Landing (descent or approach)

Just prior to the accident the airplane was seen on final approach flying in an erratic manner at a low altitude. Two witnesses riding in a car wrote they saw the airplane, 'going up and down toward the ground. We could hear a faint clicking noise, and the propellers were going around slowly.' The witnesses saw the airplane take 'a short nosedive and crashed.' They wrote that the airplane was not traveling 'very fast and it was pretty level to the ground.' The witnesses could not hear the engines because they were in a car. According to fuel records, the pilot of N1576T put 112 gallons of fuel on board the airplane on march 17, 1994, and the flight started at 1030 on march 19, 1994. The accident occurred at 1355, for a total flight time of 3 hours and 25 minutes. Using fuel consumption data for this aircraft it was estimated that fuel exhaustion would occur after 3 hours and 4 minutes of flight. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

While on approach at night, in VMC, the left engine lost power due to fuel starvation. The propeller was not feathered, the l/g was left down, and the aircraft drifted left of crs, struck trees, and then the ground. One gallon of fuel was drained from the right wing, engine and fuel line. No fuel was found in the left wing, engine and fuel line. The copilot said the fuel quantity system was erratic with the left side more erratic, and the right side reading about 10 gallons more than the left side. Testing found the right side indicated about 45 gallons more than was present while the left side was inoperative. There was no requirement for periodic recalibration of the fuel quantity system. The owner/pilot had operated the aircraft on 32 flights, over 23 hours, and refueled 23 times using partial fills, since he had full tanks. The pilot was checked out 17 months prior and the instructor said the pilot was fine, however, he was cautioned him to enroll in recurrent training. There was no record he did. The pilot had received an FAA checkride 19 months prior to the accident, which he passed.

The aircraft was engaged in a cargo flight from Bogotá to San Andrés Island, carrying six passengers, three crew members and a load of 70 boxes of dynamite on behalf of the Ministry of Defense. During the takeoff roll, after V1 speed, one of the tyre burst. The captain continued and completed the rotation. During initial climb, he informed ATC about the situation and followed a holding circuit for about two hours to burn fuel. Following an unstable approach, the aircraft landed too far down the runway. As the captain realized he could not stop the aircraft within the remaining distance, he decided to retract the undercarriage. The aircraft slid on its belly, overran, went through a fence and eventually came to rest in a ravine located 100 metres further. All nine occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Fortunately, the dynamite did not explode.

Following a visual approach to Pointe-Noire Airport runway 17, the twin engine airplane belly landed and skidded on runway for about 250 metres before coming to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

VH-SWP was operating on a standard company flight plan for the route Bankstown-Tamworth-Armidale-Glen Innes-Inverell and return, and the flight plan indicated the flight would be conducted in accordance with IFR procedures. The classification of the flight was shown as non-scheduled commercial air transport although the aircraft was operating to a company schedule, and departure and flight times for each route segment were indicated on the flight plan. The aircraft departed Bankstown at about 0640 and proceeded as planned to Inverell where the pilot rested until his departure that afternoon for the return journey. The schedule required an Armidale departure at 1721. At 1723 the pilot reported to Sydney Flight Service that he was departing Armidale for Tamworth. The planned time for the flight was 17 minutes. Although the flight-planned altitude for this sector was 6,000 ft, the pilot was unable to climb immediately because a slower aircraft, which had departed Armidale for Tamworth two minutes earlier, was climbing to that altitude. In addition, there was opposite direction traffic at 7,000 ft. The next most suitable altitude was 8,000 ft, but separation from the other two aircraft, which were also IFR, had to be established by the pilot before further climb was possible. The published IFR lowest safe altitude for the route was 5,400 ft. The pilot subsequently elected to remain at 4,500 ft in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and at 1727 requested an airways clearance from Tamworth Tower. A clearance was issued by ATC to the pilot to track direct to Tamworth at 4,500 ft visually. At about 1732 the pilot requested a descent clearance. He was cleared to make a visual approach with a clearance limit of 5 NM by distance measuring equipment (DME) from Tamworth, and was requested to report at 8 DME from Tamworth. The pilot acknowledged the instructions and reported leaving 4,500 ft on descent. Transmissions from ATC to the pilot less than two minutes later were not answered. The aircraft was not being monitored on radar by ATC, nor was this a requirement. At about 1740, reports were received by the police and ATC of an explosion and possible aircraft accident near the mountain range 8 NM north-east of Tamworth Airport. The aircraft wreckage was discovered at about 2115 by searchers on the mountain range.Soon after the aircraft was reported missing, a search aircraft pilot, who had extensive local flying experience, reported to ATC that the top of the range (where the accident occurred) was obscured by cloud, and that there was very low cloud in the valley nearby.

