Crash of a Cessna 402A in Stord: 9 killed

Date & Time: Oct 12, 1998 at 2325 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OY-BHE
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Aalborg - Stord
MSN:
402A-0062
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
On final approach to Stord-Sørstokken Airport by night, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed in a rocky area located 180 metres short of runway 33. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed, among them eight naval workers.
Probable cause:
It was determined that both engines failed simultaneously on final approach due to fuel exhaustion.

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Arusha

Date & Time: Oct 9, 1998 at 1056 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5H-MPR
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Arusha – Kilimanjaro – Mombasa
MSN:
402B-0113
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7700
Captain / Total hours on type:
252.00
Circumstances:
Prior to departure, the pilot reported to ground mechanics that an unusual noise came from the left main gear. An inspection was conducted but nothing anormal was noted. Nevertheless, the pilot was told to fly directly to Mombasa for further control. After takeoff from runway 09, while climbing, the pilot was contacted by ATC who reported that the left main gear detached and fell away. He was cleared to return for an emergency landing and completed a belly landing few minutes later. The aircraft came to rest on runway and was damaged beyond repair. All four occupants escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the left main gear had undergone a maintenance check on January 3, 1996 and no anomalies had been detected since. Nevertheless, the runway surface at Arusha Airport was in relative poor condition with the presence of several holes. As a result, it is likely that the landing gear suffered a severe impact during a previous landing.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Ravenna

Date & Time: Oct 8, 1998 at 0255 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N3543A
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Detroit – Ravenna
MSN:
31-7952242
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2370
Captain / Total hours on type:
80.00
Aircraft flight hours:
10112
Circumstances:
The pilot departed on a night multiple-leg flight series with full tanks. On approach for the second landing, the green landing gear lights extinguished. The pilot discovered that if the landing gear was extended the circuit breaker would stay in and if the landing gear was retracted the circuit breaker would pop. The circuit breaker controlled the landing gear lights, the engine oil pressure, and both fuel quantity gauges. The pilot continued on four additional flights in that condition. The fourth flight terminated 5 miles from the runway with a double power loss. Examination revealed the fuel tanks were empty. The pilot had flown the airplane 4.3 hours including 6 takeoffs, one missed approach, and a 20 minute ground run prior to departure with both engines running on the final flight.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper decision to continue to operate the airplane with inoperative equipment which resulted in fuel exhaustion. Factors were the inoperative fuel quantity gauges, and the night conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747SP-44 in Maputo

Date & Time: Oct 5, 1998 at 0955 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZS-SPF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Maputo - Lisbon
MSN:
21263
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
50
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Maputo Airport, while climbing, the engine n°3 failed, exploded and caught fire. Debris struck the engine n°4 and punctured the right wing and a fuel tank, causing a severe fire. The crew was cleared for an immediate return. Following a normal approach and landing, the aircraft was stopped on the main runway and all 66 occupants evacuated safely. The aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Douglas DC-3C in Canaima: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 2, 1998 at 0945 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YV-611C
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Canaima - Canaima
MSN:
1977
YOM:
1938
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a charter flight over the Salto Angel falls east of the Mt Auyán-Tepui, in the Canaima National Park, carrying 22 tourists and a crew of three. On approach to Canaima Airport, at an altitude of 3,000 feet, the right engine lost power. The crew continued the approach when the left engine suffered a loss of power as well. The aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field located 1,600 metres short of runway. The copilot was killed and three other occupants were seriously injured.

