Landing (descent or approach)

On approach to Voi Airport, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Irima located about 9 km north from runway 18 threshold. All four occupants were killed. Registration unconfirmed.

The airplane departed São Paulo-Congonhas Airport on an ambulance flight to Diamantina-Juscelino Kubitschek Airport, carrying two doctors and two pilots. Following an unstabilized approach, the airplane landed too far down the runway 03 and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down a ravine and came to rest. All four occupants evacuated with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight crew were conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in night instrument meteorological conditions when they were advised by the tower controller that the weather had deteriorated below minimums. The captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer was the pilot flying during the approach. Since the airplane was inside the final approach fix and stabilized, both pilots agreed to continue with the approach. Both pilots stated that they had visual contact with the runway approach lighting system at the 200 ft above ground level (agl) decision altitude, and they decided to continue the approach. The first officer said he then returned to flying the airplane via instruments. As the first officer continued the approach, the captain told him the airplane was drifting right of the runway centerline. The first officer said that he looked outside, saw that the weather had deteriorated, and was no longer comfortable with the approach. The first officer said he pressed the takeoff and go-around switch, while at the same time, the captain called for a go-around. The captain said that he called for the go-around because the airplane was not aligned with the runway. Although both pilots stated that the go-around was initiated when the airplane was about 50 to 100 ft agl, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording revealed that the first officer flew an autopilot-coupled approach to 50 ft agl (per the approach procedure, a coupled approach was not authorized below 240 ft agl). As the airplane descended from 30 to 20 ft agl, the captain told the first officer three times to “flare” then informed him that the airplane was drifting to right and he needed to make a left correction to get realigned with the runway centerline. Three seconds passed before the first officer reacted by trying to initiate transfer control of the airplane to the captain. The captain did not take control of the airplane and called for a go-around. The first officer then added full power and called for the flaps to be retracted to 15º; however, the airplane impacted the ground about 5 seconds later, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. Data downloaded from both engines’ digital electronic engine control units revealed no anomalies. No mechanical issues with the airplane or engines were reported by either crew member or the operator. The sequence of events identified in the CVR recording revealed that the approach most likely became unstabilized after the autopilot was disconnected and when the first officer lost visual contact with the runway environment. The captain, who had the runway in sight, delayed calling for a go-around after the approach became unstabilized, and the airplane was too low to recover.

After takeoff from his home airport with about 50 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank, the pilot climbed to 7,000 ft and proceeded to his destination. When he was about halfway there, he switched from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Immediately after switching fuel tanks, the engine started to sputter and lost power. The pilot switched back to the right fuel tank but there was no change. He then tried different power settings, adjusted the mixture to full rich and switched tanks again without regaining engine power. The pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having an engine problem and needed to land at the nearest airport. ATC instructed him contact the control tower at the nearest airport and cleared him to land. The pilot advised the controller that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport and that he was going to land in the water. During the water landing, the airplane came to a sudden stop. The pilot and his passenger then egressed, and the airplane sank. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed about 2 months prior to the accident and test flights associated with the annual inspection had all been done with the fuel selector selected to the right fuel tank, and this was the first time he had selected the left fuel tank since before the annual inspection. The airplane was equipped with an engine monitor that was capable of recording engine parameters. Examination of the data revealed that around the time of the loss of engine power, exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature experienced a rapid decrease on all cylinders along with a rapid decrease of turbine inlet temperature, which was indicative of the engine being starved of fuel. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. During examination of the fuel system, the fuel selector was observed in the RIGHT fuel tank position and was confirmed to be in the right fuel tank position with low pressure air. However, when the fuel selector was positioned to the LEFT fuel tank position, continuity could not be established with low pressure air. Further examination revealed that a fuel selector valve labeled FERRY TANK was installed in the left fuel line between the factory-installed fuel selector and the left fuel tank. The ferry tank fuel selector was observed to be in the ON position, which blocked continuity from the left fuel tank to the engine. Continuity could only be established when the ferry tank fuel selector was positioned to the OFF position. With low pressure air, no continuity could be established from the ferry tank fuel line that attached to the ferry tank’s fuel selector. The ferry tank fuel selector valve was mounted between the pilot and copilot seats on the forward side of the main wing spar in the area where the pilot and copilot would normally enter and exit the cockpit. This location was such that the selector handle could easily be inadvertently kicked or moved by a person or object. A guard was not installed over the ferry tank fuel selector valve nor was the selector valve handle safety wired in the OFF position to deactivate the valve even though a ferry tank was not installed. Review of the airplane’s history revealed that about 3 years before the accident, the airplane had been used for an around-the-world flight by the pilot and that prior to the flight, a ferry tank had been installed. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any logbook entries or associated paperwork for the ferry tank installation and/or removal, except for a copy of the one-page fuel system schematic from the maintenance manual with a handwritten annotation (“Tank”), and hand drawn lines, both added to it in blue ink. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records did not reveal any record of a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair or Alteration) or a supplemental type certificate for installation of the ferry tank or the modification to the fuel system.

