Manchester-Ringway

The pilot had planned to fly from Bournemouth Airport to Manchester Airport operating the flight as a single pilot, with a passenger seated in the co-pilot’s seat. He arrived at the airport approximately one hour before the planned departure time of 1130 hrs, completed his pre‑flight activities and went to the aircraft at approximately 1110 hrs. The 1120 hrs ATIS gave the weather at the airport as: surface wind from 230° at 10 kt, visibility 10 km or greater, few clouds at 1,000 ft, broken cloud at 1,200 ft and at 2,000 ft, temperature 16°C, dew point 12°C and QNH 1015 hPa. After starting the engines, the pilot was cleared to taxi to holding point ‘N’ for a departure from Runway 26 and he was given clearance to take off at 1127 hrs. At 1129:45 hrs, approximately 55 seconds after the aircraft became airborne, the aerodrome controller transmitted “four six bravo mike do you have a problem?” because he believed the aircraft was not climbing normally. The pilot replied “november four six bravo going around” and, shortly afterwards, “four six bravo requesting immediate return”. The controller cleared the pilot to use either runway to land back at the airport but received no reply. The pilot carried out a forced landing into a field 1.7 nm west of the Runway 08 threshold at Bournemouth Airport and neither he nor his passenger was hurt.

The twin engine aircraft departed Stauning Airport at 0000LT on a cargo flight to Manchester with two pilots on board. Shortly after takeoff from runway 27, while in initial climb by night, the crew declared an emergency after the main cabin door opened. The captain reduced both engines power and the aircraft crash landed on the Klægbanke, less than 4 km from the airport. Both pilots were rescued an hour later (they were uninjured) and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed East Midlands runways 27 on a ferry flight to Manchester. During initial climb by night, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 160 knots and disintegrated in a field near the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

A Britten-Norman BN-2B-27 Islander sustained substantial damage in a forced landing on a Merseyside beach. The airplane was to carry mail on an early morning service from Manchester Airport (MAN) to Ronaldsway Airport, Isle of Man. The commander arrived at the aircraft at about 03:45 hrs in the morning. As it was dark, the internal checks were done in normal cockpit lighting and, having completed the usual preflight administration, he was ready to start engines at about 04:50 hrs. The aircraft took off at 05:09 hrs, on a Special Visual Flight Rules Clearance, turned right onto a northwesterly heading, and climbed to an initial cruising altitude of 1000 feet. Just prior to crossing the coast, as conditions were conducive to the formation of carburettor icing, the commander selected HOT air on both engines for 30 seconds. At this stage the aircraft was cruising at an altitude of 2000 feet at between 120 and 130 knots with both engines set at 24 inches manifold pressure and 2300 revolutions per minute. When the aircraft was about 2 nautical miles out to sea, the port engine appeared to surge and then stopped. Shortly afterwards, the starboard engine did the same thing. At 05:28 hrs the commander informed Liverpool Approach that he had a problem and was going to attempt a forced landing at Woodvale Airfield. Having turned back towards the shore, the commander selected the TIP/MAIN switch to TIP and reduced the indicated airspeed to about 65 kt in the descent. The aircraft did not reach Woodvale and a forced landing was carried out on the beach. It was while the commander was making the aircraft safe that he noticed that the main fuel cock selectors were positioned such that both engines had been feeding from the right fuel tank. Both fuel cocks were then selected to OFF and, when the shutdown had been completed, the commander vacated the aircraft uninjured. The aircraft had landed on flat sand, but had struck a soft patch; this had resulted in the collapse of the nose and right main undercarriage, and damage to the nose and the wing centre section. Recovery attempts by local services had severely damaged the tailplane and had probably caused the sideway failure of the left undercarriage. The aircraft was totally submerged during the subsequent high tide. Examination of the aircraft, before it was recovered from the beach, showed no evidence of any pre-impact failure in the engine or flying controls. The fuel state was approximately 289 litres with the right main tank empty.

