Crash of an Antonov AN-124-100 in Novosibirsk

Date & Time: Nov 13, 2020 at 1210 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-82042
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Novosibirsk - Vienna
MSN:
9773054055093
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
VI4066
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The four engine airplane departed Seoul-Incheon Airport on a cargo flight to Vienna, with an intermediate stop in Novosibirsk, carrying 14 crew members and a load consisting of 84 tons of automobile parts. Shortly after takeoff from runway 25 at Novosibirsk-Tolmachevo Airport, while in initial climb, a catastrophic failure occurred on the engine n°2. Several debris punctured the fuselage, damaging slats on both left and right side. As a result, radio communications were cut, the power supply failed and the thrust control on all three remaining engines dropped. The crew entered a circuit for an immediate return despite the aircraft was in an overweight condition for an emergency landing. After touchdown on runway 25 that offered an LDA of 3,597 metres, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its both nose gears and slid in a snow covered field before coming to rest 300 metres further. All 14 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft seems to be damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of the high pressure compressor disk on the engine n°2 during the takeoff procedure.

Crash of a Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 in São Pedro

Date & Time: Oct 30, 2020 at 1750 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PR-LMP
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
São Paulo – São Pedro
MSN:
500-00094
YOM:
2009
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7300
Captain / Total hours on type:
2350.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
676
Copilot / Total hours on type:
409
Circumstances:
After touchdown on runway 29 at São Pedro Airport, the crew initiated the breaking procedure but the airplane failed to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with various obstacles, went down an embankment of 10 metres and eventually came to rest 130 metres further, bursting into flames. All four occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
Studies and research showed that the low deceleration of the aircraft and the limitation of the hydraulic pressure provided by the brake system were compatible with a slippery runway scenario. Thus, one inferred that the runway was contaminated, a condition that would reduce its coefficient of friction and impair the aircraft's braking performance, making it impossible to stop within the runway limits. On account of the mirroring condition of the runway in SSDK, it is possible that the crew had some difficulty perceiving, analyzing, choosing alternatives, and acting appropriately, given a possible inadequate judgment of the aircraft's landing performance on contaminated runways.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-32A in Iquitos

Date & Time: Oct 14, 2020 at 1321 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OB-2120-P
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lima - iquitos
MSN:
18 05
YOM:
1989
Country:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5681
Captain / Total hours on type:
4530.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1366
Copilot / Total hours on type:
470
Aircraft flight hours:
9830
Aircraft flight cycles:
10893
Circumstances:
After touchdown on runway 06 at Iquitos-Coronel Francisco Secada Vignetta Airport, the aircraft went out of control and veered off runway to the left. It contacted trees and bushes, lost its right wing and came to rest 100 metres to the left of the runway, broken in two. A fire erupted but was quickly extinguished. All four crew members were slightly injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Runway Excursion due to loss of directional control of the aircraft after landing by disengaging the propeller stops for aerodynamic braking at a higher than established speed, which generated an uncontrollable leftward turning moment of the trajectory, due to asymmetric thrust of the propellers.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Performing a landing on an Unstabilised Approach, not executing the established Go-Around procedure.
- Performing a failed landing due to asymmetric thrust of the propellers, not applying the procedure established in the Operator's QRH to shut down the failed engine.
- Probable failure of the KTA Fuel Regulator of the Automatic Engine Rotation Frequency and Power Regulation System, which blocked the reduction of the power of the N°2 engine to established operating regimes for the approach and landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-4A in Yakataga

