Country
code

Littoral

Crash of a Boeing 727-223 in Cotonou: 141 killed

Date & Time: Dec 25, 2003 at 1459 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
3X-GDO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Conakry - Cotonou - Kufra - Beirut - Dubai
MSN:
21370
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
GIH141
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
153
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
141
Captain / Total flying hours:
11000
Captain / Total hours on type:
8000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
67186
Aircraft flight cycles:
40452
Circumstances:
Flight GIH 141 was a weekly scheduled flight, performed by the Union des Transports Africains (UTA), between Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Beirut (Lebanon) and Dubai (United Arab Emirates). A stopover at Kufra (Libya) was planned between Cotonou and Beirut. Having departed from Conakry at 10 h 07 with eighty-six passengers, including three babies, and ten crew members, the Boeing 727-223 registered 3X-GDO landed at Cotonou Cadjèhoun on 25 December 2003 at 12 h 25. Nine passengers disembarked. Sixty-three persons, including two babies, checked in at the airport check-in desk. Ten others, including one baby, boarded from an aircraft that had arrived from Lomé (Togo). Passenger boarding and baggage loading took place in a climate of great confusion. The airplane was full. In the cockpit, two UTA executives were occupying the jump seats. Faced with the particularly large number and size of the hand baggage, the chief flight attendant informed the Captain of the situation. The ground handling company’s agents began loading the baggage in the aft hold when one of the operator’s agents, who remains unidentified, asked them to continue loading in the forward hold, which already contained baggage. When the operation was finished, the hold was full. During this time, the crew prepared the airplane for the second flight segment. The co-pilot was discussing his concerns with the UTA executives, reminding them of the importance of determining the precise weight of the loading of the airplane. The flight plan for Kufra, signed by the Captain, was filed with the ATC office but the meteorological dossier that had been prepared was not collected. Fuel was added to fill up the airplane’s tanks (14,244 liters, or 11.4 metric tons). The accompanying mechanics added some oil. The Captain determined the limitations for the flight and selected the following configuration: flaps 25°, air conditioning units shut down. At 13 h 47 min 55, the crew began the pre-flight checklist. Calm was restored in the cockpit. At 13 h 52 min 12, flight GIH 141 was cleared to roll. The co-pilot was pilot flying (PF). The elevator was set at 6 ¾, it was stated that the takeoff would be performed with full power applied with brakes on, followed by a climb at three degrees maximum to gain speed, with no turn after landing gear retraction. As the roll was beginning, a flight attendant informed the cockpit that passengers who wanted to sit near their friends were still standing and did not want to sit down. The airline’s Director General called the people in the cabin to order. Take-off thrust was requested at 13 h 58 min 01, brake release was performed at 13 h 58 min 15. The airplane accelerated. In the tower, the assistant controller noted that the take-off roll was long, though he did not pay any particular attention to it. At 13 h 59, a speed of a hundred and thirty-seven knots was reached. The Captain called out V1 and Vr. The co-pilot pulled back on the control column. This action initially had no effect on the airplane’s angle of attack. The Captain called « Rotate, rotate »; the co-pilot pulled back harder. The angle of attack only increased slowly. When the airplane had hardly left the ground, it struck the building containing the localizer on the extended runway centerline, at 13 h 59 min 11. The right main landing gear broke off and ripped off a part of the underwing flaps on the right wing. The airplane banked slightly to the right and crashed onto the beach. It broke into several pieces and ended up in the ocean. The two controllers present in the tower heard the noise and, looking in the direction of the takeoff, saw the airplane plunge towards the ground. Immediately afterwards, a cloud of dust and sand prevented anything else being seen. The fire brigade duty chief stated that the airplane seemed to have struck the localizer building. The firefighters went to the site and noticed the damage to the building and the presence of a casualty, a technician who was working there during the takeoff. Noticing some aircraft parts on the beach, they went there through a service gate beyond the installations. Some survivors were still in the wreckage, others were in the water or on the beach. Some inhabitants from the immediate vicinity crowded around, complicating the rescuers’ task. The town fire brigade, the Red Cross and the Cotonou SAMU, along with some members of the police, arrived some minutes later.
Probable cause:
The accident resulted from a direct cause:
• The difficulty that the flight crew encountered in performing the rotation with an overloaded airplane whose forward center of gravity was unknown to them; and two structural causes:
• The operator’s serious lack of competence, organization and regulatory documentation, which made it impossible for it both to organize the operation of the route correctly and to check the loading of the airplane;
• The inadequacy of the supervision exercised by the Guinean civil aviation authorities and, previously, by the authorities in Swaziland, in the context of safety oversight.
The following factors could have contributed to the accident:
• The need for air links with Beirut for the large communities of Lebanese origin in West Africa;
• The dispersal of effective responsibility between the various actors, in particular the role played by the owner of the airplane, which made supervision complicated;
• The failure by the operator, at Conakry and Cotonou, to call on service companies to supply information on the airplane’s loading;
• The Captain’s agreement to undertake the take-off with an airplane for which he had not been able to establish the weight;
• The short length of the runway at Cotonou;
• The time of day chosen for the departure of the flight, when it was particularly hot;
• The very wide margins, in particular in relation to the airplane’s weight, which appeared to exist, due to the use of an inappropriate document to establish the airplane’s weight and balance sheet;
• The existence of a non-frangible building one hundred and eighteen meters after the runway threshold.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-7C in Douala: 111 killed

