Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

During the flight, the private pilot/operator was most likely seated in the left seat. He obtained his instrument rating about 7 months prior to the accident, and had accumulated approximately 300 hours of flight experience; of which, about 80 hours were in the accident airplane. The commercial pilot/company pilot was most likely seated in the right seat. He had accumulated approximately 1,000 hours of flight experience; of which, about 125 hours were actual instrument experience, and 80 hours were in the accident airplane. The commercial pilot had filed a flight plan to the wrong airport, received a weather briefing for the wrong airport, and therefore was not aware of the NOTAM in effect for an out of service approach lighting system at the destination airport. When the commercial pilot realized his error, he changed the flight plan, but did not request another weather briefing. According to radar information, the airplane flew the instrument landing system runway 5 approach fast, performed a steep missed approach to 1,000 feet, and then disappeared from radar, consistent with a loss of control during the missed approach. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions were identified with the airplane during the investigation. The reported weather at the accident airport included an overcast ceiling at 200 feet, visibility 1 mile in light rain and mist, and wind from 160 degrees at 4 knots. The investigation could not determine which pilot was flying the airplane at the time of the accident.

The airplane was operated by a company pilot. A noncompany pilot, who had not attended or completed a training course or received a checkout for Raytheon Aircraft Company Beech King Air 200 airplanes, was asked by the pilot to accompany him on the flight so that the noncompany pilot could accumulate flight time. The flight only required one pilot. While the airplane was in cruise flight (27,000 feet mean sea level), the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the sound of the windshield fracturing. The CVR transcript indicated that the company pilot was not in the cockpit when the windshield fractured because he was emptying trash in the cabin. This action showed poor judgment considering the noncompany pilot was not qualified in the airplane. Although the windshield stayed in place, the company pilot stated that “within seconds” after it fractured, he depressurized the airplane because he was unsure about the windshield’s “integrity.” However, the Beech King Air Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) states to maintain cabin pressurization in the event of a fractured windshield and further states that the airplane can continue flight for up to 25 hours with the windshield fractured. During the on-scene examinations, an unapproved document (not derived from the AFM) that contained several checklists was found on the airplane. The company pilot stated that he used this document and that it “came with the airplane.” The document did not include a checklist addressing a cracked or shattered windshield. The company pilot most likely was not aware that the airplane should not have been depressurized nor that it could operate for 25 hours after the fracture occurred and, therefore, that the fractured windshield did not present an in-flight emergency. The CVR transcript revealed that, after depressurizing the airplane, the pilots attempted to use the oxygen masks but were unable to receive any oxygen. (The pilots most likely did not turn the oxygen on once they needed it because they either forgot as a result of the emergency or because they did not have time to do so before they lost consciousness.) According to the company pilot, during his preflight inspection of the airplane, the oxygen system was functional. He stated that, after the inspection, he turned the oxygen system ready switch to the OFF position because he wanted to “save” the oxygen, which was not in accordance with the Before Start checklist in the AFM. Post accident functional testing of the oxygen system revealed normal operation. The unapproved checklists document did not include the instruction to leave the oxygen system on. Regardless, the pilot stated that he knew the approved checklist stated to leave the oxygen system on but that he still chose to turn it off. The pilot exhibited poor judgment by using an unapproved, incomplete checklists document and by knowingly deviating from approved preflight procedures. About 1 minute after the pilots tried to get oxygen, the CVR recorded the last comment by either pilot. For about the next 7 minutes until it stopped recording, the CVR recorded the sounds of increased engine propeller noise, the landing gear and overspeed warning horns, and altitude alerts indicating that the airplane had entered an uncontrolled descent. (The CVR’s 4-g impact switch was found in the open position during the on-scene examination, indicating that the airplane experienced at least 4 acceleration of gravity forces.) Further, a plot of two radar data points, recorded after the last pilot comment, showed that the airplane descended from 25,400 feet to 7,800 feet within 5 minutes. Shortly thereafter, the pilots regained consciousness and recovered from the uncontrolled descent. The airplane was substantially damaged by the acceleration forces incurred during the uncontrolled descent and subsequent recovery. Examination of the windshield revealed that a dense network of fractures was located on the inner glass ply; however, the windshield did not lose significant pieces of glass and maintained its structural integrity. Therefore, the fractures did not preclude safe continued flight. Post accident examinations revealed evidence that the fracture initiated due to a design deficiency in the glass. The manufacturer redesigned the windshield in 2001 (the accident airplane was manufactured in 1998), and no known similar fractures have occurred in the newly designed windshield. The manufacturer chose not to issue a service bulletin for a retrofit of the new windshield design in airplanes manufactured before 2001 because the fracture of one pane of glass is not a safety-of-flight issue.

