Georgia

The Sherpa departed Hurlburt Field AFB, Florida, on flight PAT528 to Oceana NAS, Virginia, carrying 18 passengers and a crew of three. While in cruising altitude over Georgia, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls, severe turbulences, windshear conditions and wind gusting up to 72 knots. The aircraft became unstable, lost 100 feet in three seconds then adopted a nose up attitude. Within the next 12 seconds, the aircraft suffered a positive aerodynamic acceleration then entered an uncontrolled descent, partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in an open field. All 21 occupants were killed.
Crew (171st Aviation Regiment Lakeland):
CW4 Johnny W. Duce,
CW2 Erik P. Larson,
S/Sgt Robert F. Ward Jr.
Passengers (213rd Red Horse Flight, Virginia Beach):
M/Sgt James Beninati,
S/Sgt Paul J. Blancato,
T/Sgt Ernest Blawas,
S/Sgt Andrew H. Bridges,
M/Sgt Eric G. Bulman,
S/Sgt Paul E. Cramer,
T/Sgt Michael E. East,
S/Sgt Ronald L. Elkin,
S/Sgt James P. Ferguson,
S/Sgt Randy V. Johnson,
SRA Mathrew K. Kidd,
M/Sgt Michael E. Lane,
T/Sgt Edwin B. Richardson,
T/Sgt Dean J. Shelby,
S/Sgt John L. Sincavage,
S/Sgt Gregory T. Skurupey,
S/Sgt Richard L. Summerell,
Maj Frederick V. Watkins III.

Shortly after takeoff, the airplane experienced electrical problems, including numerous tripped circuit breakers. The flight crew requested a return to airport. During the landing rollout, the lead flight attendant and air traffic control personnel reported to the flight crew that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane; subsequently, the flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation on one of the taxiways. Examination of the airplane revealed fire damage to the left, forward areas of the fuselage, cabin, and forward cargo compartment. The greatest amount of fire damage was found just aft of the electrical disconnect panel located at fuselage station 237. There was no evidence that the drip shield normally installed over the disconnect panel was present at the time of the accident. Bluish stains caused by lavatory rinse fluid were observed on surfaces near the disconnect panel on the accident airplane and in the same areas on another of AirTran's DC-9 airplanes. Examination of one of the connectors from the disconnect panel on the accident airplane revealed light-blue and turquoise-green deposits on its internal surfaces and evidence of shorting between the connector pins. It could not be determined when the drip shield over the disconnect panel was removed; however, this likely contributed to the lavatory fluid contamination of the connectors. Following the accident, AirTran revised its lavatory servicing procedures to emphasize the importance of completely draining the waste tank to avoid overflows. Boeing issued an alert service bulletin recommending that operators of DC-9 airplanes visually inspect the connectors at the FS 237 disconnect panel for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and that they install a drip shield over the disconnect panel. Boeing also issued a service letter to operators to stress the importance of properly sealing floor panels and adhering to lavatory servicing procedures specified in its DC-9 Maintenance Manual. The Safety Board is aware of two incidents involving the military equivalent of the DC-9 that involved circumstances similar to the accident involving N826AT. Drip shields were installed above the FS 237 disconnect panels on both airplanes.

The pilot had experienced engine problems during a flight and requested maintenance assistance from the local maintenance repair station. Before the maintenance personnel signed off and completed the repairs, the pilot refueled the airplane, and attempted an instrument flight back to the originating airport. While enroute, the pilot reported a low fuel situation, and deviated to a closer airport. During the approach, the airplane lost engine power on both engines, collided with trees, and subsequently the ground, about a half of a mile short of the intended runway. There was no fuel found in the fuel system at the accident site. No mechanical problems were discovered with the airplane during the post-accident examination. This accident was the second time the pilot had exhausted the fuel supply in this airplane.