British Airtours Flight 328 (also known as flight 28M) was a charter flight from Manchester to Corfu. At 06:08 in the morning the crew were cleared to taxi to runway 24 for departure. At 06:12 the aircraft had lined up on the runway and was cleared for takeoff. The takeoff was to be performed by the co-pilot. During the takeoff run the captain made the routine 'eighty knots' call and 12 seconds later a 'thump' or 'thud' was heard. The captain immediately ordered 'stop', closed the throttles an selected reverse thrust. The maximum speed achieved was 126 knots IAS. At first the captain thought they had suffered a tyre burst or a bird strike. The co-pilot had applied maximum wheel braking, however, because of the possible tyre burst, the captain said 'Don't hammer the brakes, don't hammer the brakes'. At 45 seconds after the start of the takeoff run, 9 seconds after the 'thud', as the aircraft decelerated trough 85 knots the captain radioed ATC that they were abandoning takeoff. The fire bell rang simultaneously and he added as he cancelled reverse thrust, 'it looks as though we've got a fire on number 1'. ATC confirmed this: 'right there's a lot of fire, they're on their way now.'. At 25 seconds past the 'thud' (and 20 seconds before the aircraft stopped) the crew decided to evacuate via the starboard side. The 737 was decelerating through 36 knots then and the captain warned the cabin crew about the evacuation six seconds later. After the aircraft stopped a no. 1 engine fire drill was carried out, the no. 2 engine was shut down and the passenger evacuation drill carried out. Before completion of this drill the captain saw fuel and fire spreading forward on the left side of the aircraft. Both flight crew members escaped through the sliding window in the right hand side. Immediately after the 'thud' an intense fire developed on the left-hand side of the plane, causing some cracking and melting of windows with some associated smoke in the aft cabin. This caused some passengers to stand up in alarm and move into the aisle. Immediately after coming to a halt the purser tried to open the right front door (R1) but the escape slide container jammed on the doorframe, preventing further movement of the door. He then crossed to the L1 door and opened it (25 seconds had passed since the aircraft had stopped). The purser then returned to the R1 door and managed to clear the obstruction and was able to open the door 85 seconds after the aircraft had stopped. Meanwhile passengers had managed to open the right hand overwing exit. The R2 (right rear) door had also been opened but no one escaped through this exit. In total 17 surviving passengers escaped through the L1 door, 34 through R1 and 27 through the overwing exit.

Dan-Air flight 1008 took off from Manchester Airport (MAN) at 09:22 UTC en route for Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN). After an uneventful flight, the crew contacted Tenerife North Airport Approach Control at 13:14, informing them that they were at FL110 and at 14 nautical miles from the TFN VOR/DME. Approach Control replied, "Dan Air one zero zero eight, cleared to the Foxtrot Papa beacon via Tango Foxtrot November, flight level one one zero expect runway one two, no delay." The Dan Air crew repeated the clearance and requested meteorological information, which was given as: "OK runway in use one two, the wind one two zero zero five, visibility six from seven kilometres clouds, two oktas at one two zero metres, plus four oktas at two five zero metres, plus two oktas at three five zero metres, November Hotel one zero three, temperature one six, dew point one, and drizzle." Approximately one minute later Approach Control told the aircraft to descend and maintain FL60. Receipt of this message was acknowledged by the aircraft, whereupon the controller immediately requested it to indicate its distance from the TFN beacon. The crew replied that it was at 7 NM from TFN. At 13:18:48 UTC the aircraft notified Approach Control that it had just passed TFN and that it was heading for the 'FP' beacon. The controller then informed them of an unpublished hold over Foxtrot Papa: "Roger, the standard holding over Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Dan Air 1008 only replied "Roger" without repeating the information received, which was not compulsory under the ICAO regulations in force at the time of the accident. Almost one minute later, the aircraft the crew reported: "Dan Air one zero eight, Foxtrot Papa level at six zero, taking up the hold" and Tenerife APP replied: "Roger". Instead of passing overhead FP, the flight had passed this navaid at 1.59 NM to the South. Instead of entering the 255 radial, the Boeing 727 continued its trajectory in the direction of 263 degrees for a duration of more than 20 seconds, entering an area with a minimum safety altitude (MSA) of 14500 ft. The co-pilot at that point said: "Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" The captain remarked "Yes, doesn't isn't parallel with the runway or anything." The flight engineer then also made some remarks about the holding procedure. Approach control then cleared them down to 5000 feet. The captain then remarked: "Hey did he say it was one five zero inbound?". It appears that at this moment the information received on the holding flashed back to the Captain's mind, making him realize that his manoeuvre was taking him to magnetic course 150 degrees outbound from 'FP', whereas the information received was "inbound" on the holding, heading 150 degrees towards 'FP'. The copilot responded: "Inbound yeh". "I don't like that", the captain said. The GPWS alarm sounded. The captain interrupted his left hand turn and entered a right hand turn and ordered an overshoot. They overflew a valley, temporarily deactivating the GPWS warning. The copilot suggested: "I suggest a heading of one two two actually and er take us through the overshoot, ah." But the captain continued with the turn to the right, because he was convinced that the turn he had been making to the left was taking him to the mountains. The captain contacted Approach Control at 13:21: "Er ... Dan Air one zero zero eight, we've had a ground proximity Warning." About two seconds later the aircraft flew into the side of a mountain at an altitude of approximately 5450 ft (1662 m) and at 11.5 km off course.