Date & Time: Oct 10, 2020 at 1544 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N96358
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kenai - Yakataga
MSN:
27284
YOM:
1944
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17925
Captain / Total hours on type:
2163.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8832
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1964
Aircraft flight hours:
33718
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot reported that the flight had been delayed for “nearly 2 weeks due to rain” but that the company had contacted their customer, who was a local resident of the area, and he had reported that the landing grass airstrip was “currently dry” and that he was unaware of any NOTAMs reporting that the runway was closed. The pilot reported that, while landing the airplane on the airstrip, the braking action was “zero” along the entire length of the runway. Subsequently, while about 5 knots, the airplane overran the end of the runway, and the nose landing gear collapsed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the forward fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that, during a formal flight brief from a Federal Aviation administration (FAA) Flight Service Station (FSS), he and the copilot asked if there was “anything special going on down there” that they should be aware of” but that FSS personnel did not mention any NOTAMs stating that the runway was closed to heavy airplanes nor was it mentioned when they activated the flight plan. However, according to FAA FSS recordings, during the first conversation, the pilot did not ask for any NOTAMs for the airport. During the second conversation, the FSS asked the pilots if they needed any weather information or NOTAMs, and the pilots responded, “no,” and that they “were all good.” A NOTAM had been issued, which stated, in part, that the landing runway was closed to aircraft that weighed more than 5,000 lbs. The airport chart supplement remarks stated, in part, that “the runway was extremely soft when wet…Use of heavy aircraft over 4,000 lbs gross not recommended during fall, winter, & spring due to” soft field conditions and rutting.” The pilot reported that the airplane’s weight was about 62,568 lbs at the time of the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilots’ decision to land on a wet, soft runway, which resulted in the loss of braking action upon landing and a subsequent runway overrun and nose landing gear collapse.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Mundri

Date & Time: Oct 10, 2020
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5H-NWA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mundri - Juba
MSN:
208B-0891
YOM:
2001
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane suffered an accident while taking off from Mundri Airfield, causing the right main gear and the nose gear to be torn off. Also, both wings were severely damaged. There were no fire and no injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It seems it was owned by Newton Air and leased to Zantas Air Services.

Crash of a Cessna 414 Chancellor in North Palm Beach

Date & Time: Oct 8, 2020 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8132Q
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
North Palm Beach - Claxton
MSN:
414-0032
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1987
Captain / Total hours on type:
897.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
149
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
6377
Circumstances:
The copilot, who was seated in the right seat, reported that after an uneventful run-up and taxi, the pilot, who was seated in the left seat, initiated the takeoff. The airplane remained on the runway past the point at which takeoff should have occurred and the copilot observed the pilot attempting to pull back on the control yoke but it would not move. The copilot then also attempted to pull back on the control yoke but was also unsuccessful. Observing that the end of the runway was nearing, the copilot aborted the takeoff by reducing the throttle to idle and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the runway into rough and marshy terrain, where it came to rest partially submerged in water. Postaccident examination of the airplane and flight controls found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Specifically, examination of the elevator flight control rigging, in addition to functional checks of the elevator, confirmed continuity and normal function. Additionally, the flight control lock was found on the floor near the rudder pedals on the left side of the cockpit. Due to a head injury sustained during the accident, the pilot was unable to recall most of the events that transpired during the accident. The pilot did state that he typically removed the control lock during the preflight inspection and that he would place it in his flight bag. He thought that a shoulder injury may have led to the control lock missing the flight bag, and why it was found behind the rudder pedals after the accident. Review and analysis of a video that captured the airplane during its taxi to the runway showed that the elevator control position was similar to what it would be with the control lock installed. While the pilot and copilot reported that they did not observe the control lock installed during the takeoff, the position of the elevator observed on the video, the successful postaccident functional test of elevator, and the unsecured flight control lock being located behind the pilot’s rudder pedals after the accident suggest that the control anomaly experienced by the pilots may have been a result of the control lock remaining inadvertently installed and overlooked by both pilots prior to the takeoff. According to the airframe manufacturer’s preflight and before takeoff checklists, the flight control lock must be removed during preflight, prior to engine start and taxi, and the flight controls must be checked prior to takeoff. Regardless of why the elevator control would not move during the takeoff, a positive flight control check prior to the takeoff should have detected any such anomaly. It is likely that the pilot failed to conduct a flight control check prior to takeoff. Further, the pilot failed to abort the takeoff at the first indication that there was a problem. Although delayed, the copilot’s decision to take control of the airplane and abort the takeoff likely mitigated the potential for more severe injury to the occupants and damage to the airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection during which he failed to detect a flight control abnormality, and his failure to expediently abort the takeoff, which resulted in the co-pilot performing a delayed aborted takeoff and the subsequent runway overrun.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46R-350T Matrix in Vannes