The flight was cleared for an NDB or GPS runway 14 instrument approach. The pilot was instructed to report procedure turn. Center radar reported the airplane's altitude was last observed at 200 feet. A witness observed the airplane as it collided with trees and the ground and, subsequently burst into flames. No mechanical problem with the airplane was reported by the pilot or discovered during the wreckage examination. Weather minimums for the approach are 800 feet an one mile. Low clouds were reported in the area at the time of the accident.

Witness's reported that the airplane took off from runway 05, which has an up slope of 1.2 degrees. The airplane was observed at approximately 10 feet above ground level, in a nose high attitude traveling parallel to the ground and not climbing. The airplane narrowly cleared a 6- foot fence off the departure end of runway 05. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted a utility pole, the roof of a bus stop, which was followed by a brick wall. At the time of the accident runway 23, which has a 1.2-degree down slope and has a clear-cut area on the departure end, was available for use. The basic empty weight for this airplane is 3,097 pounds; the useful load is 1,201.7 pounds. The actual load at the time of the accident was in excess of the useful load. There is no record of the pilot completing a weight and balance computation prior to take-off. The toxicology examinations were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, drugs and alcohol. The toxicology examination revealed that 1175(mg/dl) glucose was detected in the urine. Examination of the airplane and subsystems failed to disclose any mechanical or component failures.

The Cessna 551, collided with trees and subsequently the ground following a missed approach to runway 10, at the Crisp County Airport in Cordele, Georgia. According to the Jacksonville Air Traffic Control Center, the pilot was given radar vectors to the outer marker and cleared him for the non-precision localizer approach to runway 10. Recorded radar data showed the airplane initiating the approach at 1900 feet mean sea level (MSL) as published. The airplane descended to 600 feet MSL as published and over-flew the airport. The controller stated that he was waiting for the missed approach call, as he observed the airplane climb to 700 feet MSL. The airplane then descended back to 600 feet MSL and disappeared from radar. The controller never received a missed approach call. A witness near the airport stated that he heard the airplane fly over but did not see it due to haze and fog.

The pilots stated that approach and landing were normal. During landing rollout, about 2,000 feet down the runway, the brakes became ineffective. The aircraft continued to roll off the end of the runway, down an embankment, across a 4 lane road, and came to rest in a drainage ditch. Post-crash examination of the main landing gear brakes showed that 3 out of the 4 brake assemblies were worn beyond allowable limits and all 4 antiskid wheel generators were not producing voltage within the allowable limits. The outboard right main tire had failed during landing roll do to the antiskid becoming inoperative due to the low voltage of the wheel generator. The airplane had received an A-1 through A-6 inspection 2 days before the accident and this was the first flight since the inspection. The A-5 inspection requires inspection of the landing gear brake assemblies for wear, cracks, hydraulic leaks, and release.

The flight was cleared for a localizer approach to runway 32 at Newnan-Coweta County Airport during dark night conditions. About 8 minutes later the pilot reported to air traffic control that he had missed approach and would like to try another approach. The flight was radar vectored to the final approach course and again cleared for the localizer runway 32 approach. The flight was observed on radar to continue the approach until a point about 4 nautical miles from the airport, at which time radar contact was lost. The last observed altitude was 1,600 feet msl. The aircraft collided with 80-foot tall trees, while established on the localizer for runway 32, about 1.3 nautical miles from the runway. About the time of the accident the weather at the airport was reported as a cloud ceiling 200 feet agl, and visibility .75 statute miles. Post crash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engines, propellers, and systems showed no evidence of pre-crash failure or malfunction.

