Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Following an uneventful flight from Boston-Logan, the crew initiated the descent to Gainesville Airport. Weather conditions at destination were considered as marginal due to the presence over the area of the tropical storm 'Colin'. After landing on a wet runway, the aircraft rolled for about 1,000 feet then veered off runway to the left. While contacting soft ground, the left main gear and the nose gear collapsed then the aircraft came to rest in a grassy area. All three occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 33L at Seoul-Incheon Airport and reached V1 speed after a course of 6,413 feet. At a speed of 182 knots, the crew heard a noise corresponding to the failure of both tires n°9 and 10 located on the central landing gear. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance of 4,635 feet (in relation with the total weight of 629,600 lbs), the airplane overran. While contacting a grassy area, the nose gear collapsed then the airplane struck various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 485 meters past the runway end. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 3 June 2016, a Cessna 208B of registration 5Y-JLL and serial number 2158 was conducting a charter passenger flight from Akobo Airstrip to Juba with 4 passengers and one flight crew member on board. According to the operator, during takeoff from Akobo Airstrip at approximately 10 a.m. Local Time, the pilot executed a premature takeoff due to animal incursion on the runway. The airplane's right main landing gear clipped the Airstrip perimeter fence and the aircraft crash-landed onto grass-thatched houses and trees near the end of the runway. Damage was substantial with no reported injuries. The runway was reported to have been wet at the time of occurrence.

On 19 May 2016, at 0832 hours local time (L), a B-52H, tail number 60-0047 [Mishap Aircraft (MA)], assigned to the 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Wing, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, departed the prepared-surface overrun of Runway 06 Left (RWY 06L) during a highspeed, heavy-weight, aborted takeoff. The Mishap Crew (MC), which consisted of the Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Co-Pilot (MCP), Mishap Radar Navigator (MRN), Mishap Navigator (MN), Mishap Electronic Warfare Officer (MEW), an augment pilot occupying the Mishap Gunner (MG) station, and an Instructor Weapon System Officer occupying the Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) jump seat, were conducting a Higher Headquarters Directed mission. The MC were treated for minor injuries consistent with a ground egress. The MA sustained total damage with a loss valued at $112M. There was no damage to private property. The MC were cleared for takeoff at 0831L. The MA accelerated within performance standards verified by takeoff and landing data calculated performance for S1 timing and S1 decision speed. Approximately three to five seconds after reaching the S1 speed of 111 knots, the MP, MCP, and MN observed birds in front of the MA at wing level. Shortly thereafter, the MP and MCP observed engine indications for numbers 5, 6, and 7 “quickly spooling back” from the required takeoff setting. The MP also observed high oil pressure indications on the number 8 engine and a noticeable left-to-right yawing motion. Accelerating through approximately 142 knots, the MP simultaneously announced and initiated aborted takeoff emergency procedures. With the throttles set to idle thrust and airbrakes set to six, the MP initiated continuous braking pressure. The MCP deployed the drag chute at 135 knots. The drag chute failed to inflate properly. At 2,500 feet runway remaining, the MP shut off the outboard engines (numbers 1/2 and 7/8). Shortly thereafter, the MP announced the MA and MC were going to depart the prepared surface. The MEW jettisoned the defensive compartment, starboard-side hatch and the MP shut off the inboard engines (numbers 3/4 and 5/6). The MA departed the prepared surface shearing the main landing gear. The MA finally came to a rest slightly canted from runway centerline, right wing down approximately 300 feet from the runway, and subsequently caught on fire. The MC performed emergency aircraft shutdown procedures and safely egressed the MA through the MEW hatch.

