South America

It is believed that the accident was the consequence of a loss of control following an excessive accumulation of ice on the airplane.

During a night approach in IMC conditions, the aircraft collided with the antenna of the inner marker after the crew descended below the MDA and deviated from the approach pattern. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The adverse weather conditions probably produced an optical illusion among the crew,
- The crew had only little training in instrument flights,
- Wrong altimeter setting,
- Absence of crew resources management,
- Poor crew coordination.

Operation with four consecutive flights made by the same crew to Chagual aerodrome (an aerodrome that demands a high alertness and situational awareness due to difficult topographical conditions), a long and exhausting day flying and working together with the multiple functions performed by the technical crew (dispatcher, payer, loader, cabin crew) probably decreased the performance and capacity of the technical crew and safety. Poor planning on the part of the Operations and Sales Management of the Aero Condor Company Charter, by not providing the NOTAM which showed the lack of JET A1 fuel in Trujillo causing programming, operational and logistic difficulties.

It was determined that the crew thought the Coca runway was short. To be able to stop the plane on the runway without excessive use of the brakes, the crew decided to land as early as possible. Doing so, the aircraft landed 4,5 metres short of runway. The published procedure request a minimum altitude of 50 feet over the threshold and the AFM showed a landing distance of 930 metres needed at maximum landing weight considering 42° of flaps, speed brakes out, lift dumpers armed, antiskid operative. Wrong approach procedure on part of the crew.

Loss of control on landing for unknown reasons. It was not possible to determine whether the heavy rainfall that occurred in the region effectively contributed to the loss of control of the aircraft on the ground. In addition to the narrowing of the runway, the position of the drainage ditch became an obstacle, which prevented the aircraft from decelerating safely, culminating in the collision of the front landing gear against it and the impact of the propeller on the ground.

The non-observance of the procedures described for an engine failure after V1, especially those relating to the maintenance of safe takeoff speed of 84 knots, the retraction of the flaps, automatic operation of the landing gear lever and the use of contingency power. The erroneous operation of the fuel-flow-control lever (FCL) of engine number one, the move from the open to the closed position during the chain of events, which left the plane and the inappropriate use of the fuel-flow-control lever (FCL) of engine number two, to bring it to the MAX NG position in an attempt to obtain performance of the engine. Maintaining an attitude of the plane on take-off after nr. 2 engine failure with the consequent reduction of speed and then maintaining the aircraft in a climbing attitude, after an engine shutdown, which came at stall speed and the subsequent lack of control of the aircraft. The failure of the engine for undetermined reasons during the takeoff roll, after V1, which forced the crew to perform a series of emergency procedures to deal with the fault and continue with the initial climb. The absence or failure of resource management among flight crew members during the sequence of events. The unmeasurable reduction in the situational awareness of the crew as a result of the financial situation of the company and the divorce in which the Captain of the aircraft was involved.