The first officer of AirTran Airways flight 890, which preceded AirTran flight 867 in the accident airplane, identified and reported a leak from the right engine of the Boeing 737-200 during a postflight inspection at William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Georgia. AirTran mechanics at ATL identified the source of the leak as a chafed hydraulic pressure line to the right thrust reverser. They found the part in the illustrated parts catalog (IPC), which was not designed as a troubleshooting document and does not contain sufficient detail for such use. One of the mechanics telephoned an AirTran maintenance controller in Orlando, Florida, for further instructions. The mechanics who initially identified the source of the leak had little experience working on the Boeing 737 because they had worked for ValuJet Airlines, which flew DC-9s only, until ValuJet and AirTran merged in September 1997. On the basis of the information provided by the mechanic, and without questioning his description of the line or verifying the part number that he had provided against the IPC or some other appropriate maintenance document, the maintenance controller instructed the mechanic to cap the leaking line and deactivate the right thrust reverser in accordance with AirTran's Minimum Equipment List procedures. However, instead of capping the hydraulic pressure line, the mechanics capped the right engine hydraulic pump case drain return line. The mechanics performed a leak check by starting the auxiliary power unit and turning on the electric hydraulic pumps to pressurize the airplane's hydraulic systems; no leaks were detected. Although the mechanics were not required by company procedures to test their repair by running the engines, this test would have alerted the mechanics that they had incorrectly capped the hydraulic pump case drain line, which would have overpressurized the hydraulic pump and caused the hydraulic pump case seal to rupture. However, because the mechanics did not perform this test, the overpressure and rupture occurred during the airplane's climb out, allowing depletion of system A hydraulic fluid. Depletion of system A hydraulic fluid activated the hydraulic low-pressure lights in the cockpit, which alerted the flight crew that the airplane had a hydraulic problem. The crew notified air traffic control that the airplane would be returning to ATL and subsequently declared an emergency. The flight crew's initial approach to the airport was high and fast because of the workload associated with performing AirTran's procedures for the loss of hydraulic system A and the limited amount of time available to perform the procedures. Nevertheless, the crew was able to configure and stabilize the airplane for landing. However, depletion of system A hydraulic fluid disabled the nosewheel steering, inboard flight spoilers, ground spoilers, and left and right inboard brakes. The flight crew was able to land the airplane using the left thrust reverser (the right thrust reverser was fully functional but intentionally deactivated by the mechanics), outboard brakes (powered by hydraulic system B), and rudder. The flight crew used the left thrust reverser and rudder in an attempt to control the direction of the airplane down the runway, but use of the rudder pedals in this manner had depleted the system A accumulator pressure, which would have allowed three emergency brake applications. The use of the right outboard brake without the right inboard brake at a higher-than-normal speed (Vref for 15-degree flaps is faster than Vref for normal landing flaps) and with heavy gross weight (the airplane had consumed only 4,650 pounds of the 28,500 pounds of fuel on board at takeoff) used up the remaining friction material on the right outboard brake, causing it to fail. (The left outboard brake was still functional at this point.) The lack of brake friction material on the right outboard brake caused one of the right outboard brake pistons to overtravel and unport its o-ring, allowing system B hydraulic fluid to leak out; as a result, the left outboard brake also failed. Loss of the left and right inboard and outboard brakes, loss of nosewheel steering, and use of asymmetric thrust reverse caused the flight crew to lose control of the airplane, which departed the left side of the runway and came to rest in a ditch.

A Cessna 525 and a Cessna 172 collided in flight about 3,400 feet mean sea level on converging courses, with the 525 heading north and the 172 heading southwest. The converging speed was about 300 knots. The 525 departed under instrument flight rules, received vectors, and was initiating a climb on course. Training in the 525 emphasizes maximum use of the autopilot to afford greater outside scanning by the single pilot. The 525 was in radio contact with terminal approach control and the pilot's acknowledgement of the climb clearance was interrupted by the collision. The 172 had departed a local airfield, located just outside the 30 mile Mode C veil airspace of a terminal airport, and proceeded southwest. The collision occurred as the 172 was approaching Class D airspace of a military tower, and the pilot was initiating radio contact with the military tower. The terminal approach controller in contact with the 525 stated he did not observe the primary target of the 172, and conflict alert software was not installed. The 172 did not display a transponder signal and the transponder switch was subsequently found in the 'off' position. A cockpit visibility study indicated that from a fixed eye position the 172 was essentially hidden behind aircraft structure of the 525 for the 125 seconds before impact. The 172 could be seen by shifting the pilot's eye position. The 525 was viewable in the left lower section of the 172's windscreen. Both airplanes were operating in visual flight conditions.