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 680FPL in Palm Springs: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 1, 1998 at 1005 LT
Registration:
N5YZ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Palm Springs - Palm Springs
MSN:
680-1513-22
YOM:
1965
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3200
Aircraft flight hours:
5420
Circumstances:
While departing on a local area aircraft checkout flight the aircraft stayed low and the pilot advised the tower that he had a fuel problem. The aircraft had been fueled with aviation grade 100LL twice the day before in preparation for a trip. The pilot attempted to return to the airport, but collided with power lines 1.5 miles north. Examination of the engines revealed severe detonation had occurred. A fuel sample was obtained from the aircraft and tested negative for jet fuel contamination. The aircraft had been modified by installation of higher horsepower engines and turbochargers with manual wastegates. During postaccident examination of the aircraft systems the manual wastegates were found partially closed; a position that can provide additional manifold pressure. The engines are restricted to a maximum of 29.5 inHg.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to properly use the manual turbocharger wastegates and to monitor the manifold pressure during takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Praia: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 28, 1998 at 1330 LT
Operator:
Registration:
D4-CAX
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Campo de Priguiça – Praia
MSN:
550
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
VR5301
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
19
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was completing a government flight (VR5301) from Campo de Priguiça to Praia, carrying three crew members and the Prime Minister Carlos Veiga and his team. On approach to Praia-Francisco Mendes Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong winds. The crew was cleared to make a low pass over runway 22 then make a sharp turn to the left, causing the left wing tip to struck the ground. Out of control, the aircraft crashed 150 metres from the runway 04 threshold. A passenger, a Prime Minister's bodyguard, was killed while 21 other occupants were injured, four seriously.
Probable cause:
It was reported that prior to departure from Campo de Priguiça Airport, the crew was informed about weather conditions at destination that were considered as good with 10 km visibility and clouds at 1,400 feet. It was determined that weather conditions at Praia Airport deteriorated en route and the crew failed to obtain a second bulletin from ATC based at Praia. Also, the crew departed Campo de Priguiça Airport with insufficient fuel reserve, which contributed to the precipitation of the last flight sequence.

Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation V Ultra in Fairoaks

Date & Time: Sep 26, 1998 at 0703 LT
Registration:
VP-CKM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sheffield - Fairoaks
MSN:
560-0413
YOM:
1997
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14500
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Circumstances:
The crew left Sheffield in VP-CKM at 0622 hrs for their flight planned destination of Fairoaks with London Heathrow Airport as an alternate. By 0650 hrs they were in contact with the Aerodrome Flight Information Service Officer (AFISO) at Fairoaks but the AFISO advised the crew not to land until the normal operating time at 0700 hrs when the airfield would have fire cover available. The current weather was reported to the crew by the AFISO as follows: Sky clear; mist with a visibility of 1,200 metres; surface wind 060° less than 5 kt; QNH 1002 mb and QFE 1005 mb. The commander, who was the handling pilot, approached the airfield on a track of 060° using the Fairoaks Non-directional Radio Beacon (NDB) and the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS), and descended to 1,000 feet agl with the intention of landing on Runway 06. However, neither pilot saw the airfield until they were overhead and, in agreement with the AFISO, decided to make an approach to Runway 24 because of better visibility in that direction. The AFISO switched on the Abbreviated Precision Approach Path Indicators (APAPIs) for Runway 24 and the commander flew a tear drop pattern to the east of the airfield and then established the aircraft on a track of 240° towards the airfield. During the pattern, the gear had been selected down and the flaps set to an intermediate position. At 1.8 nm DME range, the co-pilot saw the APAPIs slightly left of the aircraft nose and pointed them out to the commander; at the time, the co-pilot recalled that the APAPIs were showing 'two whites', the aircraft was at 1,000 feet agl and at 124 kt IAS. By now, the crew had been advised to land at their discretion with the wind calm. Subsequently, full flap was selected and the commander noted his speed on short finals as 104 kt. As VP-CKM approached the threshold, the commander called for the deployment of speedbrakes; as the co-pilot deployed the speedbrakes, he noted the DME range as 0.5 nm and that the FMS indicated a tailwind of 5 kt. The commander considered that touchdown was positive and just beyond the threshold; the co-pilot considered that touchdown was just past the APAPIs. Immediately after touchdown, the commander selected full thrust reverse on both engines and applied moderate wheel braking. Initially, he considered that the retardation seemed adequate but then seemed to reduce. The co-pilot was not aware of retardation and remembered applying maximum brake pedal pressure while noticing that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". When he realised that he could not stop the aircraft before the end of the runway, the commander stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to close down the engines. During the later part of the landing run, the co-pilot heard a call of "going round" and saw the commander stow the thrust reversers. After leaving the runway, the aircraft travelled for 250 metres before coming to rest. The passenger evacuated through the cabin escape hatch and the co-pilot followed him after an unsuccessful attempt to open the normal cabin door. The co-pilot was then able to open the cabin door from the outside and assist the commander to leave. The commander had sustained back injuries and the copilot had received some cuts and bruises.
Probable cause:
Investigation indicated that there was no technical reason for the aircraft to overrun the runway. One factor outside the crew's control was that the APAPIs were not set at the glideslope angle described in the Jeppesen approach charts. However, the error was one quarter of one degree and should not have affected the touchdown point of the aircraft. Additionally, the crew stated that the APAPIs showed 'two whites' when first acquired and made no mention of them during the approach; it seems likely that the commander was flying his approach to land close to the threshold. Prior to departure, the commander checked the landing distance required for the expected weight of VP-CKM at Fairoaks and calculated that he had 30 to 40 metres longer than required based on zero surface wind. This calculation was subsequently confirmed as reasonable for a landing on Runway 24. However, the initial approach into Fairoaks was for Runway 06 which has a landing distance some 53 metres less than Runway 24. Therefore, the landing distance available on Runway 06 was less than that required by the Flight Manual by at least 13 metres. The commander was unable to land on Runway 06 because of the into sun visibility and so landed on Runway 24. For the approach to Runway 06, the surface wind was reported as 060° less than 5 kt and, for the subsequent approach to Runway 24 the surface wind was reported as calm. The landing distance available on Runway 24 was more than that required by the Flight Manual on a dry runway with no wind. However, the reported surface winds indicated a possibility that the aircraft could experience some tail wind component during the landing and the co-pilot also noted that the FMS displayed a tailwind of 5 kt as he deployed the speedbrakes. The presence of mist could indicate a runway surface other than dry and the co-pilot also noted that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". Against these factors, the commander would have considered the added advantage of using thrust reversers. Nevertheless, since the commander was not applying any recommended safety factors, it would have been prudent for him to ensure that his approach and touchdown were accurate. He considered that his speed was close to that required as he approached the threshold and that the landing was just beyond the threshold. However, the co-pilot considered that the touchdown was just past the APAPIs positioned 142 metres from the threshold. Outside observers noted the touchdown as between 1/3 and 1/2 way down the runway and this view was corroborated by calculations from the CVR and radar information. The speed on touchdown, as assessed from the recorded information, was close to that required. From touchdown to leaving the paved runway surface, took a period of 11.5 seconds. Thrust reverse was used for three seconds and deselected some 6 seconds before the aircraft left the runway. As thrust reverse was deselected, the commander called "we're going round". This would indicate that the commander became concerned during his landing roll that he would not be able to stop in the distance available and deselected thrust reverse in preparation for a Go-Around. However, the Flight Manual warns that a Go-Around should not be attempted once thrust reverse has been selected. Since there was no evidence from the CVR that power was subsequently advanced, it seems likely that the commander immediately decided against this option. However, the action of deselecting thrust reverse reduced the aircraft rate of deceleration as the runway end approached and resulted in a longer overrun. The commander subsequently stated that he cancelled reverse thrust to enable him to shut down the engines and reduce the risk of fire in what was, by then, obviously going to be an overrun.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31P Pressurized Navajo in Myrtle Beach

