Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard at Kish Island Airport and was considered as damaged beyond repair. All 158 occupants escaped uninjured.

During the takeoff roll from Dubai Intl Airport runway 12L, after V1 speed, the crew heard a loud bang then noticed severe vibrations when the nose gear collapsed. The captain abandoned the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking manoeuvre. The aircraft slid on its nose for few hundred metres and came to rest just before the end of the runway, slightly to the left of the centerline. All 250 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While taxiing at Kuwait City Airport, preparing for a flight to Beirut, the twin engine aircraft collided with a vehicle, causing serious damages to the right wing. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was conducting flights for the purpose of parachute operations; these flights are known colloquially as ‘lifts’. On the previous day, he had conducted 13 lifts, of which eleven were to an altitude of 12,000 ft and two to an altitude of 5,500 ft or less. On the day of the accident the pilot recorded that he took off for the first lift at 0927 hrs. The aircraft, with nine parachutists aboard, climbed to 12,000 ft and landed at 0946 hrs. There followed three flights of an average 18 minute duration, between each of which the aircraft was on the ground for no more than 7 minutes. The last of these flights landed at 1100 hrs, after which the aircraft uplifted 230 ltr of Jet A1 fuel. The aircraft utilised the main runway, Runway 29, for each of these flights. The surface wind had freshened from the south and the pilot requested the use of the shorter Runway 21. The air/ground radio operator refused this request because he believed that the pilot had not been checked out to use this runway, as required by the Headcorn Aerodrome Manual. Accordingly, the pilot approached a nominated check pilot who agreed to observe his next flight. The check pilot briefed the pilot of OY-JRR on the procedures for using the short runway, emphasising the need to make an early decision to abort the takeoff if necessary. The check pilot stated that the pilot of OY-JRR performed a thorough pre-takeoff check using the full checklist available in the cockpit and that the subsequent flight was entirely satisfactory. Following the check flight the aircraft took off again at 1148 hrs and flew a further five flights, each separated by periods that ranged between 7 and 36 minutes. The check pilot observed several of these flights, all of which were from Runway 21, and most appeared to proceed normally. He and another witness noticed that on one occasion the climb gradient after takeoff appeared shallower than normal, but they believed that the wind speed had decreased at this time. The pilot recorded that the aircraft was refuelled again after landing at 1443 hrs, this time uplifting 266 ltr of fuel. The next takeoff was at 1447 hrs and having climbed to 12,000 ft again the aircraft landed at 1521 hrs. The accident occurred on the pilot’s eleventh flight of the day. Prior to the flight the aircraft was refuelled with a further 100 ltr at 1555 hrs. Shortly before 1605 hrs the aircraft taxied to Runway 21. It appeared to accelerate normally but at no time was the tail seen to rise in its usual manner prior to becoming airborne. Onboard, the experienced jump-master noticed that the aircraft was passing the aerodrome refuelling installation and several aircraft parked close to the runway, beyond the intersection of Runway 21 with Runway 29. He was aware that the aircraft had now passed the point where it would normally become airborne. Almost simultaneously, he heard the pilot shout “Abort”. One of the parachutists shouted to the other occupants “Brace - Brace, everyone on the floor”. The aircraft stopped abruptly when its left wing and cockpit collided with a camouflaged F100 fighter aircraft which was parked as a museum exhibit to the left of the southern edge of Runway 21. The occupants of the cabin were able to vacate the aircraft with mutual assistance. Members of the aerodrome fire service extinguished a small fire, which had started in the area of the engine, and other witnesses helped the occupants to move away from the aircraft. The pilot, however, remained unconscious in the cockpit. He was attended subsequently by paramedics and taken to hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.

On final approach, while flying at an altitude of 120 metres at 3 kilometres from the runway threshold, the aircraft was hit by an RPG, probably fired by rebels from a boat. The projectile hit the left main gear and a fire erupted. The aircraft landed safely and all 15 occupants escaped uninjured. It took about one hour for the only fire-fighting truck available at the airport to reach the plane as it had no fuel. Eventually, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair and cannibalized. One week later, some technicians of the Belarus operator returned to Mogadishu to recover pieces and material from the aircraft. On departure, another II-76 from the same operator was hit by a missile and destroyed.

Crashed shortly after take off from Cali-Alfonso Bonilla Aragón Airport, bound for Medellín. Both occupants were injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 7 March 2007, a Boeing Company 737-497 aircraft, registered PK-GZC, was being operated by Garuda Indonesia on an instrument flight rules (IFR), scheduled passenger service, as flight number GA200 from Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta to Adisutjipto Airport, Yogyakarta. There were two pilots, five flight attendants, and 133 passengers on board. The pilot in command (PIC) and copilot commenced duty in Jakarta at about 21:30 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), or 04:30 local time, for the flight to Yogyakarta. Prior to departing Jakarta, during the push back, the PIC contacted the ground engineers and informed them that the number-1 (left) engine thrust reverser fault light on the cockpit instruments had illuminated. The engineers reset the thrust reverser in the engine accessories unit and the fault light extinguished. The scheduled departure time was 23:00. The aircraft took off from Jakarta at 23:17, and the PIC was the pilot flying for the sector to Yogyakarta. The copilot was the monitoring/support pilot. During the cruise, just before top of descent, the crew was instructed by Jakarta Control to ‘maintain level 270 and contact Yogya Approach 123.4’. The copilot acknowledged; ‘contact Yogya 123.4, Indonesia 200’. The PIC started to give a crew briefing at 23:43 stating: ‘in case of holding, heading of 096’. The briefing was interrupted by a radio transmission from Yogya Approach, giving GA200 a clearance to Yogyakarta via airway W 17 for runway 09, and a requirement to report when leaving flight level 270. When radio communication was completed, the PIC continued with the crew briefing for an ILS approach, stating:
When clear approach ILS runway 09, course 088. (C) Frequency 1091, aerodrome elevation three hundred fifty, (C) leaving two thousand five hundred by 6 point 6 DME ILS, (C) to check four DME one thousand six hundred seventy, (C) crossing two DME one thousand thirty seven. Decision Altitude ILS Cat I, five eight seven, two three seven both set, approach flap forty, auto brake two. Speed one three six, one five one, two twenty. Timing from final approach-fix to VOR 6 DME. (C) With airspeed approximately one four one, two minutes thirty six. (C) In case localizer, MDA seven hundred, localizer, miss approach, at point six. (C) DME ILS India Juliet oscar golf. (C) On landing, to the left standby parking stand. Go-around missed approach climb one thousand five hundred turn left. To holding fix via Yogya VOR, continue climb four thousand feet, to cross Yogya at or above two thousand five hundred DME eight. (C).
Twelve minutes and 17 seconds later, Yogya Approach cleared GA200 ‘for visual approach runway zero nine, proceed to long final, report runway in sight’. The copilot acknowledged the clearance and asked for confirmation that they were cleared to descend to circuit altitude, Yogya Approach replied ‘descend to two thousand five hundred initially’. The crew informed the investigation that they were conducting an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 09, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). However they did not inform Yogya Approach or Yogyakarta Tower that they were flying the 09 ILS approach. At 23:58:10, the aircraft overran the departure end of runway 09 at Yogyakarta Airport. The PIC reported that as the aircraft was about to leave the runway, he shut down both engines. The aircraft crossed a road, and impacted an embankment before stopping in a rice paddy field 252 meters from the threshold of runway 27 (departure end of runway 09). The aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces and an intense, fuel-fed, post impact fire. There were 119 survivors. One flight attendant and 20 passengers were fatally injured. One flight attendant and 11 passengers were seriously injured.

