Landing (descent or approach)

The pilot was on a visual flight rules flight transporting mail to a remote village. He reported that when he was about 15 minutes from the destination, he checked the automated weather observing system (AWOS) for updated weather information for the destination and recalled that the visibility was reported as 7 miles. However, the information he recalled was not consistent with what was actually reported by the AWOS; 18 minutes before the accident, the AWOS reported no more than 1 3/4 miles visibility. As he descended the airplane from 2,500 ft to 1,500 ft in the terminal area, he observed reduced visibility conditions that would require an instrument approach procedure. According to the pilot, while maneuvering toward the initial approach fix, he heard the autopilot disconnect, and the airplane began an uncommanded descent. He said that he remembered pulling on the control wheel and thought he had leveled off, but then the airplane impacted terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and rudder. He could not recall if he had heard terrain warnings or alerts before the impact. An airplane performance study indicated that the airplane was in a continuous descent from 2,500 ft until the final data point about 12 ft above the surface; the airplane was not leveled off at any time during the descent. In the final 15 seconds of recorded data, the rate of descent increased from about 500 fpm to about 2,300 fpm before decreasing to 1,460 fpm at the last recorded data point. Postaccident examinations of the airframe, engine, flight control, and autopilot components revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation or affected flight controllability. It is likely that the unexpected instrument approach procedure increased the pilot's workload as he maneuvered to set up for the approach. Further, when the autopilot disconnected, the airplane continued to descend; although the pilot reported that he heard the autopilot disconnect, he did not arrest the airplane's descent rate. Given the low visibility conditions, it is likely that the pilot did not detect the airplane's descent, and the airplane descended into the terrain.

A single-engine airplane was taking off from runway 15 about the same time that a multi-engine business jet landed on a nearly perpendicular runway (runway 22). The single-engine airplane, piloted by a private pilot, was departing on a local flight. The jet, piloted by an airline transport pilot, was rolling down the runway following a straight-in visual approach and landing. The single-engine airplane collided with the empennage of the jet at the intersection of the two runways. Witnesses in the airport lounge area heard the pilot of the single-engine airplane announce on the airport's universal communications (UNICOM) traffic advisory frequency a few minutes before the accident that the airplane was back-taxiing on the runway. The pilot of the jet did not recall making any radio transmissions on the UNICOM frequency and review of the jet's cockpit voice recorder did not reveal any incoming or outgoing calls on the frequency. The pilots of both airplanes were familiar with the airport, and the airport was not tower controlled. The airport had signage posted on all runways indicating that traffic using the nearly perpendicular runway could not be seen and instructed pilots to monitor the UNICOM. A visibility assessment confirmed reduced visibility of traffic operating from the nearly perpendicular runways. The reported weather conditions about the time of the accident included clear skies with 4 miles visibility due to haze. Both airplanes were painted white. It is likely that the pilot of the jet would have been aware of the departing traffic if he was monitoring the UNICOM frequency. Although the jet was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), he reported that the system did not depict any conflicting traffic during the approach to the airport. Although the visibility assessment showed reduced visibility from the departing and arrival runways, it could not be determined if or at what point during their respective landing and takeoff the pilot of each airplane may have been able to see the other airplane. In addition to the known reduced visibility of the intersecting runways, both airplanes were painted white and there was reported haze in the area, which could have affected the pilots' ability to see each other.

According to the operator's director of safety, during landing in gusty crosswind conditions, the multi-engine, turbine-powered airplane bounced. The airplane then touched down a second time left of the runway centerline. "Recognizing their position was too far left," the flight crew attempted a go-around. However, both engines were almost at idle and "took time to spool back up." Without the appropriate airspeed, the airplane continued to veer to the left. A gust under the right wing "drove" the left wing into the ground. The airplane continued across a grass field, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The director of safety reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 110° at 21 knots, gusting to 35 knots. The pilot landed on runway 04. The Beechcraft airplane flight manual states the max demonstrated crosswind is 25 knots. Based on the stated wind conditions, the calculated crosswind component was 19 to 33 knots.

