Georgia

The instrument flight was cleared for an ILS approach to the destination airport. While maneuvering for the final approach course, the flight encountered convective activity (thunderstorms). The pilot was questioned by the tower concerning his position on the approach course. The tower radar placed the flight's position 1/4 to 1/2 mile east of the final approach course. The pilot stated that he was on the localizer. Subsequent functional checks of the ils system by air ways facilities, failed to reveal a problem with the ils approach system. The airplane collided with trees about one and one half miles northeast of the airport and one half mile east of the approach course. Weather reports recorded level four thunderstorm activity within the immediate vicinity of the destination airport. Wreckage examination failed to disclose any mechanical problems with the airplane. The air traffic controllers provided the pilot with current weather conditions at the airport throughout the final minutes of the flight, therefore the pilot was aware of the thunderstorm activity near and at the airport. All four occupants were killed.

A student pilot in American AA-1A, N9317L, was on an approach to land on runway 05 of the uncontrolled airport, as a commercial pilot in Cessna 414A, N47WD, was on an approach to land on runway 14. The two runways intersected near their approach ends. The two aircraft collided as they were about to touch down at dusk over the intersection. Witnesses on the ground stated that they observed lights on the Cessna, but did not observe any lights on the American. Witnesses in other aircraft in the area stated that they heard the pilot of the american announcing his position in the traffic pattern and landing intentions, but did not hear the pilot of the Cessna on the Unicom frequency. The pilot of the Cessna stated that he announced his intention to land on runway 14 over Unicom frequency 123.0. The published Unicom frequency for the Statesboro Airport was 122.8.

The aircraft was designed and used as the company's engineering test bed. An evaluation of the fly-by-wire rudder actuator and ground minimum control speed (vmcg) was being conducted. During the final hi-speed ground test run, the aircraft abruptly veered left and became airborne. It entered a left turn, climbed to about 250 feet, departed controlled flight and impacted the ground. Investigation revealed a design feature in the rudder actuator that removes hydraulic pressure within the actuator if the rudder position commanded by the pilot exceeded the actual rudder actuator position for a specified time, and the rudder aerodynamically trails. The actuator previously disengaged in flight. The company did not conduct a system safety review of the rudder bypass feature and its consequences to all flight regimes, nor of the vmcg test. The flight test plan specified that engine power be retarded if the rudder became ineffective. Neither pilot had received training as an experimental test pilot. The company allowed experimental flight tests at a confined, metropolitan airport. All seven occupants were killed.

The pilot reported that immediately after takeoff, he had a collision with a flight of birds. He stated that the right engine immediately had a partial loss of power. He stated that he did not attempt to raise the landing gear nor the flaps following the loss of engine power, and the aircraft would not maintain altitude. Examination of the aircraft engines revealed that there was rotational scratching of the turbine housings on the right engine, and no rotational scratching on the turbine housing of the left engine.

The Sherpa departed Fort Rucker-Cairns AAF on a training flight, carrying three crew members who were supposed to test the aircraft in special configuration. Two hours and 45 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 5,336 feet in good weather conditions, the aircraft became unstable and rolled to the right to an angle of 12° then to the left to an angle of 35°. It entered an uncontrolled descent before crashing in an open field located 4 miles north of Colquitt, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed. It was determined that control was lost while the aircraft' speed was 89 knots. Originally, the crew was supposed to simulate an engine failure at the altitude of 10,000 feet but apparently encountered problems as the aircraft' speed was dropping by the order of one knot per second before it became unstable. At the time of the accident, the total weight of the aircraft and its CofG were within limits.

At 0716, the pilot received a weather brief for a proposed takeoff of 1130. The FSS briefer provided info on thunderstorms forecast in GA and FL. No info was provided about forecast lines and clusters of thunderstorms in SC coastal plains and sern GA. En route, the pilot was given info about level III thunderstorms across the projected flight path by Beaufort and Savannah approach control. ATC radar data revealed that the aircraft flew the route contained in the flight plan clearance. Radio transmissions from the aircraft indicated that onboard weather radar was being used. ATC radar data and radio communications indicated that the aircraft entered a thunderstorm, then made a 180° turn to exit the storm. Examination of the wreckage revealed plastic deformation of the wings inboard of the engines in an upward direction. Also, both wings broke off outboard of the engines in a downward direction. The horizontal stab and elevator were not recovered. There was fuselage damage which indicated that the horizontal stab separated aft and down. All five occupants were killed.

Before takeoff, an IFR flight plan was filed for a 15 minutes flight from Rome, GA, to Huntsville, AL. Takeoff was commenced at 0937 est with the copilot flying the aircraft. After a VFR takeoff, the captain contacted Atlanta Center to obtain an IFR clearance. The controller advised that other traffic was in the area and instructed the flight to remain VFR (while an IFR clearance was being arranged). At that time, the flight reported at 1,300 feet in VFR conditions. While waiting for an IFR clearance, the crew became concerned about higher terrain and low ceilings. At about 0940, the captain directed the copilot to fly 'back to the right.' Approximately one minute later, the CVR stopped recording and radio contact was lost with the aircraft. Later, the aircraft was found where it had collided with the top of Mt Lavender. Elevation of the crash site was approximately 1,580 feet msl. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system. All nine occupants were killed, among them Angelo J. Bruno, the chairman of Bruno's Inc. company; his brother, Lee J. Bruno, vice chairman; Sam A. Vacarella, senior vice president for merchandising; Edward C. Hyde, vice president for store operations, and R. Randolph Page Jr., vice president for personnel.

The single engine rated pilot and 2 passengers were returning from Florida after picking up a newly acquired Cessna 402. The pilot called Macon FSS for fuel availability, and began a night, VFR descent. At about 5,300 feet msl, the airplane began rapid altitude excursions, while in a tight, right hand turn. During this time, it descended 2,600 feet in 37 seconds, then climbed 1,200 feet in 12 seconds. Subsequently, the airplane impacted gradually rising terrain at high speed. The engines were buried, and all prop blades showed evidence of power at impact. Weather in the area was reported to be: sky partially obscured with fog. An investigation revealed that the pilot was not multi-engine rated. A pilot for the seller flew with the accident pilot a few hours prior to the crash; he reported that the accident pilot had difficulty flying the airplane. He recommended that the accident pilot get additional training prior to leaving florida, but the accident pilot refused. All three occupants were killed.

Witnesses reported that the airplane suddenly turned or rolled left until the wings were perpendicular to the ground. The airplane then fell in a nose-down attitude. Examination of the left propeller components indicated a blade angle of about 3°, while the left propeller control unit (pcu) ballscrew position was consistent with a commanded blade angle of 79.2°. Extreme wear on the pcu quill spline teeth, which normally engaged the titanium-nitrided splines of the propeller transfer tube, was found. The titanium-nitrided surface was much harder and rougher than the nitrided surface of the quill. Therefore, the transfer tube splines acted like a file and caused abnormal wear of the gear teeth on the quill. Wear of the quill was not considered during the certification of the propeller system. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all 23 occupants were killed, among them John Goodwin Tower, Senator of Texas and the astronaut Manley Sonny Carter.

Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft was seen flying low over trees, followed by a rapid roll to the left and a collision with wooded terrain. One witness reported seeing gray smoke trailing the left engine before the crash. An inspection of the wreckage revealed the left engine spark plugs were black and heavily sooted. Neither propeller had been feathered before the accident. The landing gear was found in an extended position. Further investigation revealed that Cessna multi-engine service bulletin (SB) 88-3 was not complied with. This SB modified the fuel system to provide for direct pilot (rather than automatic) actuation of the output pressure of the auxiliary fuel pumps. Both engines ran satisfactorily on a test stand following the accident. No other evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction was found. All three occupants were killed.