Landing (descent or approach)

The commercial pilot was conducting an instrument approach following a 3.5-hour cross-country instrument flight rules (IFR) flight in a single-engine turboprop airplane. About 1.6 miles from the runway threshold, the airplane began a climb consistent with the published missed approach procedure; however, rather than completing the slight left climbing turn toward the designated holding point, the airplane continued in an approximate 270° left turn, during which the airplane's altitude varied, before entering a descending right turn and impacting terrain. Tree and ground impact signatures were consistent with a 60° nose-low attitude at the time of impact. No distress calls were received or recorded from the accident flight. A postimpact fire consumed a majority of the cockpit and fuselage. Weather information for the time of the accident revealed that the pilot was operating in IFR to low IFR conditions with gusting surface winds, light to heavy snow, mist, cloud ceilings between 700 and 1,400 ft above ground level with clouds extending through 18,500 ft, and the potential for low-level wind shear and clear air turbulence. The area of the accident site was under AIRMETs for IFR conditions, mountain obscuration, moderate icing below 20,000 ft, and moderate turbulence below 18,000 ft. In addition, a winter storm warning was issued about 6 hours before the flight departed. Although the pilot received a weather briefing about 17 hours before the accident, there was no indication that he obtained updated weather information before departure or during the accident flight. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; however, the extent of the fire damage precluded examination of the avionics system. The airplane was equipped with standby flight instruments. An acquaintance of the pilot reported that the pilot had experienced an avionics malfunction several months before the accident during which the airplane's flight display went blank while flying an instrument approach. During that occurrence, the pilot used ForeFlight on his iPad to maneuver back to the northeast and fly the approach again using his own navigation. During the accident flight, the airplane appeared to go missed approach, but rather than fly the published missed approach procedure, the airplane also turned left towards to northeast. However, it could not be determined if the pilot's actions were an attempt to fly the approach using his own navigation or if he was experiencing spatial disorientation. The restricted visibility and turbulence present at the time of the accident provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's turning flight track and steep descent profile are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation.

On 25th January 2018 at 14:28 h, a Gulfstream 200 (G200) aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-BTF operated by Nestoil Plc, departed Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos (DNMM) as a charter flight to Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja (DNAA) on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan. Onboard were four passengers and three flight crew members. The Pilot in command (PIC) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the Co-pilot was the Pilot Flying (PF). The departure, cruise and approach to Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport were normal. At 14:45 h, 5N-BTF contacted Abuja radar and was subsequently cleared for Radar vectors ILS approach Runway 22. Abuja Airport Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) Papa for time 14:20 h was monitored as follows; “Main landing runway 22, wind 110/07 kt, Visibility 3,500 m in Haze, No Significant Clouds, Temperature/Dew point 33/- 01°C, QNH 1010 hPa, Trend No Significant Change, End of Information Papa”. At 15:17 h, 5N-BTF reported 4 NM on Instrument approach (ILS) and was requested to report 2 NM because there was a preceding aircraft (Gulfstream 5) on landing roll. Thereafter, 5N-BTF was cleared to land runway 22 with reported wind of 070°/07 kt. At 15:18 h, the aircraft touched down slightly left of the runway centre line. According to the PF, in the process of controlling the aircraft to the centre line, the aircraft skidded left and right and eventually went partly off the runway to the right where it came to a stop. In his report, the PM stated that on touchdown, he noticed the aircraft oscillating left and right as brakes were applied. The oscillation continued to increase and [the aircraft] eventually went off the runway to the right where the aircraft came to a stop, partially on the runway. During the post-crash inspection, the investigation determined that the skid marks on the runway indicated that the aircraft steered in an S-pattern continuously with increasing amplitude, down the runway. On the last right turn, the aircraft exited the right shoulderof the runway, the right main wheel went into the grass and on the final left turn, the right main landing gear strut detached from its main attachment point after which the aircraft finally came to a complete stop on a magnetic heading of 160°. The ATC immediately notified the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS), Approach Radar Control, and other relevant agencies about the occurrence. All persons on board disembarked with no injuries. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the occurrence. The serious incident occcurred in daylight.