Date & Time: Mar 4, 1962 at 1921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ARUD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lourenço Marques – Douala – Lisbon – Luxembourg
MSN:
45160
YOM:
1957
Flight number:
CA123
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
101
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
111
Captain / Total flying hours:
11587
Captain / Total hours on type:
287.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10249
Copilot / Total hours on type:
227
Circumstances:
The aircraft lined up on runway 12 and took at 1820 GMT (night takeoff evening twilight ended at 1756 hours). According to the controller on duty at the control tower the aircraft's landing lights were not on during the take-off. The aircraft lifted off runway 12 after what appeared to be an unusually long run of approximately 2,300 meters (of 2,850 meters available) after release of the brakes and gained height with difficulty. The anti-collision light was seen at a low altitude and the disappeared behind the trees. Five seconds later the sky was lit up by a fire. The left wing and left side of the fuselage struck the first trees of the forest at a height of about 22 meters above the elevation and about 2,300 meters beyond the threshold of runway 30. After the initial impact in a near level flight attitude and with the aircraft slightly banked to port, it then went progressively into a dive with the left wing low and sheared the tops of the trees over a traversed distance of about 130 meters before final impact with the water of a creek. The attitude of the aircraft on final impact was approximately 25° nose down with the same angle of left bank. The aircraft exploded on impact. The fuel and oil spread over the surface of the water and ignited. The fire destroyed the submerged parts of the wreckage. All 111 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
In spite of the very numerous expert examinations and all the tests on the ground and in flight which the Commission of Inquiry has carried out or caused to be carried out, the state of the wreckage and its position in an inundated forest area have prevented the Commission from determining with absolute certainty the cause of the accident to DC-7C G-ARUD. The commission considers, however, that there is evidence to show that an elevator spring-tab mechanism may have jammed before impact. This jamming would have resulted in abnormal elevator control forces during the takeoff. Flight tests have shown this to be consistent with a prolonged takeoff run and a risk of losing height during flap retraction. Furthermore, the following features, all adverse, may have aggravated the circumstances in which the accident occurred: - the implementation of a procedure for gaining speed which was conducive to the aircraft being flown at a low altitude - the fact that a positive rate of climb was not maintained at the time of flap retraction which, in the SABENA procedure applied by Caledonian Airways, is not subject to any altitude limitation other than that of obstacle clearance - the presence in the co-pilot's seat of a check pilot whose attention may have been attracted more by the actions of the first pilot than by the indications on his own instrument panel. The Commission had been unable to eliminate an instrument failure as a possible cause of the accident, as the instruments were not recovered or were too seriously damaged to allow of any valid expert examination.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-54A-5-DO Skymaster in Douala: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jun 13, 1961 at 1933 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TJ-ABC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Douala - Douala
MSN:
7473
YOM:
1944
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
13412
Captain / Total hours on type:
212.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1142
Copilot / Total hours on type:
62
Circumstances:
The crew as performing a local night training flight at Douala Airport. After completing several maneuvers at the end of the afternoon with departures alternately from runway 12 and 30, the crew started a new takeoff from runway 12. After liftoff, the airplane encountered difficulties to gain height when the propeller on engine number 2 struck a tree located 1,200 meters past the runway end. The airplane continued at low height and struck a second tree, causing a fuel tank to be ruptured and to catch fire. In the mean time, the propellers on engine number one, two and four detached and the airplane eventually crashed in a huge explosion 200 meters farther. All five crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by flight at too low an altitude during a night training exercise. According to witnesses, the instructor had directed the pilot to circle the runway at an altitude of 150 ft during the first training exercise; it appears that this instruction was maintained for the same exercise by night. Assuming that take-off was made with flaps extended, it so happened that complete retraction of the flaps occurred practically at the time of impact with the first tree. In fact, it can be estimated that the flight lasted 30 - 40 seconds from the time of take-off to impact with the first tree. Retraction of the landing gear takes ' 15 seconds and of the flaps approximately 10 seconds. Rapid retraction of the flaps at low speed causes the aircraft to nose down, It is possible that the loss of altitude occurred just before reaching the curtain of trees. Flaps are normally retracted gradually after reaching an altitude of 200 feet in visual meteorological conditions and 400 ft in instrument meteorological conditions or at night. The normal path of a DC-4 with one engine on reduced-power at take-off, climbing speed 400 - 500 ft/min, made it impossible for the aircraft to clear the tops of the trees which it struck. Assuming the take-off was made without flaps - a manoeuvre not recommended during night flights at Douala - the path followed would have inevitably brought the aircraft into the trees. It should be noted that the Air France DC-4 Manual prohibits counter-rotating the engine propeller in case of hydraulic Iock; this manoeuvre merely forces the oil into the intake pipe and can render the engine inoperative. Even though this prohibited manoeuvre was followed, it does not appear that it was one of the causes of the accident; the incident would most certainly have occurred during the first aerodrome circuit after the return to the parking area. In conclusion, it appears that the accident should be ascribed to lack of seriousness and judgement on the part of the instructor. Pilot fatigue may also be invoked after a two-hour training flight at very low altitude under the constant supervision of the instructor. The pilot was a very serious, methodic and calm flier, but he did not have sufficient authority to disregard the unduly risky manoeuvres urged upon him, as confirmed orally by a flight mechanic who had flown with the crew involved in the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DH.89A Dragon Rapide near Mouangko: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 18, 1956
Registration:
F-OAVZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Libreville – Kribi – Douala
MSN:
6790
YOM:
1944
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
While cruising at low height, the twin engine aircraft hit a tree and crashed in the Sanaga River, about 40 km south of Douala. As the airplane failed to arrive at Douala Airport, SAR operations were conducted and the wreckage was found near Mouangko five weeks later on October 26. The pilot was killed. For undetermined reason, he was flying at an insufficient altitude.

Crash of a Douglas DC-3A in Cotonou

Date & Time: Feb 16, 1950
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-BAOD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
11720
YOM:
1943
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On touchdown, the right main gear failed. The aircraft veered off runway to the right, lost its right engine and came to rest. All three crew members were unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.