Vickers Vanguard

At 1808LT, the crew reached the runway 32R holding point and was cleared for takeoff 4 minutes later. During the takeoff roll, the captain noticed control problems and abandoned the takeoff procedure and returned to the apron. The crew proceeded to various checks and few minutes later, it was decided to take off again. Shortly after liftoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft rolled to the left then overturned and crashed in the Gulf of Lion few hundred meters offshore. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

During the takeoff roll on runway 36L at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport, at a speed of 110 knots, the captain started the rotation while the engine n°4 was not running properly. After liftoff, the aircraft banked right, causing the right wing tip to struck the runway surface. Out of control, the aircraft stalled and crashed 136 meters to the right of the runway. It broke in two and burst into flames. All four occupants were injured.

The Invicta International Airlines Vickers Vanguard was operating on a charter flight from Bristol (BRS) to Basel-Mulhouse (BSL). After entering the Basel Mulhouse terminal area, the flight was cleared to continue to the BN NDB. Weather was poor at that time: cloud base at 120 m (390 feet) and a reported runway visual range of 700 (2,300 feet) and 1,300 m (4,250 feet). On arrival at the BN beacon the crew were cleared to descend to 2,500 feet and were asked to report over the MN beacon before making a 90° left hand turn to finals for runway 16. At 09:56 the crew reported at 2,500 feet, followed by a position report of the MN beacon at 09:57:40. When on finals over the BN beacon, the crew reported turning outbound and said they would report at the MN beacon again for another approach. When the crew reported overhead the BN beacon again, the plane was in fact overhead the airfield, flying parallel to the ILS localizer beam. After 1,5 minute the aircraft began to overshoot, correctly making an initial turn to the west. The crew, now flying well south of the field, were instructed to report back over the MN beacon. When reporting over the MN beacon again, before it would have to turn left for finals, the plane was in fact overhead the BS beacon, a beacon located to the south of runway 16. At 10:11:25 the crew reported over the BN beacon on finals and was cleared to land. In fact the plane was now flying 3 miles South of the field and 1 mile west of the extended centerline. Two miles further on Basle ATC asked the crew "Are you sure you are over the BN?". The captain replied "I think I've got a spurious indication. We are on the LO... on the ILS now, sir". Half a minute later the captain radioed "BN is established on localizer and glide path; the ADF's all over the place in this weather." Last radio contact was when the captain reported at 1,400 feet, to which ATC replied that the flight was probably to the south of the airport. At 10:13 the plane brushed against a wooded range of hills and crashed 15 km southeast from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated, except for the tail section, where most of the survivors were found. Two stewardess and 35 passengers survived while 108 other occupants were killed.

En route from London-Heathrow to Salzburg at an altitude 19,000 feet, the rear pressure bulkhead ruptured. An explosive decompression of the fuselage occurred, causing serious interior damage and severe distortion of upper tailplane skin attachments. The tail surfaces subsequently detached, causing the airplane to enter a steep dive. The Vanguard spiraled down out of control and crashed in a field next to a highway. During the investigation corrosion was found in the lower part of the rear pressure bulkhead underneath plating that was bonded to the structure. The bond was completely delaminated in this area and the bulkhead material literally eaten away. Fluid contamination, perhaps from the lavatory, was thought to have been the root cause for the corrosion.

The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from Turnhouse Airport, Edinburgh to Heathrow Airport, London. The flight departed Edinburgh at 23:17 hours UTC on October 26 for an domestic flight to London. The flight was uneventful until Garston VOR, the holding point. At 00:15 the captain decided to attempt a landing on runway 28R. The co-pilot was probably making the ILS approach, monitored on PAR by the air traffic control officer, while the pilot-in-command would be seeking a visual reference to enable him if possible to take over control and land. RVR on this runway was reported as 350 m (1140 feet). At 00:23 the captain informed ATC that he was overshooting. He then decided to make a second attempt, this time on runway 28L for which the RVR was reported as 500 m (1634 feet). Since the ILS was operating on glide path only and not in azimuth, ATC provided a full taIkdown. At half a mile from touchdown the PAR Controller was not entirely satisfied with the positioning of the aircraft in azimuth and was about to give instructions to overshoot when he observed that the pilot had in fact instituted na overshoot procedure. At 00:35 hours the pilot-in-command reported that they overshot because they did not see anything. He then requested to join one of the stacks and hold for a little while. This request was granted. The pilot-in-command decided to wait for half an hour at the Garston holding point. At 00:46 another Vanguard landed successfully on runway 28R. At 01:11, although there had been no improvement in the weather conditions, the pilot-in-command probably stimulated by the other aircraft's success, asked permission to make another attempt to land on runway 28R. Meanwhile another Vanguard aircraft had overshot on 28R. However, the captain started another monitored ILS final approach on runway 28R at 01:18. At 01:22 the PAR controller passed the information that the aircraft was 3/4 of a mile from touchdown and on the centre line. Twenty-two seconds later the pilot-in-command reported they were overshooting. The copilot rotated the airplane abruptly and the captain raised the flaps. Instead of selecting the flaps to 20 degrees, he selected 5 degrees or fully up. Because the speed was not building up, the copilot relaxed pressure on the elevator. Speed increased to 137 kts and the vertical speed indicator showed a rate of climb of 850 feet/min. The copilot therefore put the aircraft's nose further down. At four seconds before impact the VSI was probably showing a substantial rate of climb and the altimeter a gain in height, although the airplane was in fact losing height. The copilot was misled into continuing his down pressure on the elevator. The vanguard had by then entered a steep dive. The aircraft hit the runway about 2600 feet from the threshold.