Edinburgh

The aircraft was scheduled to operate a night cargo flight from Edinburgh to Coventry. The weather conditions at Edinburgh Airport were wintry with snowfall, which required the aircraft to be de-iced. Shortly after both engines had been started, the commander signalled to the marshaller to remove the Ground Power Unit (GPU) from the aircraft, which was facing nose out from its stand, down a slight slope. As the marshaller went to assist his colleague to remove the GPU to a safe distance prior to the aircraft taxiing off the stand, the aircraft started to move forward slowly, forcing them to run to safety. The flight crew, who were looking into the cockpit, were unaware that the aircraft was moving. It continued to move forward until its right propeller struck the GPU, causing substantial damage to the GPU, the propeller and the engine. The ground crew were uninjured. No cause as to why the aircraft moved could be positively identified.

After an uneventful flight from Edinburgh the pilot made a visual approach to Runway 28 (landing distance available 1,400 metres) at Dundee. The pilot reported that the aircraft floated down the runway in the flare and bounced lightly on touchdown. During the bounce the aircraft initially yawed left and then rolled left in a normal pitch attitude with no stall warning. Full right rudder was applied but this was unable to correct the yaw. Power was applied to initiate a go-around, whilst maintaining full right rudder, but the pilot was unable to prevent the left wing from hitting the ground. This caused the aircraft to yaw rapidly to the left bringing one of its wheels into contact with a low wall. The pilot then reduced power and ditched in the River Tay, approximately 10 metres from the shore. The air traffic controllers on duty reported that the aircraft achieved a high nose attitude during the go-around before the left wing dropped and the aircraft veered to the left. The aircraft came to rest with the top of the fuselage out of the water and the pilot and passengers were able to evacuate though the main door and stand on the wing to await rescue by the airport's hovercraft. The hovercraft could only carry two passengers at a time thus the process was delayed resulting in the pilot and passengers suffering from mild hypothermia.

The aircraft landed at Edinburgh Airport, Scotland, at 00:03 and was parked there on Stand 31 in conditions including light and moderate snowfall. After preparation for a Royal Mail charter flight 670A to Belfast, start clearance was given at 15:03. At 15:12 hrs the crew advised ATC they were shutting down due to a technical problem. The crew then advised their company that a generator would not come on line. An avionics technician carried out diagnosis during which both engines were ground-run twice. No fault was found and the flight crew requested taxi clearance at 17:10. A normal take off from runway 06 was carried out followed by a reduction to climb power at 1,200 feet amsl. At 2,200 feet amsl the aircraft anti-icing systems were selected on. Three seconds later the torque on each engine reduced rapidly to zero. A MAYDAY call was made by the crew advising that they had experienced a double engine failure. The aircraft was ditched in the Firth of Forth estuary some 100 meters from the shoreline near Granton Harbour. Both pilots were killed. Weather reported just before the accident with a temperature of +2°C, dewpoint of -3°C, visibility of more then 10 km, broken clouds at 4500 feet and cover at 8000 feet.

While on a cargo from Edinburgh to Coventry, cruising at FL150, the crew encountered severe icing conditions when engines n°2 and 3 failed. The crew was cleared to initiate an emergency descent to FL070 and FL050 and elected to divert to Birmingham Airport. Shortly later, he was able to restart the engine n°2 when the engine n°4 failed as well. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded area located in Uttoxeter, about 45 km north of Birmingham Airport. The copilot was seriously injured and the captain was killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Edinburgh at 0832LT on a flight to Stornoway. At 0859LT, the crew was cleared to reach the operational zone and three minutes later, reached the altitude of 3,500 feet under VFR mode. While cruising at the altitude of 200 feet and at a speed of 130 knots, the right engine lost power. The crew cancelled the sortie and decided to divert to Port Ellen Airport. After the right propeller had been feathered, the aircraft lost speed and the crew was unable to maintain a safe altitude so he decided to ditch the aircraft 5 nm east of Colonsay Island. All three occupants took refuge on the left wing but the aircraft sank after few minutes and the wreckage was not recovered. All three occupants were rescued 40 minutes later and suffered hypothermia as the water temperature was 11° C.

