Landing (descent or approach)

On Saturday January 23, 2021, a Sabreliner with registration XB-JMR on a domestic Flight Plan with two pilots on board departed Guadalajara for Queretaro in Mexico. On reaching a cruising altitude of 20,000 feet the crew changed destination and shortly after disappeared off Mexican Radar. Mexican Authorities suspect the Transponder was turned off by the crew. The aircraft entered the Kingston Flight Information Region (KIN FIR) without a filed Flight Plan, south of Jamaica and at approximately 6:14pm local the crew declared an emergency. The crew reported to Air Traffic Control that they were at 10,000 feet and 14 miles from land and on a heading of 055 degrees (heading north-east). The crew requested instructions to land at the nearest airport due to one engine shut down. The aircraft was observed on radar heading in a north-east direction in the vicinity of the Vernamfield area then changed direction to a south-east heading. The aircraft began circling the Portland Cottage area in Clarendon, 'squawking' Transponder code A1327 and climbing out of 17,000 feet at 6:20pm local. Search and Rescue was initiated with the Jamaica Defence Force at 6:22pm local. On reaching 18,000 feet the aircraft disappeared from radar at 6:34pm local - Transponder possibly turned off by crew. The Aircraft impacted the shoreline south-east of the White Sand Beach area of Rocky Point in Clarendon (17°45'55.69"N 77°15'42.94"W) at approximately 6:39pm local. On Sunday January 24, 2021, a site visit was conducted by personnel from the Operations and Airworthiness units of the Flight Safety Division. With assistance from the Security Forces, photographic evidence of the site was collected. The crash site and the aircraft were vandalized. The aircraft may have made a gear up/flaps up landing. Left-wing leading-edge slats were deployed indicating low airspeed and possible high angle of attack at time of impact.

The crew were scheduled to operate two cargo flights from Exeter Airport (EXT), Devon, to East Midlands Airport (EMA), Leicestershire, and return. The co-pilot was the PF for both sectors, and it was night. The sector from EXT to EMA was uneventful with the crew electing to landed with FLAP 40. The subsequent takeoff and climb from EMA to EXT proceeded without event. During the cruise the crew independently calculated the landing performance, using the aircraft manufacturer’s software, on their portable electronic devices. Runway 26 was forecast to be wet, so they planned to use FLAP 40 for the landing on Runway 26, with AUTOBRAKE 3. With both pilots being familiar with EXT the PF conducted a short brief of the pertinent points for the approach. However, while they did mention that the ILS had a 3.5° glideslope (GS), they did not mention that the stabilized approach criteria differed from that on a 3° GS. From the ATIS they noted that the weather seemed to be better than forecast and the surface wind was from 230° at 11 kt. The ATC provided the flight crew with radar vectors from ATC to the ILS on Runway 26 at EXT. The landing gear was lowered and FLAP 25 selected before the aircraft intercepted the GS. FLAP 40 (the landing flap) was selected on the GS just below 2,000 ft amsl. With a calculated VREF of 134 kt and a surface wind of 10 kt the PF planned to fly the approach with a VAPP of 140 kt. At about 10 nm finals, upon looking at the flight management computer, the PM noticed there was a 30 kt headwind, so a VAPP of 144 kt was selected on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). The crew became visual with the runway at about 1,000 ft aal. The PF then disconnected the Auto Pilot and Auto Throttle; the Flight Directors remained on. As the wind was now starting to decrease, the VAPP was then reduced from 142 to 140 kt at about 600 ft aal. As the wind reduced, towards the 10 kt surface wind, the PF made small adjustments to the power to maintain the IAS at or close to VAPP. At 500 ft radio altimeter (RA) the approach was declared stable by the crew, as per their standard operating procedures. At this point the aircraft had a pitch attitude of 2.5° nose down, the IAS was 143 kt, the rate of descent (ROD) was about 860 ft/min, the engines were operating at about 68% N1 and the aircraft was 0.4 dots above the GS. However, the ROD was increasing and soon thereafter was in excess of 1,150 ft/min. This was reduced to about 300 ft/min but soon increased again. At 320 ft RA, the aircraft went below the GS for about 8 seconds and, with a ROD of 1,700 ft/min, a “SINK RATE” GPWS alert was enunciated. The PF acknowledged this and corrected the flightpath to bring the aircraft back to the GS before stabilizing slightly above the GS; the PM called this deviation too. As the PF was correcting back to the GS the PM did not feel there was a need to take control. During this period the maximum recorded deviation was ¾ of a dot below the GS. At about 150 ft RA, with a ROD of 1,300 ft/min, there was a further “SINK RATE” GPWS alert, to which the PM said, “WATCH THAT SINK RATE”, followed by another “SINK RATE” alert, which the PF responded by saying “AND BACK…”. The commander recalled that as the aircraft crossed the threshold, at about 100 ft, the PF retarded the throttles, pitched the aircraft nose down, from about 5° nose up to 4° nose down, and then applied some power in the last few feet. During these final moments before the landing, there was another “SINK RATE” alert. The result was a hard landing. A “PULL UP” warning was also triggered by the GPWS, but it was not audible on the CVR. The last surface wind transmitted by ATC, just before the landing, was from 230° at 10 kt. During the rollout the commander took control, selected the thrust reversers and slowed down to taxi speed. After the aircraft had vacated the runway at Taxiway Bravo it became apparent the aircraft was listing to the left. During the After Landing checks the co-pilot tried to select FLAPS UP, but they would not move. There was then a HYDRAULIC LP caution. As there was still brake accumulator pressure the crew were content to taxi the aircraft slowly the short distance onto Stand 10. Once on stand the listing became more obvious. It was then that the crew realized there was something “seriously wrong” with the aircraft. After they had shut the aircraft down, the flight crew requested that the wheels were chocked, and the aircraft be connected to ground power before going outside to inspect the aircraft. Once outside a hydraulic leak was found and the airport RFFS, who were present to unload the aircraft, were informed.

On approach to Voi Airport, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Irima located about 9 km north from runway 18 threshold. All four occupants were killed. Registration unconfirmed.

The airplane departed São Paulo-Congonhas Airport on an ambulance flight to Diamantina-Juscelino Kubitschek Airport, carrying two doctors and two pilots. Following an unstabilized approach, the airplane landed too far down the runway 03 and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down a ravine and came to rest. All four occupants evacuated with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight crew were conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in night instrument meteorological conditions when they were advised by the tower controller that the weather had deteriorated below minimums. The captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer was the pilot flying during the approach. Since the airplane was inside the final approach fix and stabilized, both pilots agreed to continue with the approach. Both pilots stated that they had visual contact with the runway approach lighting system at the 200 ft above ground level (agl) decision altitude, and they decided to continue the approach. The first officer said he then returned to flying the airplane via instruments. As the first officer continued the approach, the captain told him the airplane was drifting right of the runway centerline. The first officer said that he looked outside, saw that the weather had deteriorated, and was no longer comfortable with the approach. The first officer said he pressed the takeoff and go-around switch, while at the same time, the captain called for a go-around. The captain said that he called for the go-around because the airplane was not aligned with the runway. Although both pilots stated that the go-around was initiated when the airplane was about 50 to 100 ft agl, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording revealed that the first officer flew an autopilot-coupled approach to 50 ft agl (per the approach procedure, a coupled approach was not authorized below 240 ft agl). As the airplane descended from 30 to 20 ft agl, the captain told the first officer three times to “flare” then informed him that the airplane was drifting to right and he needed to make a left correction to get realigned with the runway centerline. Three seconds passed before the first officer reacted by trying to initiate transfer control of the airplane to the captain. The captain did not take control of the airplane and called for a go-around. The first officer then added full power and called for the flaps to be retracted to 15º; however, the airplane impacted the ground about 5 seconds later, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. Data downloaded from both engines’ digital electronic engine control units revealed no anomalies. No mechanical issues with the airplane or engines were reported by either crew member or the operator. The sequence of events identified in the CVR recording revealed that the approach most likely became unstabilized after the autopilot was disconnected and when the first officer lost visual contact with the runway environment. The captain, who had the runway in sight, delayed calling for a go-around after the approach became unstabilized, and the airplane was too low to recover.

