Taxiing

During taxi to a runway, the instrument panel and cockpit floor erupted in flames. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the majority of the wires contained inside the main junction box had very little damage except for two wires that had insulation missing. The damage appeared to be associated with the routing of the two wires. Both wires were connected to the battery relay and ran through wires in and around the exposed terminal studs. Heat damage was noted on the insulation of wires and other components that were in contact with the exposed wires. The wires ran from the battery relay to the forward section of the cockpit, where the fire started. Due to the fire damage that consumed the cockpit, the examination was unable to determine what system the wires were associated with. Further examination revealed that the fuel pressure was a direct indicating system. Fuel traveled directly to the instruments in the cockpit via rigid aluminum lines routed on the right lower side of the fuselage, where more severe fire damage was noted. Review of maintenance records did not reveal any evidence of the fuel pressure indicating system lines and hoses having ever been replaced; however, they were only required to be replaced on an as-needed basis. The electrical system, instrument lines, and hoses through the nose compartment were required to be inspected on a Phase D inspection; the airplane's last Phase D inspection was completed about 9 months prior to the accident and the airplane had accrued 313.1 hours of operation since that inspection.

The aircraft was dispatched to Makhachkala to deliver troops, military equipments and cargo with 7 crew members on board. Ready for the next trip to Nizhny Novgorod, the crew was cleared to taxi to the holding point of runway 14. At that time, the visibility was poor due to the night and foggy conditions. Another Ilyushin II-76MD registered RA-76827 was on approach to runway 14 with 25 passengers and a crew of six on board. On final approach, the navigator informed the crew that the headlights should be switched on but no actions was taken. In a visibility lower than 800 metres, the aircraft landed slightly to the left of the runway centerline. After touchdown, the left wing impacted the cockpit of the II-76 awaiting at the holding bay. While RA-76827 suffered only minor damaged and that no one on board was injured, all four crew members in the cockpit of RA-76825 were killed while three other occupants were injured.

While taxiing to runway 23, the aircraft suffered a right landing gear failure and came to rest. There were no injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was on a post maintenance delivery mission. A crew of two engineers was positioning the aircraft from a technical hangar at Caracas-Maiquetía-Simón Bolívar Airport to the main terminal. While taxiing on the ramp, the crew lost control of the aircraft that rolled to a grassy area and eventually collided with a drainage ditch. The left main gear collapse and the left wing was severely damaged. Both crew were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was scheduled to operate a night cargo flight from Edinburgh to Coventry. The weather conditions at Edinburgh Airport were wintry with snowfall, which required the aircraft to be de-iced. Shortly after both engines had been started, the commander signalled to the marshaller to remove the Ground Power Unit (GPU) from the aircraft, which was facing nose out from its stand, down a slight slope. As the marshaller went to assist his colleague to remove the GPU to a safe distance prior to the aircraft taxiing off the stand, the aircraft started to move forward slowly, forcing them to run to safety. The flight crew, who were looking into the cockpit, were unaware that the aircraft was moving. It continued to move forward until its right propeller struck the GPU, causing substantial damage to the GPU, the propeller and the engine. The ground crew were uninjured. No cause as to why the aircraft moved could be positively identified.

The Rockwell International Sabreliner had just been released from the repair station following several months of maintenance, primarily for structural corrosion control and repair. According to the pilots, they began to taxi away from the repair station. Initially, the brakes and steering were satisfactory, but then failed. The airplane then contacted several other airplanes and a tug with an airplane in tow, before coming to a stop. The airplane incurred substantial damage as a result of the multiple collisions. Neither crewmember heard or saw any annunciations to alert them to a hydraulic system problem. Postaccident examination revealed that there was no pressure in the normal hydraulic system, as expected, and that the auxiliary system pressure was adequate to facilitate emergency braking. Additional examination and testing revealed that the aural warning for low hydraulic system pressure was inoperative, but all other hydraulic, steering, and braking systems functioned properly. Both the pilot and copilot were type-rated in the Sabreliner, and each had approximately 350 hours of flight time in type. Neither crewmember had any time in Sabreliners in the 90 days prior to the accident. Operation of the emergency braking system in the airplane required switching the system on, waiting for system pressure to decrease to 1,700 pounds per square inch (psi), pulling the "T" handle, and then pumping the brake pedals 3 to 5 times. In addition, the system will not function if both the pilot's and copilot's brake pedals are depressed simultaneously. The investigation did not uncover any evidence to suggest the crew turned on the auxiliary hydraulic system, or waited for the system pressure to decrease to 1,700 psi in their attempt to use the emergency braking system.