The crew (two pilots and two flight attendants) was completing a positioning flight to Edinburgh-Turnhouse Airport. Both pilots took the opportunity to make some training and decided to simulate an engine failure at takeoff. Shortly after liftoff at Manchester-Ringway Airport, while in initial climb, the crew shut down the engine n°4 and feathered its propeller when the airplane started to yaw sharply to starboard. Control was lost then the aircraft crashed inverted and burst into flames. A flight attendant was injured while three other occupants were killed.
Crew:
I. Wallace, pilot, †
R. A. Weeks, copilot, †
S. Wallis, stewardess, †
Jane Timson, stewardess.

The aircraft was on a non-scheduled international flight from Manchester to Palma and return. It landed at Palma at 0220 hours GMT, was refuelled and took off for Manchester at 0406 hours GMT. The co-pilot was flying the aircraft from the right-hand seat and the flight was uneventful - between 0856 hours and 0900 hours the aircraft was descending for approach and landing and was being vectored towards the ILS localizer. At 0901:30 hours the flight was informed that it was 9 miles from touchdown and well left of the centre line and it was asked if it was receiving the ILS. The pilot-in-command replied that he was and would turn right a little. Shortly thereafter one engine, most probably No. 4, ceased to deliver power, followed some 15 seconds later by the other engine on the same side. The pilot-in-command took over the controls and just after 0903 hours the Controller told the flight that it was 6 miles from touchdown and asked if it was established on the ILS localizer. This message was not acknowledged by the flight and 7 seconds later the Controller asked if it was still receiving. The pilot-in-command then replied "Hotel Golf is overshooting, we've got a little bit of trouble with rpm". The aircraft's indicated air speed was then only 116 kt and its height 1 838 ft AMSL. The Controller then ordered the pilot-in-command to turn left on to 160'~ and climb to 2 500 ft QNH. He then asked the reason for overshooting and was told "We've a little bit of trouble with rpm, will advise you". At 0903:51 hours the pilot-in-command asked what the left turn was on to. The Controller noted that the aircraft had already turned through 25' to the right instead of to the left, so he ordered the pilot to continue turning right on to 020' and climb to 2 500 ft on QNH. This was acknowledged by the co-pilot. At 0904:41 hours the Controller asked the flight to advise when ready to recommence the approach. By this time the aircraft's IAS had dropped to 111 kt, its height to 1 287 ft ONH, and it had broken cloud and was seen by an eyewitness. Thereafter it flew below cloud in conditions of reasonable visibility. At 0905:26 hours the Controller told the flight that it was 7 miles from the airfield on a bearing of 040' and requested its height. The flight reported at 1 000 ft. This was the first indication to the Controller that the aircraft was faced with an emergency and after checking that the height given was correct he put full emergency procedure into operation at the airfield and ordered the aircraft to turn right on to 180 M, so that it would close the ILS localizer. At 0905:47 hoursthe Controller asked the flight if it could maintain height. The pilot-in-command now at 981 ft AMSL and only some 800 ft above the ground replied "just about". He was told he was 8 miles from touchdown and should continue his right turn on to 200% and maintain as much height as possible. At this point 341 ft of height were lost in 10 seconds after the IAS had fallen to 100 kt and the pilot-in-command said he was not able to maintain height at the moment. The Controller told him that he was 8 miles from touchdown and closing the ILS localizer from the right. At 0907:09 hours, the Controller informed the flight that radar contact had been lost due to the aircraft's low height and asked the pilot to adjust his heading on the ILS and report when established. The co-pilot replied that they had "the lights to our right'' and were at 800 ft, just maintaining height, and the pilot-in- command asked for the emergency to be laid on. At 0907:35 hours the pilot-in-command requested his position and was told 7; miles to run to touchdown. Half a minute later the Controller repeated that he had no radar contact, and cleared the flight for landing, the surface wind being 270°/12 kt. At this stage the PAR Controller, who had overheard that the Approach Controller had lost radar contact, saw a contact at the bottom of his elevation display, and told the flight that it was 6 miles from touchdown. The co-pilot then gave their altitude as being 500 ft. The terrain clearance was only 300 ft and the IAS was below 105 kt and falling. The aircraft was approximately on the line of the ILS localizer and heading for the very centre of the built up area of Stockport. A few seconds after 0909 hours the aircraft struck the ground more or less level in pitch, slightly right wing down, and slightly yawed to the right. From the evidence of two eyewitnesses who saw the aircraft just before the crash it was clear the pilot-in-command deliberately cut the power very shortly before impact and deliberately put the aircraft down on what was the only pocket handkerchief of relatively open space available, immediately before tall blocks of flats, the town hall, the police station, and Stockport Infirmary. Three crew members and 69 passengers were killed while 12 other occupants were injured.