The pilot, accompanied by an aircraft mechanic, departed Grenoble-Aples-Isère Airport (saint-Geoirs) to carry out a check flight following a maintenance operation on the airplane. Once in an open area south of the aerodrome, the pilot began the maneuvers provided for in the test program. At the end of a stall maneuver, he found that his actions on the rudder pedals have no effect. However, it maintained control of the ailerons and elevators. He informed the aerodrome controller of the problem and indicated that he was coming back to to land to the paved runway 09. Unable to determined the exact nature of the damage, the pilot chose to land with the flaps retracted. He managed with difficulty to aligne the airplane witn the runway 09 centerline. On final, at an altitude of 300 feet, the pilot changed his mind and decided to land on the unpaved right-hand runway 09 which adjoins the paved runway. On very short final, at flare, while reducing power, at a height of about 1-2 metres, the airplane rolled to the right then to the left, causing the wing tips and the propeller to struck the ground. The aircraft exited the unpaved runway to the left and came to rest on the right edge of the paved runway. Both occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

By night, the pilot attempted to land in a prairie located in Blue Creek, west Belize. The airplane belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, almost broken in two. The pilot leaved the scene but was quickly arrested by the local police. It is believed that it was an illegal flight as the registration on the aircraft (YV3224) is wrong. It appears that the correct registration was YV3284.

On March 12, 2018, a US Bangla Airlines, Bombardier DHC-8-402, S2-AGU, flight number BS211 departed Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, Dhaka, Bangladesh at 06:51 UTC on a schedule flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu, Nepal. The aircraft overflew part of Bangladesh and Indian airspace en-route to Nepal. At 0641, Dhaka Ground Control contacted the aircraft requesting for its Bangladesh ADC number which was recently made mandatory a few weeks ago by Bangladesh authority for all international outbound flights. The crew provided the ADC number as 2177 as provided in the Flight Plan. The Ground Controller again asked the crew if they had the ADC for Bangladesh. At 0642, PIC then contacted the Operations to confirm the Bangladesh ADC number. As per the CVR records, changes in the PIC’s vocal pitch and language used indicated that he was agitated and experiencing high levels of stress at the time while communicating with Dhaka Ground Control and airlines operations. The aircraft finally took off at 0651. As the aircraft was in a climb phase, the PIC overheard a communication between Operations and another US Bangla aircraft regarding the fuel onboard but the PIC without verifying whether the message was meant for him or not, engaged in some unnecessary conversation with the Operations staff. The Captain's vocal pitch and language used indicated that he was very much emotionally disturbed and experiencing high level of stress. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Control at 0752:04. At 0807:49 the First Officer contacted Kathmandu Control and requested for descent. Kathmandu Control gave descend clearance to FL160 with an estimated approach time of 0826 which was acknowledged by the First Officer. At 0810 the flight was handed over to Kathmandu Approach. At 0811, Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to 13,500 ft and hold over GURAS. The crew inserted the HOLD in the Flight Management System. At 0813:41 Kathmandu Approach further instructed the aircraft to reduce its speed and descend to 12500 ft. At 0816 Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to further descend to 11500 ft., and cleared for VOR approach RWY 02 maintaining minimum approach speed. Both the crew forgot to cancel the hold on the FMS as they were engaged in some unnecessary conversation. Upon reaching GURAS, the aircraft turned left to enter the holding pattern over GURAS, it was noticed by PIC and FO and immediately PIC made correction and simultaneously this was alerted to the crew by Approach Control also. Once realizing the aircraft flying pattern and ATC clearance, the PIC immediately selected a heading of 027° which was just 5° of interception angle to intercept the desired radial of 202° inbound to KTM. The spot wind recorded was westerly at 28kt. The aircraft continued approach on heading mode and crossed radial 202° at 7 DME of KTM VOR. The aircraft then continued on the same heading of 027° and deviated to the right of the final approach course. Having deviated to the right of the final approach path, the aircraft reached about 2-3 NM North east of the KTM VOR and continued to fly further northeast. At 0827, Kathmandu Tower (TWR) alerted the crew that the landing clearance was given for RWY 02 but the aircraft was proceeding towards RWY 20. At 0829, Tower Controller asked the crew of their intention to which the PIC replied that they would be landing on RWY 02. The aircraft then made an orbit to the right. The Controller instructed the aircraft to join downwind for RWY 02 and report when sighting another Buddha Air aircraft which was already on final for RWY 02. The aircraft instead of joining downwind leg for RWY 02, continued on the orbit to the right on a westerly heading towards Northwest of RW 20. The controller instructed the aircraft to remain clear of RWY 20 and continue to hold at present position as Buddha air aircraft was landing at RW 02 (from opposite side) at that time. After the landing of Buddha Air aircraft, Tower Controller, at 08:32 UTC gave choice to BS211 to land either at RW 20 or 02 but the aircraft again made an orbit to the right, this time northwest of RWY 20. While continuing with the turn through Southeastern direction, the PIC reported that he had the runway in sight and requested tower for clearance to land. The Tower Controller cleared the aircraft to land but when the aircraft was still turning for the RWY it approached very close to the threshold for RWY 20 on a westerly heading and not aligned with the runway. At 08:33:27 UTC, spotting the aircraft maneuvering at very close proximity of the ground and not aligned with the RWY. Alarmed by the situation, the Tower Controller hurriedly cancelled the landing clearance of the aircraft by saying, "Takeoff clearance cancelled". Within the next 15-20 seconds, the aircraft pulled up in westerly direction and with very high bank angle turned left and flew over the western area of the domestic apron, continued on a southeasterly heading past the ATC Tower and further continued at a very low height, flew over the domestic southern apron area and finally attempted to align with the runway 20 to land. During this process, while the aircraft was turning inwards and momentarily headed towards the control tower, the tower controllers ducked down out of fear that the aircraft might hit the tower building. Missing the control tower, when the aircraft further turned towards the taxi track aiming for the runway through a right reversal turn, the tower controller made a transmission by saying, "BS 211, I say again...". At 08:34 UTC the aircraft touched down 1700 meters down the threshold with a bank angle of about 15 degrees and an angle of about 25 degrees with the runway axis (approximately heading Southeast) and to the left of the center line of runway 20, then veered southeast out of the runway through the inner perimeter fence along the rough down slope and finally stopped about 442 meters southeast from the first touchdown point on the runway. All four crew members (2 cockpit crew and 2 cabin crew) and 45 out of the 67 passengers onboard the aircraft were killed in the accident. Two more passengers succumbed to injury later in hospital during course of treatment. The aircraft caught fire after 6 seconds of touchdown which engulfed major portions of the aircraft.