Luftverkehr Friesland Brunzema und Partner KG, registered in Germany and holding the Air Operator Certificate issued by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1983, has been operating scheduled flights between Pärnu (EEPU) and Ruhnu (EERU) since 2006. The flight, initially planned for 26th February 2007, was postponed several times due to adverse meteorological conditions, causing problems with provision supply on the island. On Friday, 3rd March, pilot checked the weather at 13:00 and at 14:00. Based on the received information the pilot decided to depart for Ruhnu at 14:00. At 14:08, the aircraft took off from Pärnu airport to make a scheduled VFR flight to the island of Ruhnu. Flight was carried out in the uncontrolled airspace. Pilot, two passengers and 520 kg of cargo were on board the aircraft. According to the weather briefing received by the pilot via telephone from Kuressaare, at 14:00 the cloud height in Kuressaare (EEKE, 36 Nm northwest of Ruhnu) was 600 ft. and 180 m (approximately 540 ft.) in Ruhnu. During the uneventful flight on the altitude 1500 ft., the coast and the ice border were clearly visible. The aircraft stayed clear from the clouds and no signs of icing were noticed by persons on board. Approaching the island from the northeast it was intended by the pilot to use RWY 32 for landing. The pilot decided to fly low from east to west across the runway to check the windsock and runway condition. While approaching the island, the pilot descended at the rate of 150 ft/min with low power settings and flaps extended by 1 notch. During descent the horizontal and vertical visibility deteriorated and the flight was continued in IMC2 . The descent was continued in clouds; therefore the pilot had no visual contact with the ground and horizon. The aircraft broke off the clouds over the coast on a very low altitude (100-120 ft. by pilot’s statement). Trying to maintain safe altitude and speed pilot added power, at the same time stall warning signal activated and seconds later the lower part of aircraft’s fuselage touched the treetops and collided with the terrain at 14:36. The engines continued producing power until collision with trees which after those were set to the idle by pilot. The passengers and pilot escaped the aircraft without assistance and with no injuries. The accident site is situated 0.24 Nm northeast off the runway 32 threshold. Ground surface is uneven and forested with young pinewoods.

Owned by United Arabian Airlines, the four engine aircraft departed Khartoum on a cargo flight to Geneina on behalf of AZZA Air Transport. After touchdown, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a sandy area. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair after the undercarriage were torn off and the left wing tip was sheared off. Witnesses interviewed by the Panel stated that the majority of the passengers were military personnel. In addition to the passengers there were two D-22 type 122 mm artillery howitzers and 40 to 50 wooden boxes painted olive drab, suspected to contain arms and ammunition. The cargo was offloaded during the days following the crash under the supervision of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) who continued to guard the aircraft throughout the following week. In an official report published at the end of April 2007, UNO criticized the Sudanese authorities for not respecting the various points of resolution 1591 which stipulates that Sudan is not authorized to deliver military equipment to the Darfur region.

The aircraft was on a scheduled passenger flight from Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta to Juanda Airport, Surabaya, East Java. There were 155 persons on board, consist of 7 crew and 148 passengers. During the flight there was no abnormality declare by the flight crew. Weather condition at Surabaya was thunderstorm and rain, wind 240/7 knots with visibility 8,000 meters. The CVR revealed that there was conversation in the cockpit that was not related to the progress of the flight, the conversation was relating to the company fuel policy and training program until 2000 feet. The CVR did not reveal approach briefing and any checklist reading. On final approach of runway 28 passing 800 feet approach light insight and landing clearance was received. Prior to touchdown, control of the aircraft was transferred from co-pilot to PIC. The CVR recorded that the Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) warned “Sink Rate” and “Pull Up”. The right wheel track was found out of the runway for about 4 meter away and return to the runway. The aircraft stopped for about 100 meters from taxiway N3. After aircraft touched down, the fuselage aft of passenger seat row 16 was bended down. The passengers were panic. Flight attendants evacuated the passengers via all exits available and door slides were inflated. The two passengers were minor injured, and the aircraft suffered severe damage.