Date & Time: Oct 5, 2020 at 1415 LT
Registration:
N898BB
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vannes - La Môle
MSN:
46-92057
YOM:
2008
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
845
Captain / Total hours on type:
565.00
Circumstances:
On the morning of the day of the accident, the pilot, accompanied by a passenger, flew under IFR flight mode from La Môle (83) to Quiberon (56). The flight took 3 hours and 40 minutes and the return was scheduled in the afternoon. After landing in Quiberon, the pilot learned that there was no possibility to refuel with AVGAS, information that was not specified by NOTAM. The pilot then decided to refuel at Vannes-Meucon Airport before leaving to St Tropez-La Môle. He said he was upset by this situation and by the bad weather conditions in the area. During the pre-flight visit to Quiberon, the pilot added oil. He indicates that he also carried out a pre-flight inspection before takeoff from Vannes. During the takeoff roll from runway 22 at Vannes-Meucon Airport, the rotation took place in the first third of the runway. Just after liftoff, he saw the engine cowling open. He immediately thaught he forgot to tighten the dipstick and decided to abort the takeoff and landed on the remaining runway. The runway being long, he believed he can stop before the runway end. He put the power levers in the "full, reduced and choke" position and tried to land the plane quickly. As the aircraft already reached a high speed, it landed 200 metres short of runway end and deviated longitudinally and crossed the runway end safety area, known as RESA. It came to a stop a 100 metres further on an embankment. The left wing was partially torn off and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. There was no fire. Both occupants escaped uninjured.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-500TP Malibu Meridian in Lake Elmo

Date & Time: Oct 2, 2020 at 1512 LT
Registration:
N62ZM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lake Elmo - Mesquite
MSN:
46-97087
YOM:
2001
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3828
Captain / Total hours on type:
42.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2850
Circumstances:
On October 2, 2020, about 1512 central daylight time (CDT), a Piper PA-46-500TP, N62ZM, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Lake Elmo, Minnesota. The airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff from runway 32 at the Lake Elmo airport (21D) and following landing gear retraction, he noticed a “hiccup” in the engine power and immediately started a turn back towards the airport. During the turn, all engine power was lost and the pilot executed a forced landing into a field of standing corn. The airplane impacted the terrain, bounced, and came to rest upright in the corn about ½ mile northwest of the departure end of runway 32. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing as a result of the impact and post-crash fire. The airplane was equipped with a Pratt & Whitney PT6A turboprop engine.
Probable cause:
A total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26Sh at Chuhuiv AFB: 26 killed

Date & Time: Sep 25, 2020 at 2050 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
76 yellow
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chuhuiv AFB - Chuhuiv AFB
MSN:
56 08
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
26
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in a local training flight at Chuhuiv AFB, carrying 7 crew members and 20 cadets. On approach to runway 16, the crew apparently encountered engine problems when the aircraft lost height and crashed 2 km short of runway threshold near motorway E40, bursting into flames. Two passengers were seriously injured while 25 other occupants were killed. Few hours later, one of the survivors died from his injuries.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Guaymaral

Date & Time: Sep 22, 2020 at 0655 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
HK-4669G
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Guaymaral – Flandes
MSN:
208B-0968
YOM:
2002
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13220
Captain / Total hours on type:
1506.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2830
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Guaymaral-Flaminio Suárez Camacho Airport runway 29, while climbing to a height of 200 feet, the engine suffered and explosion and lost power. The airplane started to descend, impacted a brick wall and lost its undercarriage. It then crash landed in a prairie and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All five occupants escaped uninjured. The accident occurred three minutes after takeoff.
Probable cause:
The investigation determined that the accident was caused by the following probable causes:
- Emergency landing of the aircraft on an unprepared field, as a result of a decrease in power, generated by engine failure.
- An engine failure caused by the fracture of three (3) blades of the rotor disk of the high pressure compressor, which caused severe backwards damage to the hot and power section.
Contributing Factors:
- Non-compliance in the engine maintenance process, of what was ordered in AD. No. 2014-17-08R1 FAA (year 2014), which establishes the replacement of the engine blades high pressure compressor in anticipation of material failures in these components.
- Deficient maintenance processes by the provider of this service to the aircraft HK4669G, by not detecting the condition of the high-pressure rotor blades in the boroscopic inspections of the high pressure during routine boroscopic inspections.
- Deficient verification of the Operator's contracted maintenance processes, by not verifying the quality and compliance the quality and full compliance of these processes by the maintenance service provider.
Final Report: