Landing (descent or approach)

The report describes the accident to C208B type of aircraft, registration 5Y-JKN with two crew on onboard that occurred on Marsabit Hill on 20th March 2021 in which the aircraft crashed killing two crew onboard. The aircraft with 2200lbs fuel onboard was chartered to ferry Marsabit County Officials to a peace keeping mission at Illeret 156 nautical miles North West of Marsabit town. Preliminary information revealed that the aircraft departed Wilson Airport at 08.20am (0520Z) and arrived within the vicinity of Marsabit town at around 10.00a.m (0700Z). It collided with Kofia Mbaya Hill - Marsabit terrain while attempting to approach Marsabit airstrip. The aircraft first impacted the terrain with its nose-wheel and the main landing gears leaving parts of the fuselage and iron box with its content kept in the lower baggage compartment on the sport. It then ballooned and missed a house before it flipped upside down and impacted the ground and came to rest facing opposite direction. It left a trail of aircraft parts along its path before it came to rest. The nosewheel and its assembly separated and fell off and was found next to the house 110m from its first point of impact. There was no fire after impact but all the occupants received fatal injuries.

Following an uneventful flight from Nursultan Nazarbayev Airport on behalf of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the crew was approaching Almaty Airport runway 23R in marginal weather conditions with a ceiling at 300 feet and a visibility limited to 5 km in freezing drizzle. On short final, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 600 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. Two crew members were rescued while four others were killed.
Those killed were:
Major Gabit Esimdaevich Barlykbayev,
Captain Doszhan Galymbekovich Baimuratov,
1st Lt Mukhtar Hadzhimukanovich Sagimbayev,
Sgt Vasilkov Evgeny Borisovich.

The twin engine airplane departed Detroit-Willow Run (Ypsilanti) Airport at 2337LT on March 6 on a cargo service to Akron-Canton Airport, carrying two pilots and a load of various goods. After takeoff, the crew encountered technical problems and declared an emergency. He completed two low passes in front of the tower, apparently due to gear problems. Eventually, the aircraft belly landed at 0008LT and came to rest on runway 05R. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After takeoff from Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ATC about an engine failure and was cleared for an immediate return. On final approach to runway 22, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 7 occupants were killed, among them two pilots, four ATOS specialists (Airborne Tactical Observation System) and one technician.

On final approach to Asunción-Silvio Pettirossi Airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed on a parking place and burst into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while seven other occupants were killed.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight and was beginning an instrument flight rules approach from the south. Weather conditions at the destination airport included a ceiling between 800 and 1,000 ft and light rime icing conditions in clouds; the pilot was aware of these conditions. Elevated, wooded terrain existed along the final approach course. Radar and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data revealed that the airplane crossed the intermediate approach fix at the correct altitude; however, the pilot descended the airplane below the final approach fix altitude about 4 miles before the fix. The airplane continued in a gradual descent until radar contact was lost. No distress calls were received from the airplane before the accident. The airplane crashed on a north-northwesterly heading about 5 miles south of the runway threshold. The elevation at the accident site was about 1,880 ft, which was about 900 ft higher than the airport elevation. Postaccident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of a pre-existing mechanical failure or anomaly that would have precluded normal operation. Because of the weather conditions at the time of the final approach, the pilot likely attempted to fly the airplane under the weather to visually acquire the runway. The terrain along the final approach course would have been obscured in low clouds at the time, resulting in controlled flight into terrain.

The pilot reported that, while descending through clouds and beginning the instrument approach, some ice accumulated on the wings and he actuated the deice boots twice. The pilot saw the deice boots functioning normally on the wings and could not see the tail; however, the elevator began to shake, and he lost elevator control. The pilot applied forward pressure on the yoke and had to trim nose-down to avoid a stall. There were no cockpit caution indications and the pilot had disengaged the autopilot before descent. The airplane descended through the clouds and impacted a tree before coming to rest upright in a grass area. Postaccident examination of the wreckage, including component testing of the deice system, did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The flap jackscrew position suggested that the flaps were likely in transit between 0° and 10° flap extension at the time of impact. Review of radar data revealed that, during the 2 minutes before the accident, the airplane’s groundspeed averaged about 82 knots; or an approximate average airspeed of 94 knots when accounting for the winds aloft. Current weather observations and forecast weather products indicated that the airplane was likely operating in an area where moderate and potentially greater structural icing conditions prevailed, and where there was the potential for the presence of supercooled liquid droplets. Review of the pilot operating handbook for the airplane revealed that the minimum speed for flight in icing conditions was 130 knots indicated airspeed. It is likely that the pilot’s failure to maintain an appropriate speed for flight in icing conditions resulted in insufficient airflow over the ice contaminated elevator and the subsequent loss of elevator control.

The aircraft departed Lusaka Airport on a flight to Mukinge, carrying five crew members and a load of five diesel drums. After touchdown at Mukinge Airfield, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with obstacles and came to rest with its nose and cockpit severely damaged. Both pilots were injured and three other crew members escaped uninjured.