For unknown reasons, the twin engine aircraft made a wheels up landing at Narsarsuaq Airport and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. They were completing a flight from Goose Bay. The exact date of the occurrence remains unknown, somewhere in January 2007.

Following a normal takeoff acceleration on runway 13 at Pau-Pyrénées Airport, the pilot-in-command started the rotation when the aircraft immediately rolled to the left. Then it rolled to the right and to the left again, lost height, struck the ground and bounced. At a speed of about 160 knots, the crew reduced the engine power when the aircraft rolled to the right of the runway, struck the perimeter fence then collided with a truck driving along a road. Upon touchdown, both main landing gears were torn off and the aircraft slid on its belly before coming to rest in an open field located 535 metres past the runway end. All 54 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The truck's driver was killed while his colleague was seriously injured.

A Beech 99 and a Cessna 402 were substantially damaged in a ground collision that occurred during night taxi operations at General Mitchell International Airport (MKE), Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Both pilots followed each of the controller's instructions to proceed to the same cargo ramp using intersecting taxiways after having landed. Neither controller had advised either pilot that other aircraft would be approaching the same taxiway intersection. Neither pilot reported seeing the other airplane approaching the taxiway intersection. The Cessna 402 landed on runway 25R and was instructed to taxi to the cargo ramp via Golf, Bravo, and Alpha taxiways. The Beech 99 landed on runway 25L. The taxi instructions given to the Beech 99 pilot were to turn right at taxiway A2 (high-speed taxiway), monitor ground on frequency 121.8, and taxi to the cargo ramp. The local controller reported he scanned taxiway A, the runway, and saw the Beech 99 clear of the runway. As the Beech 99 prepared to turn off taxiway A2 onto taxiway A, the Cessna 402 approached the taxiway A and taxiway A2 intersection. The Beech 99's right propeller impacted the Cessna 402's left wing tip fuel tank. The impact of the two airplanes resulted in a fire. Both of the pilots involved in the ground collision evacuated their respective airplanes. The FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," states that the absence of holding instructions authorizes an aircraft to cross all taxiways and runways that intersect the taxi route. FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," states that it is the procedure for controllers to instruct aircraft where to turn off the runway after landing and advise the aircraft to hold short of a runway or taxiway if required for traffic. Neither aircraft was issued hold short instructions. The Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDEX), provided images of each airplane's movement leading up to the time of the ground collision. The ASDE-X replay showed the Beech 99 taxiing at 20 knots on taxiway A2 approaching the taxiway A intersection. The Cessna 402 was shown taxiing at 20 knots just short of the taxiway A and taxiway A2 intersection. Both pilots reported that they did not see the other airplane approaching the same intersection while taxiing. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 states that vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to "see and avoid" other aircraft.