Air traffic control had cleared the airplane for the ILS approach to runway 24, circle to land on runway 06. The airplane broke off the approach to runway 24, and was observed by a witness at a low altitude, on a left downwind for runway 06, flying in and out of clouds. On the base leg, the airplane turned to the left, and a witness saw the left wing make contact with the ground. One witness said that before the crash, the engine sounded 'like they were at full rpm. Several pilots from the air national guard (ang) at the airport went to the crash site minutes after the crash, and observed ice on the airplane's wings and empennage. One of the ang pilot reported his observation of the ice on the aircraft: 'It appeared to be approximately 1/8 inch in thickness throughout the left and right wing surfaces and the rear empennage sections . . .' Another ang pilot described the weather at the time of the accident as, visibility less then one mile with 'freezing rain and sleet.' The examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from St Petersburg to Nalcik with an intermediate stop in Volgograd, carrying seven passengers, six crew members and a load of 12,5 tons of coins minted in St Petersburg. On final approach, at a distance of 8 km from the airport, at a speed of 260 km/h, flaps were selected down to an angle of 35°. Thirty seconds later, the aircraft started to pitch up and down then nosed up to an angle of 15°. It entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 414 km/h in a nose down angle of 55° in an open field located 4,5 km short of runway threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 13 occupants were killed.

The public use flight was being operated by the Indian Health Service of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. It departed VFR from Devils Lake, North Dakota, with an intended destination of Rolla, North Dakota. The pilot attempted two visual approaches at Rolla, but encountered whiteout conditions due to a snow storm. He obtained an IFR clearance and diverted to Minot. He flew two ILS approaches to runway 31 at Minot and reported a missed approach after each. Radio contact was lost after the second approach. About an hour later, a snow plow operator found wreckage on the airport. Investigation revealed the plane had impacted to the right of runway 31 with the gear retracted and the flaps extended 15°. The 0959 weather was in part: 600 feet obscured, visibility 1/2 mile variable in snow, wind 110° at 11 knots. No preimpact mechanical anomaly was found with the airplane or engines. All four occupants were killed.

The flight crew was advised prior to initiating the approach that visibility at the airport had decreased to 1/8 mile with light rain, fog and obscuration. Published landing visibility minimums for the approach was 1 mile. The 150 feet wide runway had been plowed 100 feet wide, and there were snowbanks up to 3 feet high on both sides. The airplane touched down on the unplowed portion of the runway onto a snowbank, collapsing the landing gear. The flightcrew stated that the approach lights and runway were in sight during the entire approach, and that the second pilot told the pic that he was too far left and needed to correct to the right as the airplane was about to touchdown. The tower controller stated that he lost sight of the airplane as it landed due to fog.

The pilot stated the left engine backfired and began to run rough shortly after takeoff. The engine was shut down and the propeller was feathered. He decided to return and land on the departure runway. Witnesses observed the aircraft on the downwind leg at 800 to 1,000 feet with the landing gear extended. As the aircraft turned to base leg it yawed sharply to the left and the left wing dropped. The aircraft descended rapidly. The pilot stated that as he turned from base to final leg at 75 to 100 feet the aircraft was buffeting and beginning to stall. He realized he would not make the runway and crash landed in a vacant lot. Examination of the left engine after the accident revealed no evidence to indicate precrash failure or malfunction of the engine.