The airplane departed Ankara-Esenboğa Airport at 2233LT bound for Trabzon. Following an uneventful flight, the crew started the approach by night to runway 11 and the landing was completed in heavy rain falls at 2325LT. After touchdown at a speed of 143 knots, the airplane rolled for about 2,400 metres then veered off runway to the left, went through a grassy area then down a steep slope. It lost its right engine and came to rest few metres above the sea. All 168 occupants evacuated safely. The right engine was sheared off and fell into the sea. According to first report, it is believed something went wrong with the right engine after touchdown (unintentional forward thrust and asymmetrical thrust).

The pilot reported that, during the approach following a positioning flight, he saw that the runway had a light dusting of snow on it and that the airplane touched down on speed in the first 1,000 ft of the 4,100- ft-long runway. The copilot, who was the pilot flying, applied heavy braking, but there appeared to be no braking effectiveness, and the airplane did not slow down as expected. The pilot added that, when the airplane reached about two-thirds of the way down the runway, he knew that it was going to overrun the runway due to the loss of only half of its airspeed. He thought that if he aborted the landing, there was a small chance the airplane could become airborne within the remaining runway. The copilot added engine power to abort the landing, and the nose landing gear lifted off, but insufficient runway was remaining to take off. The copilot reduced the engine power to idle, and the airplane overran the runway and went through the airport fence and a guardrail, across a highway, and into a field. Postaccident examination revealed no flat spots or evidence of skidding on the landing gear tires. The flaps were found in the “ground flaps” position, which is not allowed for takeoff. No evidence of any pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Based on an airplane weight of 11,000 lbs, the airplane’s stopping distance would have been about 4,400
ft. The flight crew’s improper decision to land on a snow-covered runway that was too short to accommodate the landing in such conditions led to a runway overrun and impact with obstacles.

The airplane departed Egelsbach Airport at 1743LT on a charter flight to Friedrichshafen, carrying one passenger and two pilots. Following an uneventful flight at FL210, the crew contacted Zurich ARTCC and was cleared to start the descent and later told to expect a runway 24 ILS approach to Friedrichshafen-Bodensee Airport. After passing 4,000 feet on descent, at a speed of 240 knots, the crew was completing a last turn in clouds when the airplane entered a rapid and uncontrolled descent until it crashed in a wooded area located in Sieberatsreute, some 15 km short of runway 24. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

The flight instructor, commercial pilot receiving instruction, and commercial pilot-rated passenger were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane during instrument meteorological conditions. After performing a practice instrument approach, the flight was cleared for a second approach; however, the landing runway changed, and the controller vectored the airplane for an approach to the new runway. The pilot was instructed to turn to a southwesterly heading and maintain 1,600 ft until established on the localizer. Radar information revealed that the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading on a course to intercept the localizer and remained at 1,600 ft for about 1 minute 39 seconds before beginning a descending right turn to 1,400 ft. The descent continued to 1,100 ft; at which time the air traffic control controller issued a low altitude alert. Over the following 10 seconds, the airplane continued to descend at a rate in excess of 4,800 ft per minute (fpm). The controller issued a second low altitude alert to the crew with instructions to climb to 1,600 ft immediately. The pilot responded about 5 seconds later, "yeah I am sir, I am, I am." The airplane then climbed 1,400 ft over 13 seconds, resulting in a climb rate in excess of 6,700 fpm, followed by a descent to 1,400 ft over 5 seconds, resulting in a 1,500-fpm descent before radar contact was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. Radar data following the initial instrument approach indicated that the airplane was flying a relatively smooth and consistent flightpath with altitude and heading changes that were indicative of autopilot use until the final turn to intercept the localizer course. Maneuvering the airplane in restricted visibility placed the pilot in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The accident circumstances, including altitude and course deviations and the subsequent high-energy impact, are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Additionally, examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of any preexisting anomalies that would have precludednormal operation. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot receiving instruction was experiencing the effects of spatial disorientation when the accident occurred. Toxicology testing of the flight instructor identified significant amounts of oxycodone as well as its active metabolite, oxymorphone, in liver tissue; oxycodone was also found in muscle. Oxycodone is an opioid pain medication available by prescription that may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks. The flight instructor's tissue levels of oxycodone suggest that his blood level at the time of the accident was high enough to have had psychoactive effects, and his failure to recognize and mitigate the pilot's spatial disorientation and impending loss of control further suggest that the flight instructor was impaired by the effects of oxycodone. Toxicology testing of all three pilots identified ethanol in body tissues; however, given the varying amounts and distribution, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from postmortem production rather than ingestion.