On May 18, 2016 the crew of An-12B 4K-AZ25 aircraft operated by Silk Way Airlines including the Captain, First Officer, navigator, flight mechanic, flight radio operator and loadmaster was planned to fly via route Baku (Azerbaijan) - Bagram (Afghanistan) - Dwyer (Afghanistan) - Mary (Turkmenistan) - Baku. There were also two maintenance mechanics and an engineer on board the a/c. The preliminary training of the crew was conducted on 29.12.2015 by the Chief Navigator of Silk Way Airlines. The pre-flight briefing was conducted on 18.05.2016 by a captain-instructor and a navigator-instructor. The following has been determined so far. According to the information available at the moment the flight to Dwyer aerodrome was conducted in an acceptable way. At 09:11:27 the crew started up the engines at Dwyer aerodrome, Engine #2 was the last to be started up at 09:47:37. Before the takeoff the Captain distributed the duties within the crew, nominating the FO as the PF, and himself as PM. After the engine startup the crew initiated taxiing to perform takeoff with heading 229°. The concrete RWY of Dwyer aerodrome is measured 2439 m by 37 m. The a/c TOW and CG were within the AFM limitations. In the course of the takeoff, at 09:57:56 the flight mechanic reported an increase in MGT of Engine #3 above the acceptable level: "Engine #3, look, engine temperature over six hundred, over seven hundred", which was confirmed by the FO: "Yes, it's getting temperature" while the Captain asked to be more attentive. According to the crew reports the takeoff was performed with Flaps 15. As the checklist was being read, the Captain ordered to lock the propellers. After the Captain's order to lock the propellers a slight increase in torque-measuring device values was recorded on Engine #1 and #4, and in 17 seconds also Engine #2, which indirectly implies that propellers #1, #2 and #4 were at stops. There is no evidence that propeller of Engine #3 was locked. At 09:59:42 the crew initiated the takeoff. Before the takeoff the ATC advised the crew on the wind direction and speed on the RWY: 280° 14 knots (7 m/sec) gusting 26 knots (13 m/sec). Thus it was quartering headwind and the headwind component might have been 5 to 9 m/sec. While performing takeoff the crew first increased thrust on Engines #1 and #4 and then on Engine #2 after 10 seconds. The thrust of the three engines was about 50 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (lower than takeoff mode). The third engine was still operating in the ground idle mode, though the CVR did not record any crew callouts concerning Engine #3 operation parameters. Based on the CCTV system of Dwyer aerodrome the takeoff roll was initiated almost from the RWY threshold and was conducted to the left of the RWY centerline. No significant deviations from the takeoff course during the takeoff roll were recorded. During the takeoff roll the rudder was deflected left close to extreme. Probably the pilots were also applying differential control on Engine #2 to decrease the right torque moment. At 10:00:14 at approximately 120 km/h IAS the "Engine #3 negative thrust" signal was started to be recorded and was recorded on up to the end of the record. At that time the a/c was about 430 m away from the start of the takeoff roll. At 10:00:42 Engines #1 and #4 thrust was increased up to 63 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (consistent with takeoff mode for the actual flight conditions). At that time the IAS was about 150 km/h Engine #2 thrust was increased up to the same value only 23 seconds later at about 200 km/h IAS. At that time the a/c was about 840 m away from the RWY end. Engine #3 was still operating in ground idle mode. Approximately 260 m before the RWY end at a speed of 220 km/h IAS (maximum speed reached) the FDR recorded the start of nose up input on the control column. The a/c did not lift off After rolling all along the RWY the a/c overran the RWY onto the ground at a speed of 220 km/h While moving on the ground the aircraft sustained significant damage, which led to post-crash fire that destroyed most of the aircraft structures. Out of the nine persons on board seven were killed and two were seriously injured and taken to hospital.

The commercial pilot reported that, after takeoff on the local skydiving flight, the engine experienced a total loss of power. He initiated a turn toward the airport, but realized the airplane would not reach the runway and chose to perform a forced landing to an open field. During the landing roll, the airplane exited the field, crossed a road, impacted a truck, and continued into a vineyard, where it nosed over. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the fuel pressure line that connects the fuel control unit to the airframe fuel pressure transducer was fractured below the fuel control unit fitting's swaged seat. In addition, a supporting clamp for the fuel pressure fuel line was fractured and separated. The operator reported that the fractured fuel line had been replaced the night before the accident and had accumulated about 4 hours of operational time. The previously-installed line had also fractured. Metallurgical examination of the two fractured fuel lines revealed that both fuel lines fractured due to reverse bending fatigue through the tube wall where a ferrule was brazed to the outside of the tube. There were no apparent anomalies or defects at the crack initiation sites. Examination of the supporting clamp determined that it fractured due to unidirectional bending fatigue where one of the clamp's tabs met the clamp loop, with the crack initiating along the inward-facing side of the clamp. The orientation of the reverse bending fatigue cracks and the spacing of the fatigue striations on the tube fracture surfaces were consistent with high-cycle bending fatigue due to a vibration of the tube. The cushioned support clamp is designed to prevent such vibrations from occurring. However, if the clamp tab is fractured, it cannot properly clamp the tube and will be unable to prevent the vibration. The presence of the fractured clamp combined with the fact that the two pressure tubes failed in similar modes in short succession indicated that the clamp most likely failed first, resulting in the subsequent failure of the tubes. Since the clamp was likely fractured when the first fractured fuel pressure line was replaced, the clamp was either not inspected or inadequately inspected at the time of the maintenance.

