Moscow-Chkalovsky

Failure and explosion of the left engine at takeoff following a bird strike.

The following contributing factors were identified:
- A series of negligences was noted in the operations of the company and the maintenance of the airplane,
- The flight was not properly prepared and the total weight of the aircraft was well above the MTOW,
- Due to the combination of the following factors, the pilots did not take the corrective actions to maintain a good climb path:
- Lack of seriousness and lack of documentation control during cargo loading at Chkalovsky Airport,
- Lack of rigor and non-compliance with standard operating procedures regarding the pre-takeoff check of the cargo, which led the ground personnel to load cargo with a total weight in excess of 13,6 to 14 tons,
- At takeoff, the total weight of the aircraft was estimated to be 204 tons while it was certified for a maximum weight of 191.9 tons taking into account all factors at the time of the accident,
- All crew members were unable to identify in due time the successive errors made by the captain (pilot-in-command), among others the stabilizers that were prematurely positioned in an angle of -3.9 ° while the trailing edge flaps were retracted, causing the lift to be insufficient,
- The coordination within the flight crew was ineffective and the copilot and the navigator did not pay sufficient attention to the altitude of the aircraft through flight conditions in reduced visibility,
- Lack of visibility caused by foggy conditions which did not allow the flight crew to distinguish in time the obstacles located past the runway end,
- As a result of this accident, the operator certificate was revoked.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the approach in poor weather conditions below the minimum prescribed altitude and while deviated from the approach path. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Navigational error on part of the crew during the final stage of the approach,
- ATC based at Batumi Airport failed to determine the exact position of the aircraft and failed to warn the crew accordingly,
- The crew 's decision to continue the approach in such conditions rather than to divert to a suitable alternate airport,
- Erroneous data transmitted by ground navigational aids in the Batumi area.

The following findings were reported:
- Weather conditions were marginal,
- At the time of the accident, the runway length was 2,350 metres instead of 3,300 metres due to work in progress,
- The ILS CAT III system was inoperative during work in progress,
- The pilots were warned that the crew of an aircraft that landed on the same runway 36 about 11 minutes earlier established a visual contact with the runway at an altitude of 200 feet only,
- The crew continued the approach below MDA without establishing visual contact with the runway,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Poor approach planning,
- The crew failed to follow the approach checklist,
- The crew did not divide up the tasks in a correct manner,
- The crew did not prepare for a possible go-around procedure,
- The decision of the captain to initiate a go-around procedure was taken too late,
- The crew encountered engine trouble after the power levers were suddenly moved,
- The relative low experience of the captain on this type of aircraft.

It is believed that the loss of control occurred after the right engine failed during initial climb for unknown reasons.

It was reported the pilot-in-command positioned the rudder in a 25° angle without reducing speed. The airplane a steep turn and went out of control.

Fire on the left engine caused by the failure of a connecting rod for undetermined reason. This caused the piston of the 11th cylinder to brake.

The flight mechanic forgot to switch the tanks in time sot the fuel pressure dropped, causing the right engine to fail, soon followed by the left one.

It was determined that the takeoff procedure was precipitated and that the period of time of 10 minutes between the engine startup and the takeoff was insufficient.