The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his high-performance, turbine-powered airplane with full tanks of fuel. He landed and had the airplane serviced with 150 gallons of fuel. He subsequently departed on the return flight. As the airplane approached the destination airport, the pilot asked for priority handling and reported that the airplane "lost a transfer pump and had a little less fuel than he thought," and he did not want to come in with a single engine. When asked if he needed assistance, he replied "negative." The pilot was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 19 during night conditions. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot requested the runway lights for runway 25 be turned on and reported that the airplane lost engine power in one engine. The controller advised that the lights on runway 25 were being turned on and issued a landing clearance. The airplane impacted terrain before the threshold for runway 25. During examination of the recovered wreckage, flight control continuity was established. No useable amount of fuel was found in any of the airplane's fuel tanks; however, fuel was observed in the fuel lines. All transfer pumps and boost pumps were operational. The engine-driven fuel pumps on both engines contained fuel in their respective fuel filter bowls. Both pumps were able to rotate when their input shafts were manipulated by hand. Disassembly of both pumps revealed that their inlet filters were free of obstructions. Bearing surfaces in both pumps exhibited pitting consistent with pump operation with inadequate fuel lubrication and fuel not reaching the pump. The examination revealed no evidence of airframe or engine preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Performance calculations using a flight planning method described in the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane could have made the return flight with about 18 gallons (119 lbs) of fuel remaining. However, performance calculations using a fuel burn simulation method developed from the fuel burn and data from the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane would have run out of fuel on approach. Regulations require that a flight depart with enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, at night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. The calculated 45-minute night reserves required about 56 gallons (366 lbs) of fuel using a maximum recommended cruise power setting or about 37.8 gallons (246 lbs) of fuel using a maximum range power setting. Regardless of the flight planning method he could have used, the pilot did not depart on the accident flight with the required fuel reserves and exhausted all useable fuel while on approach to the destination. The airplane was owned by Edward B. Noakes III.

On 22 November 2017, the pilot-in-command (PIC) accompanied by the first officer (FO) took off from the Cape Town International Airport (FACT) on a private flight to the Rand Airport (FAGM). The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) by day and the approach was conducted under visual flight rules (VFR). The PIC was the pilot flying (PF) and was seated on the left seat and the FO was occupying the right seat. The air traffic controller (ATC) on duty at FAGM tower stated that the FO reported in-bound for a fullstop landing at FAGM. The last wind direction data for Runway 29 was transmitted to the FO as 230°/11 knots (kts) and Query Nautical Height (QNH): 1021. The FO acknowledged the transmission and the crew elected to land on Runway 11. The PIC stated that the approach for landing was stable and that the touchdown was near the first taxiway exit point. According to the FO, the aircraft floated for a while before touchdown. This was confirmed during the investigation. During the landing rollout, the PIC applied the brakes and the brakes responded for a short while, however, the aircraft continued to roll without slowing down. At approximately 300 metres (m) beyond the intersection of Runway 35 and Runway 11, the PIC requested the FO to apply emergency brakes. The FO applied the emergency brakes gradually and the aircraft continued to roll before the brakes locked and the tyres burst. The aircraft skidded on the main wheels and continued for approximately 180m until it overshot the runway. The undercarriage went over a ditch of approximately 200 millimetres in depth at the end of the runway into the soft ground and the aircraft came to a stop approximately 10m from the threshold facing slightly left off the extended centre line Runway 11. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the impact sequence and none of the occupants sustained injuries. The crash alarm was activated by the tower and the fire services responded to the scene.