Date & Time: Sep 25, 1998
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N684AE
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
31-7400207
YOM:
1974
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
For unknown reasons, the twin engine airplane belly landed at Myrtle Beach and was damaged beyond as a result. The pilot, sole on board, escaped uninjured.

Crash of a Convair CV-240-13 in San Juan

Date & Time: Sep 24, 1998 at 1319 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N91237
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
San Juan – Santiago de Cuba
MSN:
140
YOM:
1949
Flight number:
TFA237
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7772
Captain / Total hours on type:
1409.00
Aircraft flight hours:
33835
Circumstances:
During the initial takeoff roll, there was a fluctuation of Brake Mean Engine Pressure (BMEPa measurement of engine output) on #2 engine, and the pilot elected to abort the takeoff. The pilot completed two additional engine run-ups, and no abnormalities were noted. During the second attempted takeoff, and as the airplane climbed through 200 feet MSL, a loud bang or back fire from the #2 engine was heard. BMEP fluctuated and dropped showing about 150 BMEP difference with engine #1. The engine oil temperature started to rise rapidly, the engine oil pressure dropped and the airplane started to vibrate. The first officer reduced the #2 engine to 'dry' power, upon which a second bang or backfire was heard from the #2 engine. The #2 propeller was then feathered by the First Officer. Since altitude could not be maintained, the pilot ditched the airplane in the salt water lagoon. An FAA Inspector who examined the crash site noted that the right engine propeller was not fully feathered, and the wing flaps were extended about three degrees.. The airplane was recovered from the water 70 days after the accident. The flight crew completed the engine out emergency procedure in accordance with the prescribed checklist.
Probable cause:
The loss of power in the No. 2 engine for undetermined reasons, and the inability of the pilot to establish a climb and/or maintain altitude. A factor was the incompletely feathered No. 2 propeller.
Final Report: