Takeoff (climb)

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Reus to Barcelona for maintenance purposes. During take off roll on runway 07, at a speed of 80 knots, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on its nose for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll on runway 29, the aircraft did not accelerate as expected. The captain decided to abort the takeoff procedure but the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance. It overran and collided with trees located 100 meters further. A crew member was injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 17 January 2004, the occurrence pilot started his workday in Toronto, Ontario, reporting for duty at 0445 eastern standard time. In the morning, he completed flights in the Cessna 208B Caravan from Toronto to Windsor, Ontario, Windsor to Pelee Island, Ontario, and then Pelee Island to Windsor where the aircraft landed at 0916. At approximately 1500, the pilot received local weather and passenger information by telephone from the Pelee Island office personnel. The 1430 weather was reported as follows: ceiling 500 feet obscured, visibility two miles. There were eight male passengers for pick up at Pelee Island. One additional passenger was travelling with the pilot. There was no discussion concerning the amount of cargo to be carried or the passenger weights. At 1508, the pilot received a faxed weather package that he had requested from the Flight Information Centre (FIC) in London, Ontario. At 1523, the aircraft was refuelled in preparation for the scheduled 1600 departure to Pelee Island. The passengers were loaded earlier than usual to allow time for aircraft de-icing, as wet snow had accumulated on the fuselage and wings since the previous flight. At 1555, the aircraft was de-iced with Type 1 de-icing fluid, and it departed for Pelee Island at 1605 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan as Flight GGN125. At 1615, the pilot advised the Cleveland Control Centre, Ohio, United States, that he had Pelee Island in sight, was cancelling IFR, and was descending out of 5000 feet. The pilot also advised Cleveland that he would be departing IFR out of Pelee Island in about 20 minutes as GGN126 and asked if a transponder code could be issued. The Cleveland controller issued a transponder code and requested a call when GGN126 became airborne. The pilot advised that the flight would depart on Runway 27 then turn north. These were the last recorded transmissions from the aircraft. The aircraft landed at 1620. While on the ramp, two individuals voiced concern to the pilot that there was ice on the wing. Freezing precipitation was falling. The pilot was observed to visually check the leading edge of the wing; however, he did not voice any concern and proceeded with loading the passengers and cargo. At approximately 1638, GGN126 departed Pelee Island for Windsor. After using most of the runway length for take-off, the aircraft climbed out at a very shallow angle. No one on the ground observed the aircraft once it turned toward the north; however, witnesses who were not at the airport reported that they heard the sound of a crash, then no engine noise. A normal flight from Pelee Island to Windsor in the Cessna Caravan takes 15 to 20 minutes. Shortly after the aircraft departed, the ticket agent in Windsor received a call from Pelee Island reporting that a crash had been heard. At 1705, when the aircraft had not arrived, the ticket agent called Windsor tower. The pilot had not made contact with any air traffic services (ATS) facility immediately before or after departure, so there was nothing in the ATS system to indicate that the aircraft had taken off. It was, therefore, unaccounted for. There was no signal heard from the emergency locator transmitter (ELT). At 1710, the Windsor tower controller contacted the Rescue Coordination Centre in Trenton, Ontario, and a search was initiated. At 1908, the aircraft empennage and debris were spotted by a United States Coast Guard (USCG) helicopter on the frozen surface of the lake, about 1.6 nautical miles (nm) from the departure end of the runway. There were no survivors. The empennage sank beneath the surface some four hours later. The wreckage recovery was not fully completed until 13 days later.

During the takeoff roll from a grassy runway (780 metres long), the pilot noted standing water on the ground. He attempted to take off prematurely to avoid these puddles but the aircraft stalled and crash landed. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following a night takeoff from runway 22R at Sharm el Sheikh-Ophira Airport, the plane climbed and maneuvered for a procedural left turn to intercept the 306 radial from the Sharm el Sheikh VOR station. When the autopilot was engaged the captain made an exclamation and the autopilot was immediately switched off again. The captain then requested Heading Select to be engaged. The plane then began to bank to the right. The copilot then warned the captain a few times about the fact that the bank angle was increasing. At a bank angle of 40° to the right the captain stated "OK come out". The ailerons returned briefly to neutral before additional aileron movements commanded an increase in the right bank. The aircraft had reached a maximum altitude of 5,460 feet with a 50° bank when the copilot stated 'overbank'. Repeating himself as the bank angle kept increasing. The maximum bank angle recorded was 111° right. Pitch attitude at that time was 43° nose down and altitude was 3,470 feet. The observer on the flight deck, a trainee copilot, called 'retard power, retard power, retard power'. Both throttles were moved to idle and the airplane gently seemed to recover from the nose-down, right bank attitude. Speed however increased, causing an overspeed warning. At 04:45 the airplane struck the surface of the water in a 24° right bank, 24° nose-down, at a speed of 416 kts and with a 3,9 G load. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris sank by a depth of 900 metres. All 148 occupants were killed, among them 133 French citizens, one Moroccan, one Japanese and 13 Egyptian (all crew members, among them six who should disembark at Cairo). Weather at the time of accident was good with excellent visibility, outside temperature of 17° C and light wind. On January 17, the FDR was found at a depth of 1,020 metres and the CVR was found a day later at a depth of 1,050 metres.

On take off roll on runway 25 at dusk, left wing struck a snowbank on left side of the runway. Aircraft veered off runway and came to rest in snow with its nose gear sheared off and several damages to the fuselage. Both pilots were uninjured.

Flight GIH 141 was a weekly scheduled flight, performed by the Union des Transports Africains (UTA), between Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Beirut (Lebanon) and Dubai (United Arab Emirates). A stopover at Kufra (Libya) was planned between Cotonou and Beirut. Having departed from Conakry at 10 h 07 with eighty-six passengers, including three babies, and ten crew members, the Boeing 727-223 registered 3X-GDO landed at Cotonou Cadjèhoun on 25 December 2003 at 12 h 25. Nine passengers disembarked. Sixty-three persons, including two babies, checked in at the airport check-in desk. Ten others, including one baby, boarded from an aircraft that had arrived from Lomé (Togo). Passenger boarding and baggage loading took place in a climate of great confusion. The airplane was full. In the cockpit, two UTA executives were occupying the jump seats. Faced with the particularly large number and size of the hand baggage, the chief flight attendant informed the Captain of the situation. The ground handling company’s agents began loading the baggage in the aft hold when one of the operator’s agents, who remains unidentified, asked them to continue loading in the forward hold, which already contained baggage. When the operation was finished, the hold was full. During this time, the crew prepared the airplane for the second flight segment. The co-pilot was discussing his concerns with the UTA executives, reminding them of the importance of determining the precise weight of the loading of the airplane. The flight plan for Kufra, signed by the Captain, was filed with the ATC office but the meteorological dossier that had been prepared was not collected. Fuel was added to fill up the airplane’s tanks (14,244 liters, or 11.4 metric tons). The accompanying mechanics added some oil. The Captain determined the limitations for the flight and selected the following configuration: flaps 25°, air conditioning units shut down. At 13 h 47 min 55, the crew began the pre-flight checklist. Calm was restored in the cockpit. At 13 h 52 min 12, flight GIH 141 was cleared to roll. The co-pilot was pilot flying (PF). The elevator was set at 6 ¾, it was stated that the takeoff would be performed with full power applied with brakes on, followed by a climb at three degrees maximum to gain speed, with no turn after landing gear retraction. As the roll was beginning, a flight attendant informed the cockpit that passengers who wanted to sit near their friends were still standing and did not want to sit down. The airline’s Director General called the people in the cabin to order. Take-off thrust was requested at 13 h 58 min 01, brake release was performed at 13 h 58 min 15. The airplane accelerated. In the tower, the assistant controller noted that the take-off roll was long, though he did not pay any particular attention to it. At 13 h 59, a speed of a hundred and thirty-seven knots was reached. The Captain called out V1 and Vr. The co-pilot pulled back on the control column. This action initially had no effect on the airplane’s angle of attack. The Captain called « Rotate, rotate »; the co-pilot pulled back harder. The angle of attack only increased slowly. When the airplane had hardly left the ground, it struck the building containing the localizer on the extended runway centerline, at 13 h 59 min 11. The right main landing gear broke off and ripped off a part of the underwing flaps on the right wing. The airplane banked slightly to the right and crashed onto the beach. It broke into several pieces and ended up in the ocean. The two controllers present in the tower heard the noise and, looking in the direction of the takeoff, saw the airplane plunge towards the ground. Immediately afterwards, a cloud of dust and sand prevented anything else being seen. The fire brigade duty chief stated that the airplane seemed to have struck the localizer building. The firefighters went to the site and noticed the damage to the building and the presence of a casualty, a technician who was working there during the takeoff. Noticing some aircraft parts on the beach, they went there through a service gate beyond the installations. Some survivors were still in the wreckage, others were in the water or on the beach. Some inhabitants from the immediate vicinity crowded around, complicating the rescuers’ task. The town fire brigade, the Red Cross and the Cotonou SAMU, along with some members of the police, arrived some minutes later.

The airplane was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following an in-flight loss of control during climb after takeoff. Meteorological information indicates that the cloud ceilings were between 1,200 and 1,700 feet above ground level at the time of the accident. While airborne, the accident pilot reported to another pilot that the cloud ceiling was 1,500 feet. Radar data shows that the airplane flight profile became erratic once it had climbed above about 1,700 feet pressure altitude. The final flight path sequence depicted by the radar data shows a right-hand turn of decreasing radius with an associated rapid rate of descent. The last radar return coincided with the accident location. The non-instrument rated pilot had logged 7.0 hours of simulated instrument experience. The pilot had logged 35.8 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane, of which, all but 0.3 hours was listed as crosscountry time. No records of training in the same make and model airplane were discovered. No pre-impact mechanical deficiencies were found during the post-accident examination of the wreckage.

At approximately 0900 eastern standard time (EST), the pilot arrived at the airstrip and prepared the ski-equipped de Havilland DHC–3 (Otter) aircraft (registration C–GOFF, serial number 65) for the morning flight. This Otter was equipped with a turbine engine. Two passengers, with enough supplies for an extended period of time, including a snowmobile and camping gear, were to be flown to a remote location. The pilot loaded the aircraft and waited for the weather to improve. At approximately 1200 EST, the pilot and passengers boarded the aircraft and took off in an easterly direction. The aircraft got airborne near the departure end of the airstrip, and, shortly after take-off, the right wing struck a number of small bushes and the top of a birch tree. The aircraft descended and struck the frozen lake surface, approximately 70 feet below the airfield elevation in a steep, nose-down, right-wing-low attitude. When it came to rest, the aircraft was inverted and partially submerged, with only the aft section of the fuselage remaining above the ice. All of the occupants were wearing lap belts. The pilot and front seat passenger received fatal injuries. The rear seat passenger survived the impact and evacuated the aircraft with some difficulty due to leg injuries. The following morning, about 22 hours after the accident, a local air operator searching for the missing aircraft located and rescued the surviving passenger.

The flight was climbing from 5,000 to 10,000 feet and the pilot obtained a maximum altitude of 6,300 feet. The airplane then began to lose altitude and deviate off course. The pilot declared a mayday and reported the airplane was in a spin. Several witnesses near the accident site reported hearing airplane engine noises and seeing the airplane descend from the clouds in a nose-down spiral to the ground. Two AIRMETs were valid at the time of the accident and included the accident location: "AIRMET TANGO update 3 for turbulence ... . Occasional moderate turbulence below a flight level of 18,000 feet due to wind shear ... ." "AIRMET ZULU update 2 for ice and freezing level ... . Occasional moderate rime and/or mixed icing in clouds and precipitation below 8,000 feet." Two pilots who departed in separate Beech 200 airplanes about the time of the accident airplane stated they encountered "moderate rime" icing between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, and one pilot reported instrument meteorological conditions and light turbulence between 1,800 to 6,000 feet. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of airframe or engine malfunction. The de-ice ejector flow control valves for the left wing, right wing, and empennage pneumatic boots were removed for examination, and all valves functioned when power was supplied.