The airplane departed Kuweires-Rasin El Aboud Airbase on a flight to Hmeimim AFB, carrying 33 passengers and a crew of six. On final approach, the aircraft went out of control and crashed about 500 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. There were no survivors among the 39 occupants. The airplane was registered RF-92955 (52 red). It is believed that the loss of control that occurred on short final was the result of low level windshear.

The airplane departed Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport on a cargo flight to Lubumbashi, carrying five crew members and one passenger. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared to descend and to land at Lubumbashi-Luano Airport. After landing on runway 07, the crew started the braking procedure. At a speed of 80 knots, the aircraft deviated to the left. It veered off runway and while contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest in a grassy area along the left shoulder of the runway after a course of about 200 metres. All six occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 28th February 2018 at 10:021, the Smartlynx Airlines Estonia Airbus A320-214 registered ES-SAN took off from Tallinn airport Estonia to perform training flights with 2 crew members (captain and safety pilot), 4 students and 1 ECAA inspector on board. Following several successful ILS approaches and touch-and-go cycles, at 15:04, after a successful touch down with the runway, the aircraft did not respond as expected to sidestick inputs when reaching rotation speed. After a brief lift-off, the aircraft lost altitude and hit the ground close to the end of the runway. In the impact, the aircraft engines impacted the runway and the landing gear doors were damaged. After the initial impact, the aircraft climbed to 1590 ft from ground level and pitched down again. The pilots were able to stabilize the flight path by using manual pitch trim and engine thrust and make a U-turn back towards the runway. The crew declared an emergency and the aircraft was cleared for an emergency landing. During the approach, the aircraft lost power in both engines. The aircraft landed 150 m before the threshold of runway at 15:11. On landing, aircraft tires burst, and the aircraft veered off the runway and finally came to a stop 15 m left to the runway. The safety pilot and one of the students suffered minor impact trauma in this accident. The aircraft landing gear doors, landing gears, both engine nacelles, engines and aircraft fuselage suffered severe damage in this accident resulting in aircraft hull loss.

The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were returning to the airport in night visual meteorological conditions with a cloud ceiling about 1,500 ft above ground level. Radar data indicated that the airplane overflew the airport and completed a 360° descending right turn and overflew the airport again before entering an approximate 180° left climbing turn toward and over an unlighted area within a denselywooded national forest. The airplane continued the left turn and entered a descent to impact in a river about 1 mile from the airport. All major components of the airplane were recovered from the river except the outboard section of the left wing and the left aileron. An examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Because each of the two pilots onboard would have been capable of safely landing the airplane, it is unlikely that an acute event from either occupant's heart disease contributed to the accident. The night conditions, which included overcast clouds that would have obscured the nearly full moon, and the pilots' maneuvering for landing over an area devoid of cultural lighting provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. It is likely that the pilots experienced a "black hole" illusion while maneuvering to align with the runway for landing, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and impact with water.