On Saturday January 23, 2021, a Sabreliner with registration XB-JMR on a domestic Flight Plan with two pilots on board departed Guadalajara for Queretaro in Mexico. On reaching a cruising altitude of 20,000 feet the crew changed destination and shortly after disappeared off Mexican Radar. Mexican Authorities suspect the Transponder was turned off by the crew. The aircraft entered the Kingston Flight Information Region (KIN FIR) without a filed Flight Plan, south of Jamaica and at approximately 6:14pm local the crew declared an emergency. The crew reported to Air Traffic Control that they were at 10,000 feet and 14 miles from land and on a heading of 055 degrees (heading north-east). The crew requested instructions to land at the nearest airport due to one engine shut down. The aircraft was observed on radar heading in a north-east direction in the vicinity of the Vernamfield area then changed direction to a south-east heading. The aircraft began circling the Portland Cottage area in Clarendon, 'squawking' Transponder code A1327 and climbing out of 17,000 feet at 6:20pm local. Search and Rescue was initiated with the Jamaica Defence Force at 6:22pm local. On reaching 18,000 feet the aircraft disappeared from radar at 6:34pm local - Transponder possibly turned off by crew. The Aircraft impacted the shoreline south-east of the White Sand Beach area of Rocky Point in Clarendon (17°45'55.69"N 77°15'42.94"W) at approximately 6:39pm local. On Sunday January 24, 2021, a site visit was conducted by personnel from the Operations and Airworthiness units of the Flight Safety Division. With assistance from the Security Forces, photographic evidence of the site was collected. The crash site and the aircraft were vandalized. The aircraft may have made a gear up/flaps up landing. Left-wing leading-edge slats were deployed indicating low airspeed and possible high angle of attack at time of impact.

The crew were scheduled to operate two cargo flights from Exeter Airport (EXT), Devon, to East Midlands Airport (EMA), Leicestershire, and return. The co-pilot was the PF for both sectors, and it was night. The sector from EXT to EMA was uneventful with the crew electing to landed with FLAP 40. The subsequent takeoff and climb from EMA to EXT proceeded without event. During the cruise the crew independently calculated the landing performance, using the aircraft manufacturer’s software, on their portable electronic devices. Runway 26 was forecast to be wet, so they planned to use FLAP 40 for the landing on Runway 26, with AUTOBRAKE 3. With both pilots being familiar with EXT the PF conducted a short brief of the pertinent points for the approach. However, while they did mention that the ILS had a 3.5° glideslope (GS), they did not mention that the stabilized approach criteria differed from that on a 3° GS. From the ATIS they noted that the weather seemed to be better than forecast and the surface wind was from 230° at 11 kt. The ATC provided the flight crew with radar vectors from ATC to the ILS on Runway 26 at EXT. The landing gear was lowered and FLAP 25 selected before the aircraft intercepted the GS. FLAP 40 (the landing flap) was selected on the GS just below 2,000 ft amsl. With a calculated VREF of 134 kt and a surface wind of 10 kt the PF planned to fly the approach with a VAPP of 140 kt. At about 10 nm finals, upon looking at the flight management computer, the PM noticed there was a 30 kt headwind, so a VAPP of 144 kt was selected on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). The crew became visual with the runway at about 1,000 ft aal. The PF then disconnected the Auto Pilot and Auto Throttle; the Flight Directors remained on. As the wind was now starting to decrease, the VAPP was then reduced from 142 to 140 kt at about 600 ft aal. As the wind reduced, towards the 10 kt surface wind, the PF made small adjustments to the power to maintain the IAS at or close to VAPP. At 500 ft radio altimeter (RA) the approach was declared stable by the crew, as per their standard operating procedures. At this point the aircraft had a pitch attitude of 2.5° nose down, the IAS was 143 kt, the rate of descent (ROD) was about 860 ft/min, the engines were operating at about 68% N1 and the aircraft was 0.4 dots above the GS. However, the ROD was increasing and soon thereafter was in excess of 1,150 ft/min. This was reduced to about 300 ft/min but soon increased again. At 320 ft RA, the aircraft went below the GS for about 8 seconds and, with a ROD of 1,700 ft/min, a “SINK RATE” GPWS alert was enunciated. The PF acknowledged this and corrected the flightpath to bring the aircraft back to the GS before stabilizing slightly above the GS; the PM called this deviation too. As the PF was correcting back to the GS the PM did not feel there was a need to take control. During this period the maximum recorded deviation was ¾ of a dot below the GS. At about 150 ft RA, with a ROD of 1,300 ft/min, there was a further “SINK RATE” GPWS alert, to which the PM said, “WATCH THAT SINK RATE”, followed by another “SINK RATE” alert, which the PF responded by saying “AND BACK…”. The commander recalled that as the aircraft crossed the threshold, at about 100 ft, the PF retarded the throttles, pitched the aircraft nose down, from about 5° nose up to 4° nose down, and then applied some power in the last few feet. During these final moments before the landing, there was another “SINK RATE” alert. The result was a hard landing. A “PULL UP” warning was also triggered by the GPWS, but it was not audible on the CVR. The last surface wind transmitted by ATC, just before the landing, was from 230° at 10 kt. During the rollout the commander took control, selected the thrust reversers and slowed down to taxi speed. After the aircraft had vacated the runway at Taxiway Bravo it became apparent the aircraft was listing to the left. During the After Landing checks the co-pilot tried to select FLAPS UP, but they would not move. There was then a HYDRAULIC LP caution. As there was still brake accumulator pressure the crew were content to taxi the aircraft slowly the short distance onto Stand 10. Once on stand the listing became more obvious. It was then that the crew realized there was something “seriously wrong” with the aircraft. After they had shut the aircraft down, the flight crew requested that the wheels were chocked, and the aircraft be connected to ground power before going outside to inspect the aircraft. Once outside a hydraulic leak was found and the airport RFFS, who were present to unload the aircraft, were informed.