Takeoff (climb)

A combination of extremely soft airstrip conditions, a quartering tailwind, and underslung spreader equipment, degraded performance to the extent that the aircraft was unable to become airborne within the available length of the strip.

The pilot's loss of control for undetermined reasons, which resulted in a high speed dive to the ground.

Loss of control during initial climb following a loss of power on the right engine.

Findings and Probable Cause:
- Aircraft overweight. Pilot did not determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations. The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope).
- Pilot Unqualified. Pilot was not qualified under Part 135 for the aircraft in which he was flying.
- Documents Falsification. Pilot falsified logbook to reflect more flight time than he actually had accumulated. Review of pilot logbook revealed in several instances, pilot added as much as 1,000 hours to his total flight and multi engine times. Hundreds of day and night landings were falsified to meet qualification requirements. Pilot falsified aircraft information (types and registration numbers) reporting them to be Cessna C402 aircraft, when FAA database clearly lists the aircraft in question as aircraft other than Cessna C402. Pilot may not have completed a weight and balance report. (No evidence existed that showed he had completed a load manifest or weight and balance and performance calculations). Pilot failed to comply with prescribed Weight and Balance and Performance limitations in Pilot’s Operating Handbook. (The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope)). Pilot may not have followed “before takeoff” checklist in Pilot’s Operating Handbook.
- Fuel Selectors: “Left Engine – Left Main Tank, Right Engine – Right Main Tank”. Field investigation immediately following the accident revealed both fuel tank selectors were found selected to the right main tank. The left fuel valve was found in the left position, though the cable was separated from the valve. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- Aircraft Flight Controls (secondary control surfaces – trim tabs) were found to be out of normal range required for takeoff. The aileron trim tab was found selected all the way to the right. The rudder trim tab was found selected to the left and the elevator trim tab was found in the full nose down position. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- According to Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) normal takeoff is 0˚ flaps. (The flap selector handle was selected to 15˚with the indicator at approximately the 15˚position. The wing flap push rods were bent, indicating partial extension at impact).
- Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized to assign this pilot as a pilot in command because they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized as a single pilot operation with Mr. Gilbert Chacon as the only authorized pilot.
- Blackhawk International Airways reportedly hired Mr Morales two days prior to the fatal accident, although they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Further, they did not exercise due diligence in ensuring pilot’s qualification prior to assigning duty as pilot in command.
- There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency issued a correction letter April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts, Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs.
- Results of disassembly report confirms that no discrepancies existed that would have precluded normal operation of both left and right engines prior to impact.
- Forensic Report showed traces of benzoylegonine (a metabolite of cocaine) in the urine and traces of ethanol in the stomach contents of the pilot.
- On July 7, 2001, Morales was arrested by the Broward Sheriff's Office in an area of Pompano Beach known for drug sales. A deputy who pulled over Morales' 1993 Volkswagen Fox for running a stop sign said he found pieces of crack cocaine and other paraphernalia in the car. According to the deputy, Morales said he was in the area to buy powder cocaine for a friend.
- In November 2000, Morales was arrested by Fort Lauderdale police after he tried to "return'' $345 worth of stolen aviation parts to a local distributor. Instead of giving Morales cash, store employees called police, who were investigating a string of airplane burglaries. Mr. Morales was charged with dealing in stolen property after detectives found that a receipt in his bag belonged to the burglary victim who actually bought the parts. An additional charge of grand theft was tacked on when detectives recovered other stolen items.

The pilot's failure to maintain a proper climb rate while taking off at night, which was a result of spatial disorientation. Factors in the accident were the low visibility and cloud conditions, and the dark night.

The pilot's failure to obtain airspeed after rotation, which resulted in a stall/mush. Contributing factors were the tailwind condition, high density altitude, and upsloping runway.

The following contributing factors were identified:
- A series of negligences was noted in the operations of the company and the maintenance of the airplane,
- The flight was not properly prepared and the total weight of the aircraft was well above the MTOW,
- Due to the combination of the following factors, the pilots did not take the corrective actions to maintain a good climb path:
- Lack of seriousness and lack of documentation control during cargo loading at Chkalovsky Airport,
- Lack of rigor and non-compliance with standard operating procedures regarding the pre-takeoff check of the cargo, which led the ground personnel to load cargo with a total weight in excess of 13,6 to 14 tons,
- At takeoff, the total weight of the aircraft was estimated to be 204 tons while it was certified for a maximum weight of 191.9 tons taking into account all factors at the time of the accident,
- All crew members were unable to identify in due time the successive errors made by the captain (pilot-in-command), among others the stabilizers that were prematurely positioned in an angle of -3.9 ° while the trailing edge flaps were retracted, causing the lift to be insufficient,
- The coordination within the flight crew was ineffective and the copilot and the navigator did not pay sufficient attention to the altitude of the aircraft through flight conditions in reduced visibility,
- Lack of visibility caused by foggy conditions which did not allow the flight crew to distinguish in time the obstacles located past the runway end,
- As a result of this accident, the operator certificate was revoked.

Loss of control during initial climb following a loss of power on one engine for undetermined reasons.