Landing (descent or approach)

After a normal taxi and takeoff, the airplane's landing gear would not retract after liftoff. After unsuccessfully attempting to raise the landing gear manually, the flight crew elected to return to the airport. During the landing flare, the ground spoilers deployed when the throttles were brought to idle. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, and the right main landing gear collapsed. The investigation determined that a mechanic had wedged wooden sticks into the airplane's weight-on-wheels (WOW) switches to force them into the ground mode while the airplane was on jacks during maintenance. The mechanic said that he used the sticks to disable the WOW switches to gain access to the maintenance data acquisition unit, which was necessary to troubleshoot an overspeed alert discrepancy. After the maintenance was performed, the sticks were not removed, and the airplane was returned to service. No notation about the disabled WOW switches was entered in the work logs. Postaccident ground testing of the accident airplane's cockpit crew alerting system and examination of flight data recorder (FDR) data determined that the system was functioning properly and that it produced a blue WOW fault message, an amber WOW fault message, and a red GND SPOILER warning message when the accident flight conditions were recreated. The messages produced were consistent with FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information. Ground spoilers will deploy when the throttles are brought to idle if the spoilers are armed and the WOW switches are in the ground mode. The G-V Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) cautions flight crews not to move thrust reverser levers and to switch the GND SPOILER armed to off following an amber WOW FAULT message. A red GND SPOILER message calls for the flight crew to disarm the ground spoilers and pull the circuit breakers to make sure the spoilers are not rearmed inadvertently. Based on CVR information, there was no indication that the flight crew followed checklist procedures contained in the G-V's QRH that referenced WOW faults or GND SPOILER faults. Preflight checklist procedures also called for the flight crew to conduct a visual inspection of the WOW switches.

Following an uneventful flight from Tehran, the crew started the descent to Khorramabad Airport runway 11 in bad weather conditions. In poor visibility, the crew failed to realize he was off course when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located few km northeast from the city of Sarab-e Dowreh, about 25 km northwest from the runway 11 threshold. The wreckage was found few hours later on a snow covered rock wall. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 119 occupants were killed, among them four Spanish citizens.

As the airplane was descending to the airport, the pilot-in-command (PIC) calculated that the required distance to land on a dry runway would be 2,720 feet. The second-in-command (SIC) stated to the PIC, "all right if I touch down and there's no brakes I'm going around." The ILS Runway 23 approach was in use, and the braking action was reported "poor" by a Hawker Jet, which had landed prior to the accident flight. All runway surfaces were covered with a thin layer of snow. The airplane touched down with about 2,233 feet of runway remaining, of the 5,101-foot long runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway, and proceeded into an overrun grassy area, where the nose landing gear assembly collapsed. The tower controller advised the flightcrew prior to landing that the wind conditions were from 330 degrees at 18 knots. According to the airplane's Pilot's Operating Manual, the estimated landing distance on a dry runway, for the conditions at the time of the accident, was about 2,750 feet. No charts were available in the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual, to compute a landing distance incorporating a contaminated runway. Review of 14 CFR Part 25.1, which prescribed airworthiness standards for the issue of type certificates, and changes to those certificates, for transport category airplanes, revealed, "For landplanes and amphibians, the landing distance on land must be determined on a level, smooth, dry, hard-surfaced runway." There were no requirements for the applicant to determine landing distances on a wet or contaminated runway. The latest weather recorded at the airport, included winds from 330 degrees at 12 knots, gusts to 22 knots; visibility 3/4 statute mile, light snow; and overcast clouds at 300 feet.

At the conclusion of a dark night IMC cross-country flight, the pilot was being vectored onto the ILS approach. After stabilizing, the approach "was normal." At decision altitude, the pilot indicated that he could see the approach lights and the runway, but was not in a position to land so he executed a missed approach. After being vectored around for another approach, he stated that he was on the localizer but was "high" on the glide slope. After giving "a little" nose down pitch, he became distracted when the autopilot became "accidentally disengaged." The pilot stated that he "inadvertently descended through the glide slope and impacted the ground short of the runway." He further stated that the "first indication" that he was low was when the aircraft "struck the ground." The aircraft was destroyed on impact. A facility check conducted by the FAA of the ILS found all parameters within normal specifications.

The single engine airplane departed Thiene Airstrip at 1540LT for a local flight, carrying nine skydivers, one observer and one pilot. At the altitude of 13,500 feet, seven skydivers jumped while three others decided to stay in the cabin because the visibility was poor due to foggy conditions. While returning to his departure point, the pilot encountered poor visibility and completed two unsuccessful approach. He eventually decided to divert to Asiago Airport located 24 km from his position but this decision was taken too late. While circling around the airport, the engine failed and the aircraft stalled, struck the roof of a house and crashed in Rozzampia, less than one km east of the airfield. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot said he was on the glide slope for an ILS approach. The pilot said, "The autopilot was coupled on to the approach. The autopilot also coupled on to the Glide slope. Approximately 2-1/2 to 3 miles out, we visually had approach lights and runway lights. I then disconnected the autopilot and yaw damper, and hand flew a visual approach using the glide slope indicator as a cross check for a correct glide path to the airport. Continuing visually on the approach, I checked the GS (glide slope) and it indicated we were slightly above glide path, but was corrected, and seconds later hit a pole going through electrical wires, coming to rest short of the approach lights and to the right." An examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. An examination of the ILS approach to the runway showed the facility operated satisfactorily.

After touchdown on dirt runway 06/24 at Kavak Airstrip, the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the right and came to rest. All 17 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The runway conditions was poor at the time of the accident.

While approaching runway 11/29 in heavy rain falls, the four engine aircraft crashed two km short of runway. Two crew members and three passengers were killed. The aircraft was completing a flight from Luanda to Luena on behalf of the Government of the State of Moxico.

While descending to Guayaramerín Airport, about seven minutes prior to ETA, the pilot informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and was able to continue the approach. After touchdown, the aircraft failed to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and right wing and came to rest. All 44 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing on runway 06, the single engine aircraft bounced twice then veered off runway and came to rest in bushes. Both pilots escaped unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.