Kent

The pilot was conducting flights for the purpose of parachute operations; these flights are known colloquially as ‘lifts’. On the previous day, he had conducted 13 lifts, of which eleven were to an altitude of 12,000 ft and two to an altitude of 5,500 ft or less. On the day of the accident the pilot recorded that he took off for the first lift at 0927 hrs. The aircraft, with nine parachutists aboard, climbed to 12,000 ft and landed at 0946 hrs. There followed three flights of an average 18 minute duration, between each of which the aircraft was on the ground for no more than 7 minutes. The last of these flights landed at 1100 hrs, after which the aircraft uplifted 230 ltr of Jet A1 fuel. The aircraft utilised the main runway, Runway 29, for each of these flights. The surface wind had freshened from the south and the pilot requested the use of the shorter Runway 21. The air/ground radio operator refused this request because he believed that the pilot had not been checked out to use this runway, as required by the Headcorn Aerodrome Manual. Accordingly, the pilot approached a nominated check pilot who agreed to observe his next flight. The check pilot briefed the pilot of OY-JRR on the procedures for using the short runway, emphasising the need to make an early decision to abort the takeoff if necessary. The check pilot stated that the pilot of OY-JRR performed a thorough pre-takeoff check using the full checklist available in the cockpit and that the subsequent flight was entirely satisfactory. Following the check flight the aircraft took off again at 1148 hrs and flew a further five flights, each separated by periods that ranged between 7 and 36 minutes. The check pilot observed several of these flights, all of which were from Runway 21, and most appeared to proceed normally. He and another witness noticed that on one occasion the climb gradient after takeoff appeared shallower than normal, but they believed that the wind speed had decreased at this time. The pilot recorded that the aircraft was refuelled again after landing at 1443 hrs, this time uplifting 266 ltr of fuel. The next takeoff was at 1447 hrs and having climbed to 12,000 ft again the aircraft landed at 1521 hrs. The accident occurred on the pilot’s eleventh flight of the day. Prior to the flight the aircraft was refuelled with a further 100 ltr at 1555 hrs. Shortly before 1605 hrs the aircraft taxied to Runway 21. It appeared to accelerate normally but at no time was the tail seen to rise in its usual manner prior to becoming airborne. Onboard, the experienced jump-master noticed that the aircraft was passing the aerodrome refuelling installation and several aircraft parked close to the runway, beyond the intersection of Runway 21 with Runway 29. He was aware that the aircraft had now passed the point where it would normally become airborne. Almost simultaneously, he heard the pilot shout “Abort”. One of the parachutists shouted to the other occupants “Brace - Brace, everyone on the floor”. The aircraft stopped abruptly when its left wing and cockpit collided with a camouflaged F100 fighter aircraft which was parked as a museum exhibit to the left of the southern edge of Runway 21. The occupants of the cabin were able to vacate the aircraft with mutual assistance. Members of the aerodrome fire service extinguished a small fire, which had started in the area of the engine, and other witnesses helped the occupants to move away from the aircraft. The pilot, however, remained unconscious in the cockpit. He was attended subsequently by paramedics and taken to hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.

The aircraft, which had not flown for over 2 years, had been worked-on during the past days and had to be ferried to Blackpool with two pilots on board. During the takeoff roll on runway 22, at a speed of about 60 knots, a loud report was heard and the outboard section of the right wing disintegrated. The crew abandoned the takeoff procedure and was able to stop the aircraft on the runway. They exited the cabin and were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was returning to Rochester after an overnight business trip to Paris. It landed at Southend Airport at 1815 hours where HM customs clearance was obtained. The aircraft left Southend at 1831 hours for the 14 mile flight to Rochester. It was dark with snow, frost and fog warnings in force. The stratus cloud base at Rochester was estimated to be 600 feet and visibility was estimated to be 2,000 meters in rain and snow. Having established RTF communications with Rochester AFIS the aircraft was seen in the downwind position for runway 03 left hand at a height of 3-400 feet. This visual contact was confirmed at the pilot's request. The aircraft was next seen overhead the airfield at a similar height. When the pilot again reported 'downwind' he said that if he was not happy with his approach he might attempt an approach to the reciprocal runway 21. Eye witnesses in the village of Burham, which lies 1.5 nautical miles southwest of the airfield, saw the aircraft making a left handed approach over the River Medway valley at low level. It then headed over the centre of Burham towards the airfield and shortly afterwards crashed into the steep upper slopes of Blue Bell Hill some 45 feet below the ridge summit of 510 feet. The elevation of Rochester aerodrome is 436 feet. A severe fire followed the impact and the three occupants were killed.