The commercial pilot was entering the airport traffic pattern for landing during a familiarization flight. He reported that he turned on the carburetor heat, switched the fuel tank selector to the right fuel tank, and shortly thereafter, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot attempted numerous times to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. After realizing that he would not be able to reach the runway, he decided to make a forced landing to a small field. During the landing approach, the airplane contacted a power line, nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, about 16 ounces of water were removed from the fuel system. Water was present in the lower gascolator, the fine fuel filter (upper gascolator), and subsequent fuel line to the carburetor inlet. A brass screen at the carburetor inlet and 2 carburetor fuel bowl thumb screens also contained corrosion, water, and rust. The approved aircraft inspection checklist called for washing the carburetor and main fuel filter every 50 hours and cleaning and/or replacing the fine fuel filter every 100 hours. The fine fuel filter is not easily accessible and not able to be drained during a preflight inspection. The mechanic who completed the most recent inspection stated that he did not drain or check the fine fuel filter. The last logbook entry that specifically stated the fuel filters were cleaned was about 4 years before the accident.

The aircraft was engaged in a fire fighting mission over the Fort McMurray area as 'Tanker 45'. Following an uneventful mission, the crew returned to Manning Airport. After landing on runway 25, the aircraft suffered directional control problems and veered off runway to the right. It collided with a drainage ditch, lost its nose gear and came to rest in a grassy area. The propeller separated from the right engine while the propeller on the left engine was bent. The fuselage broke in two just behind the cockpit area. Both pilots evacuated with minor injuries.

On April 30, 2016, the aircraft Fokker F27 MK50 registration marks SE-LEZ, operating Air Vallee flight number RVL233, took off from Rimini airport at 06.48 hrs with 18 passengers and 3 crew on board. During the final approach to Catania airport, with the aircraft stabilized on ILS Z RWY 08, the crew noticed that the right and left main landing gear lights were green but the nose landing gear light was amber. The crew informed the ATS (Catania APP) that they were in contact with the problem and informed them of their intention to continue the approach to perform a low pass on the runway followed by a standard missed approach procedure, in order to request a visual verification from the control tower of the actual extension of the nose gear. During the low passage, the control tower informed the crew that the nose gear was not extended despite the opening of the nose gear compartment. After the passage, all lights, including the amber light of the nose landing gear, went off. The aircraft proceeded to the INDAX point to perform a holding at an altitude of 3000 feet as agreed with ATS during which the crew applied the abnormal procedures for nose gear unsafe down after selection and alternate down procedures. Both procedures were unsuccessful and the crew declared an "emergency" informing ATS of their intention to perform a final maneuver (leveled 2G turn). The captain of the flight, who had been PNF up to that moment, took the controls as PF and executed the turn: also in this case without any positive outcome. The crew informed ATS of the situation, stating the number of passengers, the amount of fuel on board and the absence of dangerous goods. The crew decided to follow a VOR procedure for RWY26 followed by a visual approach in order to make a last low passage to check the condition of the nose gear. After this second missed approach, the aircraft was instructed to perform an ILS procedure for RWY 08. Landing took place at 09:34 hrs with the main gear properly extracted and locked, the nose gear in "up" position and the doors open. The following is a sequence of pictures taken from a video of the accident, acquired by ANSV through the Catania airport operator, in which the aircraft is seen landing with the nose landing gear not extended and touching the ground only when it reached the speed necessary to sustain it in the absence of nose landing gear support. After completion of the landing run, with the aircraft remaining in the middle of the runway, the engines were shut down and passengers and crew disembarked without further incident. Some of the passengers were transferred to the airport emergency room and subsequently some of them were sent to hospital for further examination; no passenger was reported to have sustained injuries as a result of the event.

Crashed on final approach to El Obeid Airport, killing all five crew members. The accident was caused by a technical failure according to the Sudanese Air Force while local rebels claimed they shot down the aircraft with a mortar shell.