Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The following findings were identified:
- The condition of the runway at Cuenca airport, which at the time of the plane's landing was contaminated with water and slippery.
- The landing was made after a non-stabilized approach with a tailwind.
- During seven seconds, the crew continued the approach with an excessive rate of descent of 1,186 feet, 186 feet above the limit of 1,000 feet.
- The non-application of the Maximum Performance Landing procedure recommended by the aircraft manufacturer for landing on contaminated runways.
- The dispatch of the flight with 1,500 kg of fuel more than the amount of fuel usually used for this flight.
- Omission of the runway length calculation necessary to perform the landing using the braking efficiency information.
- The crew's decision to make the final approach with three red and one white lights, using the PAPI system, induced by the information in the Terminal Information document issued by the company, which authorized this procedure.
- The use of confusing terminology in the Terminal Information document, which used terms applicable to the Airbus fleet, instead of Embraer's.
- The crew's decision not to perform the thwarted approach maneuver after the maximum allowable vertical speed was exceeded and visibility was apparently limited after the minima were exceeded.
- Incorrect use of aircraft braking aids, in this case reverse braking aids
- The application of the emergency brake that inhibits the antiskid system.
- Lack of implementation of adequate management of crew resources, particularly within the cockpit.
- Lack of training in the use of tables for track distance calculation.
- In reference to landing conditions, the aircraft needed a runway length of 2,122 metres while the available distance was 1,900 metres.

It is considered that the accident was caused by an error in the application of the emergency extension procedure of the landing gear following a total failure of the electrical system.
Contributing factors :
- Start a visual flight with a deferred pending repair in the electrical system, specifically with the generator on the right side.
- Lack of recent training and simulation with emergency procedures.
- The versatility of the pilot and diversity of different aircraft types flown.
- The non-activation of the warning light on the left-hand side of the cockpit panel when the electrical system failed about 30 minutes prior to the total exhaustion of all batteries.

The pilot's failure to obtain proper takeoff speed before breaking ground, which resulted in the airplane's failure to gain altitude and a collision with trees and terrain.

The cause of the accident was that the crew failed to actuate the lever used to deploy the landing gear. Inadequate presentation, in the operator's operating manuals, of the flight tasks to be performed by each crew member and the timing of these tasks is identified as a contributing factor.

The following factors were identified:
- Application of the commands - contributed
There was no effective action on the aircraft controls during the final approach to avoid a brutal impact with the ground prior to the runway threshold.
- Adverse weather conditions - undetermined
It is possible that the aircraft was under the effect of the phenomenon known as windshear, which affected the approach profil and the subsequent impact with the ground short of runway.
- Pilot judgement - contributed
The risks of a possible windshear during the final approach were not adequately considered by the pilot. The decision to proceed for the landing, to the detriment of the alternative recommended by experts to perform a missed approach, proved decisive for the development of the accident.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. Neither pilot had considered that the combination of landing at night, in reduced visibility, with a crosswind and blowing snow, on a runway with no centreline lighting, was a hazard that may create additional risks.
2. The blowing snow made it difficult to identify the runway centreline markings, thereby reducing visual cues available to the captain. This situation was exacerbated by the absence of centreline lighting and a possible visual illusion caused by blowing snow.
3. Due to the gusty crosswind conditions, the aircraft drifted to the right during the landing flare, which was not recognized by the crew.
4. It is likely that the captain had difficulty determining aircraft position during the landing flare.
5. The flight crew’s decision to continue with the landing was consistent with plan continuation bias.
6. During landing, the nosewheel struck the compacted snow windrow on the runway, causing the nose landing gear to collapse.

Findings as to risk:
1. If aircraft are not equipped with a 406 MHz-capable emergency locator transmitter, flight crews and passengers are at increased risk of injury or death following an accident because search-and-rescue assistance may be delayed.
2. If operators do not have defined crosswind limits, there is a risk that pilots may land in crosswinds that exceed their abilities, which could jeopardize the safety of flight.
3. If composite propeller blades contact objects and separate, and then strike or penetrate the cabin, there is a risk of injury or death to occupants seated in the propeller’s plane of rotation.
4. If modern crew resource management training is not a regulatory requirement, then it is less likely to be introduced by operators and, as a result, pilots may not be fully prepared to recognize and mitigate hazards encountered during flight.
5. If organizations do not use modern safety management practices and do not have a robust safety culture, then there is an increased risk that hazards will not be identified and mitigated.
6. When testing an emergency locator transmitter’s (ELT) automatic activation system, a sticking g-switch may go undetected if more than 1 football throw is necessary to activate the ELT. As a result, the ELT might not activate during an accident, and search-and-rescue assistance may be delayed, placing flight crews and passenger at an increased risk for injury or death.

The unstable approach in black-hole conditions, resulting in the airplane overshooting the runway extended centerline and descending well below a safe glidepath for the runway. Contributing to the accident was the lack of monitoring by the copilot allowing the pilot to fly well below a normal glidepath.

The aircraft’s centre of gravity was significantly aft of the aft limit. When landing flap was set, full nose-down elevator and elevator trim was likely to have had no effect in lowering the nose of the aircraft. Unless the flaps had been retracted immediately, the nose-up pitch may also have resulted in tail plane stall, exacerbating the pitch up. The wings stalled, followed immediately by the right wing dropping. Recovery from the stall at such a low height was not considered possible.
Other factors:
Other factors is used for safety deficiencies or concerns that are identified during the course of the investigation, that while not causal to the accident, nevertheless should be addressed with the
aim of accident and serious incident prevention, and the safety of the travelling public.
a) Following the reweighing of SBC, the operator did not make adjustments to account for the shift of the moment arm as a result of the reweighing. Specifically, a reduction of allowable maximum weight in the baggage compartment.
b) The pilot, although signing the flight manifest on previous flights attesting that the aircraft was loaded within c of g limits, had not computed the c of g. No documentation was available to confirm that the pilot had computed the c of g for the accident flight, or any recent flights.
c) All of the High Frequency radio transmissions between Air Traffic Services and SBC were significantly affected by static interference and a lot of hash, making reception difficult, and many transmissions unclear and unreadable. This is a safety concern to be addressed to ensure that vital operational radio transmissions are not missed for the safety of aircraft operations, and the travelling public.

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the aborted landing in gusty crosswind conditions, which resulted in a runway excursion and a collision with a tree.

Failure of the left engine following the detachment of the head of a cylinder shortly after takeoff. Deficiencies in maintenance processes contributed to this situation. The crew failed to follow the emergency procedures when the left engine caught fire and exploded, reducing the power on the right engine. In such conditions, the aircraft was unable to maintain a safe altitude and the crew was forced to attempt an emergency landing.