weather was ceilings of about 100 feet and visibility of about 500 feet in light rain and fog. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 465 feet agl. Both pilots were killed.

While climbing through 6,300 feet, the pilot reported the complete loss of power on the right engine. Approx 4 min later, and after the pilot had established an emergency descent for a landing, he reported that the left engine had also lost power. The airplane impacted a driveway and skidded into a building. Examination revealed that the right engine failed due to shifting of the engine case halves. Review of the engine maintenance records indicated that several cylinders had been replaced in recent months; the cylinder through bolts are used to torque the engine case. A reason for the loss of power on the left engine was not determined.