Landing (descent or approach)

On February 16, 2000, about 1951 Pacific standard time, Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., (Emery) flight 17, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F (DC-8), N8079U, crashed in an automobile salvage yard shortly after takeoff, while attempting to return to Sacramento Mather Airport (MHR), Rancho Cordova, California, for an emergency landing. Emery flight 17 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight from MHR to James M. Cox Dayton International Airport (DAY), Dayton, Ohio. The flight departed MHR about 1949, with two pilots and a flight engineer on board. The three flight crew members were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

On approach to Sapporo-Okadama, the aircraft was too high on the glide and approached at an excessive speed. It landed too far down a snow covered runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with snow bank and came to rest. All 41 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Salima, the crew started the descent to Luanda-4 de Fevereiro Airport runway 23. Due to very bad weather conditions, the aircraft was unstable on final and the pilot decided to initiate a go-around. Few minutes later, while attempting a second approach to land, the aircraft was rolling left and right, causing the right wing to hit the runway surface. The aircraft landed hard, broke in two and came to rest few hundred metres further on the main runway. All seven occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that weather conditions were very bad at the time of the accident with heavy rain falls and wind gusting from 50 to 80 knots.

The airplane impacted a ridgeline about 1.5 miles from the runway and approximately 7 to 14 seconds after the pilot reported a dual engine flameout. The airplane's altitude was about 400 feet agl when the pilot reported the flameout. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preexisting anomalies. Icing conditions were forecast and PIREPS indicated that light to moderate rime/mixed icing conditions existed along the route of flight. The Continuous Ignition switches were found in the OFF position. The Approach procedures listed in the Airplane's Flight Manual stated, 'CONTINUOUS IGNITION SHALL BE SELECTED TO ON DURING APPROACH AND LANDING WHILE IN OR SHORTLY FOLLOWING FLIGHT IN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ICING CONDITIONS.' The aircraft manufacturer had issued a Service Bulletin in 1995 for the installation of an auto-ignition system to '... reduce the possibility of engine flame-out when icing conditions are encountered and the continuous ignition is not selected.' The operator had not installed the non-mandatory service bulletin. On May 5, 2000, the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive that required the installation of an auto-ignition system. The toxicology test detected extremely high levels of dihydrocodeine in the pilot's blood. The pilot received a special issuance second-class medical certificate on August 22, 1995, after receiving treatment for a self disclosed history of drug abuse. The drug testing that this pilot underwent as a consequence of his previous self disclosed history of drug abuse would not have detected these substances.

The airline transport certificated pilot was landing a twin-engine turboprop airplane at a remote airport on a scheduled air taxi flight. Rising hilly terrain is located east of the airport. The pilot said that during the approach for landing, he noticed the airport wind sock indicating a wind from the east about 25 knots. When the pilot descended to 500 feet, about mid-base, the airplane encountered moderate turbulence and an increased rate of descent. He added engine power to arrest the descent. As he turned toward the runway, the airplane encountered 3 to 4 rolling oscillations with a bank angle up to 90 degrees while descending toward the runway. According to a company mechanic who traveled to the scene, it appeared that the airplane struck the runway about 1,200 feet from the approach end with the left wing and left elevator, while yawed about 45 degrees to the left of the runway centerline. The airplane then slid off the left side of the runway. After the collision, the pilot evacuated the passengers, and noticed the airport wind sock was indicating a tailwind. The Airport/Facility Directory contains the following in the airport remarks: 'Unattended. Easterly winds may cause severe turbulence in vicinity of runway.'

The aircraft was departed Khartoum for a flight to Mwanza where it was supposed to pick up a cargo of 38 tonnes of fish fillet from Vick Fish Processors for delivery in Europe. When it went dark en route to Mwanza, the radio altimeter integral light was found to be unserviceable. The crew were not able to fix the problem and the continued using the FMS. The crew contacted Mwanza tower at 16:58 and were being advised that there was no power at the airport and that efforts were being made to use a standby generator. Further information passed on the crew reportedly included VOR, DME and NDB all unserviceable, weather: wind calm, 8 km visibility, temperature 25deg C and QNH 1015. After holding for 10 minutes, the airport generator came on and the runway lights went on. The first officer, who was pilot flying, started a visual runway 12 approach. When well established on finals with full landing configuration, the captain told the f/o that he was too low, and a few seconds later he told the f/o he was too high. Both the captain and the flight engineer then told the f/o to go around. The f/o overshot and climbed to 5500 feet on the downwind leg. Turning on the left base the captain remarked that the turn was too tight: ".. I will do a 360-degree turn to the right and position you finals". The captain thus took over control and started a right turn at 4400 feet. Just before completing the turn, the f/o said: "do not go down anymore, the altimeter is reading 4100 feet". Almost aligned with the runway, the f/o took over control again. At that same moment the aircraft bounced 2 or 3 times yawing to the left and came down to a halt in the middle of the lake.

En route from Tefé to Eirunépé, weather conditions deteriorated and the crew decided to divert to the non controlled Envira Airport. Following a visual approach in heavy rain falls, the aircraft landed 500 metres past the runway threshold. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft encountered aquaplaning conditions and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest 100 metres further in a ravine. The captain was seriously injured, the copilot suffered minor injuries and all 16 passengers escaped uninjured.

Freezing rain, mist, and ice pellets were forecast for the destination airport with temperatures 34 to 32 degrees F. During the daylight IMC descent and vectors for the approach, the airplane began to accumulate moderate clear ice, and a master warning light illumination in the cockpit indicated that the horizontal stabilizer heat had failed. The airplane was configured at 120 knots and 10 degrees flaps in accordance with the flight manual abnormal procedures checklist; however, the crew did not activate the horizontal stabilizer deice backup system. The aircraft touched down 1,500 ft down the runway, which was contaminated with slush, and did not have any braking action or antiskid for 3,000 ft on the 7,753-ft runway. Therefore, 3,253 ft of runway remained for stopping the aircraft, which was 192 feet short of the 3,445 ft required for a dry runway landing. Upon observing a down hill embankment and support poles beyond the runway, the captain forced the airplane to depart the right side of the runway to avoid the poles. After the airplane started down the embankment, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to a stop.

The pilot requested and received clearance to execute the SDF approach, and was instructed to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the approach. Radar data revealed the airplane was never established on the approach, and started to descend before reaching the IAF. The airplane passed the IAF at 2,900 feet, and continued in a descending left hand turn into unprotected airspace. The airplane disappeared from radar at 1,900 feet, as it completed 180 degrees of turn. The turn did not match any of the four instrument approaches to the airport. The airplane struck a guy wire on a lighted communications antenna 3.3 MN southeast of the airport on a heading of 360 degrees. No evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of the airplane or its systems was found. A flight check by the FAA confirmed no navigation signal was received for the approach, which had been turned off and listed as out of service for over 4 years. In addition, the pilot did not report the lack of a navigation signal to ATC or execute a missed approach. Interviews disclosed the ATC controller failed to verify the approach was in service before issuing the approach clearance.

On final approach to Heringsdorf Airport in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area located 750 metres short of runway 28, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. At the time of the accident, the visibility was about 400 metres with a ceiling at 100 feet, below minimums.