The Citation 550 was being repositioned for an air ambulance transportation flight, and was on approach to land on a 4,801-foot-long, grooved, asphalt runway. The airplane was being flown manually by the copilot, who reported that the landing approach speed (Vref) was 106 knots. The pilot-in-command (PIC) estimated that the airplane "broke out" of the clouds about two miles from the runway. Both pilots stated that the airplane continued to descend toward the runway, while on the glide slope and localizer. Neither pilot could recall the airplane's touchdown point on the runway, or the speed at touchdown. Witnesses observed the airplane, "high and fast" as it crossed over the runway threshold. The airplane touched down about halfway down the runway, and continued off the departure end. It then struck a wooden localizer antenna platform, and the airport perimeter fence, before crossing a road, and coming to rest about 400 feet from the end of the runway. Data downloaded from the airplane's Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) revealed that the airplane's groundspeed at touchdown was about 140 knots. Review of the cockpit voice recorder suggested that the PIC failed to activate the airplane's speed brake upon touchdown. Braking action was estimated to be "fair" at the time of the accident, with about 1/4 to 1/2 inches of loose, "fluffy" snow on the runway. The PIC reported that he thought the runway might be covered with an inch or two of snow, which did not concern him. The copilot reported encountering light snow during the approach. Both pilots stated that they were not aware of any mechanical failures, or system malfunctions during the accident; nor were any discovered during post accident examinations. According to the airplane flight manual, the conditions applicable to the accident flight prescribed a Vref of 110 knots, with a required landing distance on an uncontaminated runway of approximately 2,740 feet. The prescribed landing distance on a runway contaminated with 1-inch of snow, at a Vref of 110 knots was approximately 5,800 feet. At Vref + 10 knots, the required landing distance increased to about 7,750 feet.

Following an uneventful mail flight from Kuala Lumpur, the crew initiated a night approach to Kuching Airport. After touchdown on a wet runway due to recent heavy rain falls, the aircraft deviated to the left and veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, both main gears collapsed, the left engine was torn off and the aircraft came to rest 1,500 metres past the runway threshold. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot reported that during cruise descent the airplane accumulated about 1/2-to 3/4-inch of rime ice between 8,000 and 6,000 feet. During the approach, the pilot noted that a majority of the ice had dissipated off the leading edge of both wings, although there was still trace ice on the aft-portion of the wing deice boots. The pilot maintained an additional 20 knots during final approach due to gusting winds from the north-northwest. He anticipated there would be turbulence caused by the surrounding topography and the buildings on the north side of the airport. While on short final for runway 28, the pilot maintained approximately 121 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and selected flaps 30-degrees. He used differential engine power to assist staying on the extended centerline until the airplane crossed the runway threshold. After crossing the threshold, the pilot began a landing flare and the airspeed slowed toward red line (92 KIAS). Shortly before touchdown, the airplane "abruptly pitched up and was pushed over to the left" and flight control inputs were "only marginally effective" in keeping the wings level. The airplane drifted off the left side of the runway and began a "violent shuddering." According to the pilot, flight control inputs "produced no change in aircraft heading, or altitude." The pilot advanced the engine throttles for a go-around as the left wing impacted the terrain. The airplane cartwheeled and subsequently caught fire. No pre-impact anomalies were noted with the airplane's flight control systems and deice control valves during a postaccident examination. No ice shapes were located on the ground leading up to the main wreckage. The reported surface wind was approximately 4 knots from the north-northwest.

The airplane was substantially damaged during an in-flight recovery after the captain attempted an intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise flight and lost control. The cargo flight was being operated at night under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 at the time of the accident. The captain reported the airplane was "functioning normally" prior to the intentional aileron roll maneuver. The captain stated that the "intentional roll maneuver got out of control" while descending through flight level 200. The captain reported that the airplane "over sped" and experienced "excessive G-loads" during the subsequent recovery. The copilot
reported that the roll maneuver initiated by the captain resulted in a "nose-down unusual attitude" and a "high speed dive." Inspection of the airplane showed substantial damage to the left wing and elevator assembly.

The aircraft was conducting an instrument approach to Runway 29 at Fort St. John, British Columbia, on a scheduled instrument flight rules flight from Grande Prairie, Alberta. At 1133 mountain standard time, the aircraft touched down 320 feet short of the runway, striking approach and runway threshold lights. The right main and nose landing gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on the right side of the runway, 380 feet from the threshold. There were no injuries to the 2 pilots and 10 passengers. At the time of the occurrence, runway visual range was fluctuating between 1800 and 2800 feet in snow and blowing snow, with winds gusting to 40 knots.