The crew was completing an illegal flight when the aircraft crashed under unknown circumstances in the Sierra del Lacandón National Park. Upon impact, the aircraft lost its both wings and came to rest with its tail separated. All three occupants were found alive but seriously injured. One of them died from his injuries few hours later. The registration N326TD was probably false.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in a banana plantation near San José La Máquina. No one was found in the plane that was used for an illegal flight (contraband). The exact model and registration unknown.

The pilot reported that, while conducting a night landing on a runway contaminated with ice and patchy packed snow, the airplane overshot the touchdown zone. The pilot tried to fly the airplane onto the runway to avoid floating. The airplane touched down firm and the pilot applied moderate braking, but the airplane did not decelerate normally. The airplane went off the end of the runway and collided with several Runway End Identifier Lights (REILs) and a tree. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. The pilot reported that he did not feel modulation in the anti-lock braking system (ABS) and felt that might have contributed to the accident. An examination of fault codes from the airplane’s diagnostic storage unit indicated no ABS malfunctions or failures. An airport employee reported that he saw the airplane unusually high on the final approach and during the landing the airplane floated or stayed in ground effect before it touched down beyond the midpoint of the runway. The airplane’s long touchdown was captured by an airport surveillance video, which is included in the report docket.

The twin engine airplane departed Marseille-Provence Airport on a private flight to Annecy. En route, while cruising at FL110, the pilot was informed about the weather conditions at destination with a braking coefficient considered as medium due to a wet runway. After being cleared to land on runway 04, the pilot continued the approach but landed half way down the runway at a speed of 119 knots. After touchdown, he initiated the braking procedure but the airplane suffered an aquaplaning and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, impacted an embankment, went trough a fence and came to rest on a road. While both passengers aged 26 and 28 were slightly injured, the pilot aged 70 was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft departed Djibouti on a regular schedule service to Mogadishu with intermediate stops in Hargeisa and Garowe. There were 31 passengers and 8 crew members on board. On short final approach to Garowe Airport Runway 06, the aircraft was too low, causing the right main gear to struck the ground just short of runway threshold (concrete). The right main gear collapsed and the airplane slid on the runway until it turned to the right and came to rest on the runway with the right engine cowling contacting the runway surface. All 39 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After a 30-minute uneventful instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, the business jet landed in the rain on the 4,311ft-long runway. The pilot reported, and runway skid marks corroborated, that the airplane touched down about 1,000 ft from the approach end of the runway. The pilot reported braking action was initially normal and the anti-skid system cycled twice before it stopped working and he was unable to slow the airplane using the emergency brakes. The airplane continued off the departure end of the runway where it traveled through wet grass and a fence before coming to rest with the landing gear collapsed. A video of the airplane during the landing roll indicated there was a significant amount of water on the runway. No mechanical anomalies were found with the brake/antiskid systems during the postaccident examination of the airplane. Marks on the runway indicated functionality of the antiskid system. Stopping performance calculations estimated the distance required to stop the airplane on the runway was about 4,127 ft. The runway length remaining after the airplane touched down was about 3,311 ft. The pilot was aware of the runway length and weather conditions prior to departure and reported that he should have not accepted the trip.