Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

During initial climb, the pilot mistakenly positioned the fuel selector on the CUT OFF position while trying to retract the flaps, causing the engine to stop.

The accident was due to the fact that:
- Despite inadequate weather conditions, the crew decided to continue the approach under VFR mode and thus the approach to the ground could not be recognized in time,
- Due to insufficient situational awareness of the pilots, the descent was not canceled in time.

Examination of the accident site and surrounding area by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector revealed the left wing impacted several 4 to 6 inch-diameter trees prior to separating from the aircraft. The airplane then spun to the left, with fuel from the severed wing splashing on the nose section of the airplane and onto the hot left engine. The fuel ignited and caused substantial damage to the left engine and forward left section of the fuselage. Post-accident examination also revealed that the nose landing gear (NLG) had separated from its mount at the nose trunnion. Further investigation revealed that the left NLG trunnion lug had sheared from the trunnion assembly. The fractured lug was sent to the manufacturer for fractographic examination. The examination revealed a pre-existing crack at the surface of the NLG trunnion lug. The crack was approximately 0.015 inch deep at the time of final fracture. Subsequent investigation revealed that the fractured component was taken from a Cessna 310 airplane, and had accumulated approximately 20,000 service hours. According to maintenance records, on March 12, 2013, the nose gear attached tunnel and forward bulkhead were repaired as part of the filed insurance claim, and the nose gear trunnion assembly was replaced at this time. Cessna Multi-engine Service Bulletin MEB88-5 (Revision 2), Nose Gear Trunnion/Replacement, stated the preferred inspection method for the side lug area was a surface eddy current inspection. An alternate fluorescent penetrant inspection may be used for those facilities without eddy current inspection capabilities. However, MEB88-5 was not a federally mandated requirement for all owner/operators to accomplish. Subsequently, the subject trunnion assembly installed on the accident airplane had received only a visual examination prior to installation.

Breakdown in communication during the planning and execution of an unapproved procedure has been determined to be the probable cause of this accident.
Other contributing factors:
- Use of an unapproved procedure to aid in a maneuver that was critical,
- Too many persons were planning the maneuver and not coordinating their actions,
- Failure of planners of the maneuver to verify whether participants were in the right position,
- Inexperienced persons used in the execution of a maneuver that was not approved,
- Vehicle parked to close to the side of the runway,
- Vehicle left with engine running while parked near the runway.

Loss of control during the takeoff roll due to the poor condition of the runway.

The following findings were identified:
- The pilot took the risks inherent to that flight when he accepted to be the only crewmember on a night-time flight with an aircraft in which he lacked enough experience. It is therefore considered that the pilot was complacent when he accepted to fly the aircraft under those circumstances, taking the risks associated with the operation.
- The fact that the pilot made a phone call to his father, to tell that he was feeling insecure for conducting the flight, may be considered an indication that he was not confident, and this condition may have influenced negatively his operational performance during the descent procedure.
- It is possible that the motivation of the pilot in making a fast progress in his career contributed to his acceptance of the challenge to operate the flight, even if he was not feeling fully confident.
- It is possible that the characteristics related to the type of flight, regions, time of the day, in addition to the fact that the pilot was flying the aircraft alone for the first time, contributed to an unclear perception of the relevant elements around him, leading him to a mistaken comprehension, which resulted in the deterioration of his ability to foresee the events.
- The operational progress of the pilot in the company was expedited and, therefore, it is possible that for this reason he did not gather the necessary experience for conducting that type of flight.
- It is possible that the way the work was organized within the company, with designation of pilots not readapted in the aircraft for night-time flights without artificial horizon, and for takeoffs with an aircraft weight above the one prescribed in the manual contributed to the event that resulted in the accident.
- It is possible that the prioritization of the financial sector, in detriment of operational safety, contributed to the designation of a single pilot with short experience for transporting nine passengers.
- It is probable that the pilot, during the preparation of the aircraft for landing, allowed the its speed and power to drop to a value below the minima required for maintenance of level flight on the downwind leg.
- It is possible that the location of the runway in an isolated area of the Amazonian jungle region, without visual references in a night-time flight, contributed to the pilot’s difficulty maintaining a sustained flight.
- It is possible that the training done by the pilot in a shortened manner deprived him from the knowledge and other technical abilities necessary for flying the aircraft.
- The decisions of the company operation sector to designate a short-experienced pilot without a copilot for a night flight destined for an aerodrome located in a jungle region without visual reference with the terrain increased the risk of the operation. Therefore, the risk management process was probably inappropriate.
- It was the first time the pilot was flying the aircraft on a night-time flight without a copilot. Since he had only little experience in the aircraft, it is possible that his operational performance was hindered in the management of tasks, weakening his situational awareness.
- It was not possible to determine whether the company chose to dispense with the copilot on account of the need to transport a ninth passenger and, thus, did not consider in a conservative manner the prescription contained in the aircraft airworthiness certificate by designating just one pilot for the flight.

The final approach and the go-around procedures were non-standard. The accident was caused by a stall during the climb, and the distance between the aircraft and the ground was insufficient to expect recovery. Weather conditions were not considered as a contributing factor.