The aircraft departed Brazzaville on a cargo flight to Pointe-Noire, carrying six crew members and a load of various goods. Following a normal landing, the crew vacated the runway and while approaching the apron, they lost control of the aircraft that collided with a parked Boeing 727-246 registered 9L-LEF and operated by Canadian Airways Congo. All six crew members on board the AN-12 were injured, both pilots seriously. Both aircraft were damaged beyond repair. The Boeing 727 was empty at the time of the ground collision.

The aircraft departed Abidjan-Félix Houphouët Boigny Airport at 0952LT on a government flight to Bouaké, carrying a crew of 4 and 30 passengers, respectively a delegation of 10 people from the government among them the Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, and 20 journalists. Following an uneventful flight and a normal landing, the crew vacated the runway and taxied to the ramp when three explosions occurred on the right side of the airplane. The crew stopped the aircraft immediately on the taxiway and the rescue teams arrived quickly on the scene. Ten people were seriously injured while four passengers were killed. The aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair.
Those killed were:
Sékou Doumbia, member of the State Protocol serving the Prime Minister's office,
Souleymane Sérifou, member of the State Protocol serving the Prime Minister's office,
Lt Drissa Ouattara, Chief of Security of the Prime Minister,
Cpl Siaka Diomandé, Prime MInister's bodyguard.

While taxiing at Kuwait City Airport, preparing for a flight to Beirut, the twin engine aircraft collided with a vehicle, causing serious damages to the right wing. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A Beech 99 and a Cessna 402 were substantially damaged in a ground collision that occurred during night taxi operations at General Mitchell International Airport (MKE), Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Both pilots followed each of the controller's instructions to proceed to the same cargo ramp using intersecting taxiways after having landed. Neither controller had advised either pilot that other aircraft would be approaching the same taxiway intersection. Neither pilot reported seeing the other airplane approaching the taxiway intersection. The Cessna 402 landed on runway 25R and was instructed to taxi to the cargo ramp via Golf, Bravo, and Alpha taxiways. The Beech 99 landed on runway 25L. The taxi instructions given to the Beech 99 pilot were to turn right at taxiway A2 (high-speed taxiway), monitor ground on frequency 121.8, and taxi to the cargo ramp. The local controller reported he scanned taxiway A, the runway, and saw the Beech 99 clear of the runway. As the Beech 99 prepared to turn off taxiway A2 onto taxiway A, the Cessna 402 approached the taxiway A and taxiway A2 intersection. The Beech 99's right propeller impacted the Cessna 402's left wing tip fuel tank. The impact of the two airplanes resulted in a fire. Both of the pilots involved in the ground collision evacuated their respective airplanes. The FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," states that the absence of holding instructions authorizes an aircraft to cross all taxiways and runways that intersect the taxi route. FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," states that it is the procedure for controllers to instruct aircraft where to turn off the runway after landing and advise the aircraft to hold short of a runway or taxiway if required for traffic. Neither aircraft was issued hold short instructions. The Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDEX), provided images of each airplane's movement leading up to the time of the ground collision. The ASDE-X replay showed the Beech 99 taxiing at 20 knots on taxiway A2 approaching the taxiway A intersection. The Cessna 402 was shown taxiing at 20 knots just short of the taxiway A and taxiway A2 intersection. Both pilots reported that they did not see the other airplane approaching the same intersection while taxiing. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 states that vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to "see and avoid" other aircraft.