While approaching Lydd Airport in poor weather conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed six miles southwest of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

During the takeoff run, the airplane deviated to the left side of the runway. The copilot overcorrected, causing the aircraft to swing right, leaving the runway at an angle of 20° partially airborne. The left wing then scraped the intersecting runway 14 while maneuvering to avoid a windsock mast ahead. The aircraft touched down and skidded to a stop. An oil fire broke out in the right engine. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After takeoff from runway 03 at Rochester City Airport, while climbing to a height of 900 feet, the left engine gradually lost power. The pilot increased power on the right engine and feathered the left propeller. After passing over the M2 highway at a speed of 100 knots, he expected to return to the airfield when the right engine lost power as well. He attempted an emergency landing by the motorway and the airplane crash landed at a speed of 85 knots before coming to rest. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After a touch-and-go landing at Gatwick Airport, the right main gear didn't lock up. The gear was recycled and the pilot then checked the gear visually and the gear appeared to be fully retracted. On gear extension for the next landing, the right main gear warning light remained on. The gear was recycled several times, but without success. Other attempts (high g turns, using the hand pump, and touching the runway) also failed. It was then decided to make a wheels-up landing on a foam carpet at Manston.

Shortly after takeoff from London-Heathrow Airport, while climbing, the undercarriage wouldn't lock up after takeoff, so the crew recycled the gear a couple of times. On the third attempt, the bogie (which was not rotating in the right sequence) fouled the main hydraulic jack fracturing the attachment bolt of the shuttle valve for the main and emergency 'down' hydraulic lines. All hydraulic fluid escaped and the gear couldn't be extended anymore. In agreement with ATC, the captain decided to divert to Manston-Kent Airport where an emergency landing was carried out on a foamed runway. The airplane completed a belly landing and was damaged beyond repair while all 65 occupants escaped uninjured.

The crew was involved in a local training flight at Manston-Kent Airport. During the takeoff roll, the captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure for unknown reason. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the twin engine aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest on its belly. All three crew members were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The reason why the captain decided to interrupt the takeoff roll remains unknown.

The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Beauvais, France to Lympne, England. Before taking off the pilot-in-command obtained a weather report from Lympne as follows: Cloud ceiling : 250 ft . Visibility : 2000 m . Surface wind : 220 degrees at 18 kts. It departed Beauvais at 15:51 hours UTC on an IFR flight plan. As the aircraft passed Abbeville, radio contact was established with Lympne and a weather report was obtained which gave a visibility of 1000 m in drizzle, cloud ceiling of 250 ft and surface wind 220/18 kts gusting to 26 kts. The airline's limits for landing on runway 20 were 1100 m RVR and a cloud ceiling of 200 ft. The pilot-in-command again checked landing conditions at Lympne before commencing an instrument approach and, although conditions had not altered significantly since the previous report, he was informed of a "slight improvement" but the wind was still gusting. The final instrument approach to runway 20 using radar began at 4 miles from touchdown; the aircraft was in cloud, flying at 1100 ft, in turbulent conditions. Three and a half miles from touchdown the pilot-in-command began to descend at 350 to 400 ft/min, the equivalent of a 3° glide path in the prevailing conditions. As there was no radar glide path the Lympne radar controller advised the pilots of the height at which the aircraft should have been at each mile before touchdown. When the aircraft was about 5/8 of a mile from touchdown the radar controller gave a final heading correction and at half a mile, when the talkdown finished, he told the pilots that the aircraft was lined up with the right-hand edge of the runway. The rest of the approach was made visually but the radar controller continued to track the aircraft. He observed it deviate further to the right of the extended centre line as it neared the touchdown point. The pilot-in-command stated that he could see the ground from 250 ft, and at 220ft when half a mile from touchdown he could see the far boundary of the aerodrome through heavy drizzle. Height was maintained at 220 ft for 3 or 4 seconds, then the descent was resumed and at a quarter of a mile from touchdown and at 150 to 200 ft, full flap was selected and power reduced to 10600 rpm. At this stage turbulence became severe. The pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft was going to the right of the runway but he decided not to try to regain the centre line as this would require a turn at low altitude. As the aircraft approached the aerodrome boundary the airspeed indicator was fluctuating and an attempt was made to maintain 92 kts the starboard wing was held down slightly to compensate for port drift. The pilot-in-command stated that he began the flare-out 30 to 40 ft above the ground at an IAS of 88 kt but as he closed the throttles the starboard wing went down suddenly. Although he was aware that the aircraft was descending rapidly, he was initially more concerned about restoring lateral level ; only at the last moment did he attempt to check the rate of descent with elevator control but the aircraft struck the ground heavily on its starboard undercarriage. After the impact, the starboard wing, engine nacelle and undercarriage became separated from the main structure, the aircraft rolled over to starboard and slid along the grass inverted, coming to rest after having swung through approximately 180°.