After takeoff from his home airport with about 50 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank, the pilot climbed to 7,000 ft and proceeded to his destination. When he was about halfway there, he switched from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Immediately after switching fuel tanks, the engine started to sputter and lost power. The pilot switched back to the right fuel tank but there was no change. He then tried different power settings, adjusted the mixture to full rich and switched tanks again without regaining engine power. The pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having an engine problem and needed to land at the nearest airport. ATC instructed him contact the control tower at the nearest airport and cleared him to land. The pilot advised the controller that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport and that he was going to land in the water. During the water landing, the airplane came to a sudden stop. The pilot and his passenger then egressed, and the airplane sank. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed about 2 months prior to the accident and test flights associated with the annual inspection had all been done with the fuel selector selected to the right fuel tank, and this was the first time he had selected the left fuel tank since before the annual inspection. The airplane was equipped with an engine monitor that was capable of recording engine parameters. Examination of the data revealed that around the time of the loss of engine power, exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature experienced a rapid decrease on all cylinders along with a rapid decrease of turbine inlet temperature, which was indicative of the engine being starved of fuel. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. During examination of the fuel system, the fuel selector was observed in the RIGHT fuel tank position and was confirmed to be in the right fuel tank position with low pressure air. However, when the fuel selector was positioned to the LEFT fuel tank position, continuity could not be established with low pressure air. Further examination revealed that a fuel selector valve labeled FERRY TANK was installed in the left fuel line between the factory-installed fuel selector and the left fuel tank. The ferry tank fuel selector was observed to be in the ON position, which blocked continuity from the left fuel tank to the engine. Continuity could only be established when the ferry tank fuel selector was positioned to the OFF position. With low pressure air, no continuity could be established from the ferry tank fuel line that attached to the ferry tank’s fuel selector. The ferry tank fuel selector valve was mounted between the pilot and copilot seats on the forward side of the main wing spar in the area where the pilot and copilot would normally enter and exit the cockpit. This location was such that the selector handle could easily be inadvertently kicked or moved by a person or object. A guard was not installed over the ferry tank fuel selector valve nor was the selector valve handle safety wired in the OFF position to deactivate the valve even though a ferry tank was not installed. Review of the airplane’s history revealed that about 3 years before the accident, the airplane had been used for an around-the-world flight by the pilot and that prior to the flight, a ferry tank had been installed. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any logbook entries or associated paperwork for the ferry tank installation and/or removal, except for a copy of the one-page fuel system schematic from the maintenance manual with a handwritten annotation (“Tank”), and hand drawn lines, both added to it in blue ink. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records did not reveal any record of a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair or Alteration) or a supplemental type certificate for installation of the ferry tank or the modification to the fuel system.

The crew was completing an illegal flight when the aircraft crashed under unknown circumstances in the Sierra del Lacandón National Park. Upon impact, the aircraft lost its both wings and came to rest with its tail separated. All three occupants were found alive but seriously injured. One of them died from his injuries few hours later. The registration N326TD was probably false.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in a banana plantation near San José La Máquina. No one was found in the plane that was used for an illegal flight (contraband). The exact model and registration unknown.

The pilot reported that, while conducting a night landing on a runway contaminated with ice and patchy packed snow, the airplane overshot the touchdown zone. The pilot tried to fly the airplane onto the runway to avoid floating. The airplane touched down firm and the pilot applied moderate braking, but the airplane did not decelerate normally. The airplane went off the end of the runway and collided with several Runway End Identifier Lights (REILs) and a tree. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. The pilot reported that he did not feel modulation in the anti-lock braking system (ABS) and felt that might have contributed to the accident. An examination of fault codes from the airplane’s diagnostic storage unit indicated no ABS malfunctions or failures. An airport employee reported that he saw the airplane unusually high on the final approach and during the landing the airplane floated or stayed in ground effect before it touched down beyond the midpoint of the runway. The airplane’s long touchdown was captured by an airport surveillance video, which is included in the report docket.

The twin engine airplane departed Marseille-Provence Airport on a private flight to Annecy. En route, while cruising at FL110, the pilot was informed about the weather conditions at destination with a braking coefficient considered as medium due to a wet runway. After being cleared to land on runway 04, the pilot continued the approach but landed half way down the runway at a speed of 119 knots. After touchdown, he initiated the braking procedure but the airplane suffered an aquaplaning and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, impacted an embankment, went trough a fence and came to rest on a road. While both passengers aged 26 and 28 were slightly injured, the pilot aged 70 was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed.