Plain, Valley

The four engine airplane departed Yekaterinburg on a flight to Tiksi with an intermediate stop in Kansk, carrying 32 passengers and seven crew members. During a polar night approach, the aircraft deviated from the approach pattern and dropped below the glide path relying on a flawed approach scheme. This caused the belly to touch the summit of a snow-covered hill (392 metres high) located 31 km northwest of Tiksi Airport. The aircraft bounced and touched the ground again on the rear slope of the hill some 1,250 metres further on. The fuselage broke into three parts. There was no fire. All 7 crew and 31 passengers were injured, 16 seriously.

The airline transport pilot delayed his scheduled departure for the night cargo flight due to thunderstorms along the route. Before departing, the pilot explained to the flight follower assigned to the flight that if he could not get though the thunderstorms along the planned route, he would divert to the alternate airport. While en route, the pilot was advised by the air traffic controller in contact with the flight of a "ragged line of moderate, heavy, and extreme" precipitation along his planned route. The controller also stated that he did not see any breaks in the weather. The controller cleared the pilot to descend at his discretion from 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 3,000 ft msl, and subsequently, the controller suggested a diversion to the northeast for about 70 nautical miles that would avoid the most severe weather. The pilot responded that he had enough fuel for such a diversion but concluded that he would "see what the radar is painting" after descending to 3,000 ft msl. About 1 minute 30 seconds later, as the airplane was descending through 7,000 ft msl, the controller stated, "I just lost you on radar, I don't show a transponder, it might have to do with the weather." About 40 seconds later, the pilot advised the controller that he intended to deviate to the right of course, and the controller told the pilot that he could turn left and right as needed. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that he was going to turn around and proceed to his alternate airport. The controller cleared the pilot direct to his alternate and instructed him to maintain 3,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged the instruction, and the controller then stated, "do you want to climb back up? I can offer you any altitude." The pilot responded that he would try to climb back to 3,000 ft msl. The controller then recommended a heading of 180° to "get you clear of the weather quicker," and the pilot responded, "alright 180." There were no further communications from the pilot. Shortly thereafter, radar data showed the airplane enter a right turn that continued through about 540°. During the turn its airspeed varied between 198 and 130 knots, while its estimated bank angles were between 40 and 50°. Examination of the wreckage indicated that airplane experienced an in-flight breakup at relatively low altitude, consistent with radar data that showed the airplane's last recorded altitudes to be around 3,500 ft msl. The symmetrical nature of the breakup, damage to the outboard wings, and damage to the upper fuselage were all signatures indicative that the left and right wings failed in positive overload almost simultaneously. All of the fracture surfaces examined had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. There was no evidence of pre-existing cracking noted at any of the separation points, nor was there evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Review of base reflectivity weather radar data showed that, while the pilot was maneuvering to divert to the alternate airport, the airplane was operating in an area of light precipitation that rapidly intensified to heavy precipitation, as shown by radar scans completed shortly after the accident. During this time, the flight was likely operating in clouds along the leading edge of the convective line, where the pilot most likely would have encountered updrafts and severe or greater turbulence. The low visibility conditions that existed during the flight, which was conducted at night and in instrument meteorological conditions, coupled with the turbulence the flight likely encountered, were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's maneuvering during the final moments of the flight was consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. The pilot's continued flight into known convective weather conditions and his delayed decision to divert the flight directly contributed to the accident. Although the operator had a system safety-based program, the responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight was left solely to the pilot. Written company policy required completion of a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) before each flight by the assigned flight follower; however, a FRAT was not completed for the accident flight. The flight followers responsible for completing the FRATs were not trained to complete them for night cargo flights, and the operator's management was not aware that the FRATs were not being completed for night cargo flights. Further, if a FRAT had been completed for the accident flight, the resultant score would have allowed the flight to commence into known hazardous weather conditions without any further review. If greater oversight had been provided by the operator, it is possible that the flight may have been cancelled or re-routed due to the severity of the convective weather conditions present along the planned route of flight.