The aircraft was on its way from Iwakuni Airbase to the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) cruising in the Philippines Sea on behalf of the 7th Fleet. It is believed that while approaching the supercarrier, the airplane stalled and crashed in the sea, apparently following an engine failure. Eight crew members were rescued while three were still missing two days after the accident. The wreckage was localized on 29 December 2017 at a depth of 5,640 meteres.
Those killed were:
Lt Steven Combs, Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Equipment),
Airman Matthew Chialastri,
Aviation Ordnance Airman Apprentice Bryan Grosso.

On 14.11.2017, Khabarovsk Airlines' representative submitted the flight request for L-410UVP-E20 RA-67047 A/C flight to Joint ATM System Khabarovsk regional unit; the flight (NI 463) was planned along the route Khabarovsk – Nikolayevsk-on-Amur – Nelkan. On 14.11.2017 at 22:00 (local time: on 15.11.2017 at 08:00) at Khabarovsk airport, the preflight preparation was started including the medical examination. While the preflight preparation was being performed, new information was received that Nikolayevsk-on-Amur airport was closed due to the RWY snow removal. In coordination with ATC of Nikolayevsk-on-Amur airport, it was decided to change the route as follows: Khabarovsk – Chyumican – Nelkan. Before coming onboard the crew passed all mandatory preflight procedures as required by the normative documentation. On 15.11.2017, before the departure, Khabarovsk Airlines' technicians provided the line maintenance check in accordance with the F-A Form (Maintenance Job Card #687). No findings in relation to the aircraft and/or systems' operation were reported. The total amount of fuel on board was 1250 kg. The flight crew obtained all the necessary weather information (actual and forecast) during of the preflight weather briefing. The actual weather and the weather forecast for the departure aerodrome, on route weather, the weather forecast for the destination and alternate aerodromes – all met the FAP-128 (Russian FAR) requirements stated in items 5.30 and 5.38, and did not preclude the PIC's decision for departure. There were 2 crew members, 5 passengers and 410 kg of cargo (personal luggage and mail) onboard. The A/C takeoff mass was 6368 kg and the A/C center of gravity was at 25.5% MAC, which was within the AFM limits for the flight. The takeoff from Khabarovsk airport was performed at 23:33. 50 minutes before the approach to Chyumikan aerodrome, the flight crew checked the remaining fuel and requested the Khabarovsk ATC controller for the route change (AFIL): after passing of the OGUMI waypoint to follow the B226 airway to Nelkan destination airport without a stop at Chyumikan. According the initial flight plan, the stop at Chyumikan was intended only for refueling. On 15.11.2017 at 01:47 the Khabarovsk ATC approved the AFIL. At 02:35 the crew contacted the Nelkan Tower controller and received the approach conditions and the actual weather at the landing site. During the approach, at the true height of about 100 m and IAS of about 100 knots, developing the aggressive right roll and losing its altitude, the aircraft left the descending glidepath, collided with the ground and was destroyed. The crew and 4 passengers were killed. A 3-and-half year old child was taken to hospital with serious injuries. Nobody was killed on ground and there was no on-ground damage. The accident area is mountainous, marshy, with broad-leaved and needle-leaved trees. In winter, the area is covered with snow which is about 50-100 cm deep. The accident place ASL elevation is 304 m, the magnetic dip is minus 15°.