The aircraft took off at 2055 hrs and the ATC stated that the take-off appeared to be normal. However, three witnesses standing outside the terminal buildings state that the aircraft appeared to maintain an unusually level flight path, about 100 feet, until they lost sight of it behind the buildings. Whichever of these take-off profiles was followed, the aircraft climbed ahead to a position short of Inverness town, and returned on an approximately reciprocal track to intercept and take up the 175° radial from the VOR beacon on the airfield. Approximately 4 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft was seen flying, apparently level, in a southerly direction at a height which was unspecified but low enough to be below the main cloud base. Less than a minute later a 'dying orange glow' was seen in the area of the accident site. A search was commenced shortly afterwards but due to uncertainty about the aircraft's position it was not until early on the morning of 21 November, when the weather cleared, that the wreckage of the aircraft was found. The aircraft had flown into the side of a hill at 1,600 feet amsl and disintegrated on impact. There were only small areas of locally contained fire. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was operating a company communications flight from Edinburgh to Walney Island (Barrow-in-Furness) and departed from Edinburgh at 1908 hrs with five passengers on board, one of whom occupied the right hand pilot's seat. The flight proceeded normally on airways at FL080 until leaving controlled airspace south of Dean Cross at 1940 hrs, when the pilot contacted Walney Island aerodrome and requested the latest weather and landing information. The tower reported that there was heavy rain and a strong wind from 300° at 25 to 30 knots, and the pilot was advised that the runway in use was 30 and the QFE 1001. It was dark night with an estimated visibility of 8 km. The aircraft was next in contact with Walney Island at 1952 hrs when the pilot queried the serviceability of the non-directional beacon (NDB) 'WL'. The tower replied that it was operating. The passenger in the right hand seat states that at about this time the lights of Barrow-in-Furness could be seen intermittently through the clouds, but that the pilot was unable to see the runway lights. The pilot then requested the other runway lights to be put on, and the tower confirmed that all the lights were on. A short time later, the pilot called to say that he was on a left hand base leg for runway 30 and he received clearance to land. The wind was reported to the aircraft at that stage as 300°, 25-30 knots and the weather as continuous rain. The aircraft was observed to make its approach over the slag bank to the south-east of the airfield; one witness stated that as it crossed Walney Channel the aircraft was lower than normal. The passenger in the right hand pilot seat states that the approach appeared normal; the landing lights were on and the left hand wind screen wiper was operating and he could see the runway sodium lights ahead. He was next aware of a sudden increase in engine power and looking ahead, he saw that the runway lights ha disappeared from view. He then saw some trees illuminated by the landing lights and immediately afterwards felt the aircraft's impact with the ground. When the aircraft failed to appear on the runway, the tower operator ordered the emergency services to search the approach end of runway 30. Some difficulty was experienced in locating the aircraft which had crashed below aerodrome level into the west bank of Walney Channel and was out of view. It was only when one of the passengers had extricated himself from the wreckage and climbed the bank, that the aircraft was found. There was no fire, but the aircraft was substantially damaged. The pilot received fatal injuries, and two o the passengers, including the one in the right hand pilot's seat were seriously injured.

On the day of the accident the aircraft left Bristol under the command of the company's chief pilot for a flight to Edinburgh via East Midlands Airport. After conveying passengers to Edinburgh it was scheduled to position empty at Newcastle Airport to collect passengers for Bristol. Weather briefing had been obtained and a thorough flight plan covering the outward and return flights had been filed before the aircraft left Bristol in the morning. As there were no passengers on the flight from Edinburgh to Newcastle, the captain decided to make use of this sector to continue the other pilot's training for command of the HS-125. Accordingly, the trainee captain was flying the aircraft from the left hand seat. Prior to takeoff he was briefed that a failure of one of the engines (he was not told which one), would be simulated on takeoff and for the purpose of the exercise the rudder bias system would be switched 'OFF'. The pilots decided that no flap would be used for the takeoff which was started from the end of runway 13. The point where the aircraft became airborne was approximately 2,700 feet from the start of the roll, which was normal for the aircraft's weight and configuration, with both engines operating. The training captain called 'rotate' at approximately 120 knots, which was slightly faster than the calculated figure and when the aircraft had reached a height of approximately 12 feet and had accelerated to about 130 knots, he pulled back the thrust lever of the port engine to simulate a failure. He considered that the trainee pilot's reaction to the emergency was slow and was just about to apply right rudder to counteract the yaw when the trainee pilot applied considerable force to the left rudder and locked his leg in position. The captain immediately applied full right aileron and opened the port thrust lever but he was unable to prevent a high rate of roll developing to the left. Approximately 700 feet after the point where the aircraft became airborne the port wing tip struck the runway, fracturing the port fuel tank and spilling out fuel. The aircraft left the runway at an angle of approximately 30 degrees to the left and travelled across the grass, becoming partially inverted before settling back sideways on the ground on its undercarriage. The sideways movement of the aircraft pulled off the nose gear and the aircraft then gyrated across the airfield sustaining further structural damage before coming to rest on its main wheels and tail facing approximately in the opposite direction to the direction of takeoff. During the aircraft's gyrations on the ground, fuel, which was centrifuged out of the fractured port tank, ignited and a flash fire occurred. When the aircraft finally came to rest there was a small residual fire in the port wing which was very quickly extinguished by the airport fire service.

The crew (two pilots and two flight attendants) was completing a positioning flight to Edinburgh-Turnhouse Airport. Both pilots took the opportunity to make some training and decided to simulate an engine failure at takeoff. Shortly after liftoff at Manchester-Ringway Airport, while in initial climb, the crew shut down the engine n°4 and feathered its propeller when the airplane started to yaw sharply to starboard. Control was lost then the aircraft crashed inverted and burst into flames. A flight attendant was injured while three other occupants were killed.
Crew:
I. Wallace, pilot, †
R. A. Weeks, copilot, †
S. Wallis, stewardess, †
Jane Timson, stewardess.

The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from Turnhouse Airport, Edinburgh to Heathrow Airport, London. The flight departed Edinburgh at 23:17 hours UTC on October 26 for an domestic flight to London. The flight was uneventful until Garston VOR, the holding point. At 00:15 the captain decided to attempt a landing on runway 28R. The co-pilot was probably making the ILS approach, monitored on PAR by the air traffic control officer, while the pilot-in-command would be seeking a visual reference to enable him if possible to take over control and land. RVR on this runway was reported as 350 m (1140 feet). At 00:23 the captain informed ATC that he was overshooting. He then decided to make a second attempt, this time on runway 28L for which the RVR was reported as 500 m (1634 feet). Since the ILS was operating on glide path only and not in azimuth, ATC provided a full taIkdown. At half a mile from touchdown the PAR Controller was not entirely satisfied with the positioning of the aircraft in azimuth and was about to give instructions to overshoot when he observed that the pilot had in fact instituted na overshoot procedure. At 00:35 hours the pilot-in-command reported that they overshot because they did not see anything. He then requested to join one of the stacks and hold for a little while. This request was granted. The pilot-in-command decided to wait for half an hour at the Garston holding point. At 00:46 another Vanguard landed successfully on runway 28R. At 01:11, although there had been no improvement in the weather conditions, the pilot-in-command probably stimulated by the other aircraft's success, asked permission to make another attempt to land on runway 28R. Meanwhile another Vanguard aircraft had overshot on 28R. However, the captain started another monitored ILS final approach on runway 28R at 01:18. At 01:22 the PAR controller passed the information that the aircraft was 3/4 of a mile from touchdown and on the centre line. Twenty-two seconds later the pilot-in-command reported they were overshooting. The copilot rotated the airplane abruptly and the captain raised the flaps. Instead of selecting the flaps to 20 degrees, he selected 5 degrees or fully up. Because the speed was not building up, the copilot relaxed pressure on the elevator. Speed increased to 137 kts and the vertical speed indicator showed a rate of climb of 850 feet/min. The copilot therefore put the aircraft's nose further down. At four seconds before impact the VSI was probably showing a substantial rate of climb and the altimeter a gain in height, although the airplane was in fact losing height. The copilot was misled into continuing his down pressure on the elevator. The vanguard had by then entered a steep dive. The aircraft hit the runway about 2600 feet from the threshold.