The aircraft, operated by Manx Airlines Ltd, took off at 0915LT from Ronaldsway Airport, Isle of Man, on a flight to Ringway Airport, Manchester. It carried 39 passengers and a crew of 3. At approximately 0945LT the aircraft crashed near the summit of Winter Hill, killing 35 of the 42 persons aboard. All five crew members survived but were seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact.

The aircraft had carried out a special flight on 3 February 1958, from England to Belgrade, making an intermediate landing at Munich-Riem Airport for refuelling purposes. On 6 February it flew back from Belgrade, bound for Manchester. As planned, it again made an intermediate landing at Munich to refuel, landing there at 1417LT. The aircraft made three attempts at take-off, two were abandoned, and the accident occurred during the third attempt. The copilot abandoned the first take-off because the boost pressure readings of both engines showed upward variations, rising 2 or 3 inches above the usual reading of 57.5 inches. The second attempt to take-off followed immediately after the aircraft had taxied back to the beginning of the runway. The engine run-up was not repeated. The captain abandoned the second take-off because the boost pressure reading (this time on the port engine only) again rose beyond the normal maximum value to 60 inches. In each case the take-off was abandoned approximately half way down the runway. After the second attempt the aircraft continued rolling as far as the end of the runway and from there proceeded to the terminal building. The passengers disembarked, and the BEA station engineer went aboard. He then pointed out to the two pilots that the variations in boost pressure were connected with the elevation of Munich Airport. After a short discussion, the pilots decided to make a third (attempt at) take-off, and the passengers were told to board the aircraft again. Before the fresh (attempt to) take- off, a further engine run-up was carried out. After take-off had begun, the boost pressure reading of the port engine again fluctuated somewhat, but this ceased after the captain had throttled back slightly for a short time. After he had opened up the throttle fully again, no further fluctuation were observed. The aircraft never became airborne in the course of the third attempt at take-off. It traveled on over the whole length of the runway and the adjoining grass-covered stopway (250 m). At the end of the stopway it crashed through a wooden fence which marked the aerodrome boundary, cleared a secondary road and struck a house standing on the other side of the road. The left wing was torn off outboard of the engine mounting. Parts of the tail unit were also torn off here. The house caught fire. The aircraft then crashed into a wooden hut standing on a concrete base about 100 m further on, striking it with the right side of the rear section of the fuselage. The fuselage was torn away on a level with the trailing edge of the wing. The hut and the part of the fuselage which was torn away caught fire. The remainder of the aircraft wreckage slid on for a further 70 m. Of the 44 occupants (6 crew and 38 passengers) on board, 21 were killed instantly. The others received injuries of a more or less serious nature. Two died later in hospital as a result of their injuries. The house which was struck by the aircraft was badly damaged by fire. The hut was destroyed by fire. Among those killed were eight players and the trainer. The president of the club and ten other players survived the accident.