The twin engine aircraft departed Madrid-Cuatro Vientos Airport on a private flight to Cascais, Portugal, carrying three passengers and one pilot. One of the reasons for the flight was to repair the weather radar at a Portuguese maintenance center that specialized in this equipment. The pilot had to delay the takeoff until 1557LT due to bad weather conditions. The aerodrome of Cuatros Vietnos was in instrument conditions (IMC), which forced its closing from 0900LT until 1444LT. At 1615LT, the aircraft was en route, climbing from flight level 190 to its authorized cruise level of 210. Moments later, according to a detailed analysis of the data taken from the radar, there was a yaw to the left, and the aircraft started to turn in this direction and suddenly lose altitude. After this event, the airspeed fell quickly and gradually until the aircraft stalled. The aircraft went into a spin, which after some time turned into a flat spin. As the airplane descended out of control, and with the spin fully developped, loads were placed on the horizontal tail that exceeded the design loads, causing the tail to break up in flight into five parts before the aircraft impacted the ground. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the impact and sibsequent fire, and its four occupants were killed in the accident.

The twin engine airplane was involved in a smuggling flight within Mexico and was carrying three people. In unclear circumstances, the pilot attempted a belly landing in a swampy area located in El Sacrificio, State of Campeche. The wreckage was found by local authorities few hours later and no trace of the occupant was found or the load was found. The registration N633D is attributed to a Piper PA-31 with MSN 31-7852098 which was not involved in this accident. Thus, it was confirmed by Mexican and US Authorities that the registration was false.

The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to reposition the airplane to another airport for refuel. During preflight, he reported that the airplane's two fuel gauges read "low," but the supplemental electronic fuel totalizer displayed 55 total gallons. He further reported that it is not feasible to visual check the fuel quantity, because the fueling ports are located near the wingtips and the fuel quantity cannot be measured with any "external measuring device." According to the pilot, his planned flight was 20 minutes and the fuel quantity, as indicated by the fuel totalizer, was sufficient. The pilot reported that about 12 nautical miles from the destination airport, both engines began to "surge" and subsequently lost power. During the forced landing, the pilot deviated to land in grass between a highway, the airplane touched down hard, and the landing gear collapsed. The fuselage and both wings sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported in the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot/ Operator Aircraft Accident Report that there was a "disparity" between the actual fuel quantity and the fuel quantity set in the electronic fuel totalizer. He further reported that a few days before the accident, he set the total fuel totalizer quantity to full after refueling, but in hindsight, he did not believe the fuel tanks were actually full because the wings may not have been level during the fueling. The "Preflight" chapter within the operating manual for the fuel totalizer in part states: "Digiflo-L is a fuel flow measuring system and NOT a quantity-sensing device. A visual inspection and positive determination of the usable fuel in the fuel tanks is a necessity. Therefore, it is imperative that the determined available usable fuel be manually entered into the system."

On 10 October 2016, at approximately 0820 Pacific Daylight Time, a privately operated de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver aircraft on amphibious floats (registration C-GEWG, serial number 842), departed from Vanderhoof Airport, British Columbia, for a day visual flight rules flight to Laidman Lake, British Columbia. The pilot and 4 passengers were on board. Approximately 24 minutes into the flight, the aircraft struck terrain about 11 nautical miles east of Laidman Lake. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT) activated on impact. The ELT's distress signal was detected by the Cospas-Sarsat satellite system, and a search-and-rescue operation was initiated by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Victoria. One of the passengers was able to call 911 using a cell phone. The pilot was fatally injured, and 2 passengers were seriously injured. The other 2 passengers sustained minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no post-impact fire.

The noninstrument-rated private pilot was conducting a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country flight while receiving VFR flight following services from air traffic control. Radar data and voice
communication information indicated that the airplane was in cruise flight as the pilot deviated around convective weather near his destination. The controller issued a weather advisory to the pilot concerning areas of moderate to extreme precipitation along his route; the pilot responded that he saw the weather on the airplane's NEXRAD weather display system and planned to deviate around it before resuming course. About 3 minutes later, the pilot stated that he was around the weather and requested to start his descent direct toward his destination. The controller advised the pilot to descend at his discretion. Radar showed the airplane in a descending right turn before radar contact was lost at 2,900 ft mean sea level. There were no eyewitnesses, and search personnel reported rain and thunderstorms in the area about the time of the accident. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with an in-flight breakup. Examination of the airframe revealed overload failures of the empennage and wings. No pre-impact airframe structural anomalies were found, and the propeller showed evidence of rotation at the time of impact. Further, there was no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation. Review of weather information indicated that the pilot most likely encountered instrument meteorological conditions as the airplane descended during the last several minutes of flight. During this time, it is likely that the pilot became disoriented while attempting to maneuver in convective, restricted visibility conditions, and lost control of the airplane. The transition from visual to instrument flight conditions would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation; the turning descent before the loss of radar contact and the in-flight breakup are also consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.

The twin engine airplane was completing a flight to Asunción, carrying one passenger and one pilot. En route, the pilot encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. Upon landing on a dirt road, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest with its right wing torn off. Both occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The Cessna had departed about 3 minutes prior on a scheduled passenger flight and the Piper was en route to a remote hunting camp when the two airplanes collided at an altitude about 1,760 ft mean sea level over a remote area in day, visual meteorological conditions. The airline transport pilot and two passengers onboard the Cessna and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Piper were fatally injured; both airplanes were destroyed. Post accident examination revealed signatures consistent with the Cessna's outboard left wing initially impacting the Piper's right wing forward strut while in level cruise flight. Examination revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of either airplane. Neither pilot was in communication with an air traffic control facility and they were not required to be. A performance and visibility study indicated that each airplane would have remained a relatively small, slow-moving object in the other pilot's window (their fuselages spanning less than 0.5° of the field of view, equivalent to the diameter of a penny viewed from about 7 ft away) until about 10 seconds before the collision, at which time it would have appeared to grow in size suddenly (the "blossom" effect). From about 2 minutes before the collision, neither airplane would have been obscured from the other airplane pilot's (nominal) field of view by cockpit structure, although the Cessna would have appeared close to the bottom of the Piper's right wing and near the forward edge of its forward wing strut. The Cessna was Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipped; the Piper was not ADS-B equipped, and neither airplane was equipped with any cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). CDTI data would have presented visual information regarding the potential conflict to both pilots beginning about 2 minutes 39 seconds and auditory information beginning about 39 seconds before the collision, providing adequate time for the pilots to react. The see-and-avoid concept requires a pilot to look through the cockpit windows, identify other aircraft, decide if any aircraft are collision threats, and, if necessary, take the appropriate action to avert a collision. There are inherent limitations of this concept, including limitations of the human visual and information processing systems, pilot tasks that compete with the requirement to scan for traffic, the limited field of view from the cockpit, and environmental factors that could diminish the visibility of other aircraft. Given the remote area in which the airplanes were operating, it is likely that the pilots had relaxed their vigilance in looking for traffic. The circumstances of this accident underscore the difficultly in seeing airborne traffic by pilots; the foundation of the "see and avoid" concept in VMC, even when the cockpit visibility offers opportunities to do so, and particularly when the pilots have no warning of traffic in the vicinity. Due to the level of trauma sustained to the Cessna pilot, the autopsy was inconclusive for the presence of natural disease. It was undetermined if natural disease could have presented a significant hazard to flight safety.

The crew was performing a cargo flight from La Paragua to Canaima. While descending to Canaima in the early morning, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane crashed some 34 km northeast of the intended destination, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.
Crew:
Johnny Ramirez, pilot,
José Angel Soto Zapata, copilot.