Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) in Wichita

Date & Time: Jul 1, 2021 at 1908 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N10HK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sioux Falls – Wichita
MSN:
60-0715-8061222
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
420
Captain / Total hours on type:
95.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2744
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight when, about 8 miles north of his intended destination, he reduced engine power, pitched for level flight, and waited for indicated airspeed to drop below 174 kts to add 20° of flaps. As soon as the drag was introduced, the airplane began to “buck back and forward,” and the two engines were “throttling up and down on their own.” He noted that the right engine seemed to be “sputtering and popping” more than the left engine, so he decided to raise the flaps and to shut down and feather the right engine. He declared an emergency to air traffic control. The pilot then noticed that the left engine was “slowly spooling down” and the airplane was not able to maintain airspeed and altitude. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat, muddy wheat field about 4 nautical miles from the airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and to both wings. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector traveled to the accident site to examine the airplane. Flight control and engine control continuity were confirmed. The master switch was turned on and the fuel gauges showed a zero indication. There was no evidence of fuel at the accident site or in the airplane. During the recovery of the airplane from the field, no fuel was found in the three intact fuel tanks, nor in any of the engine fuel lines. The pilot later stated that he ran the airplane out of fuel during the accident flight. The pilot reported that, during the preflight checks and twice during the accident flight, he activated the low fuel warning light, and no anomalies were noted. Postaccident testing of the low fuel warning light in an exemplar Piper Aerostar 602P revealed no anomalies.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper fuel planning and management, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900D in Pyin Oo Lwin: 12 killed

Date & Time: Jun 10, 2021
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
4610
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Naypyidaw – Pyin Oo Lwin
MSN:
UE-325
YOM:
1998
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Naypyidaw on a flight to Pyin Oo Lwin, carrying 14 passengers and two pilots, among them high ranking officers and monks. On final approach to Pyin Oo Lwin-Anisakan Airport runway 21, the aircraft collided with obstacles and crashed near a steel plant located about 3 km short of runway threshold. A pilot and three passengers were injured while 12 other occupants were killed. Development will follow.

Crash of a Beechcraft 350 Super King Air in Kaduna: 11 killed

Date & Time: May 21, 2021 at 1800 LT
Operator:
Registration:
NAF203
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
FL-891
YOM:
2013
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Circumstances:
On final approach to Kaduna Airport in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All 11 occupants were killed, among them General Ibrahim Attahiru, Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army. He was returning to Kaduna with a delegation of six other Army officers, among them three Brigadier General.
Crew:
F/Lt T. Asaniyi,
F/Lt A. Olufade,
Sgt Adesina,
Acm Oyedepo.
Passengers:
Lt General Ibrahim Attahiru,
Br/Gen M. Abdulkadir,
Br/Gen Olayinka,
Br/Gen Kuliya,
Maj Lawal Hayat,
Maj Hamza,
Sgt Umar.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Denver

Date & Time: May 12, 2021 at 1023 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N280KL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Salida – Denver
MSN:
TC-280
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
LYM970
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11184
Captain / Total hours on type:
2656.00
Aircraft flight hours:
29525
Circumstances:
A Cirrus SR22 and a Swearingen AS226TC were approaching to land on parallel runways and being controlled by different controllers on different control tower frequencies. The pilot of the Swearingen was established on an extended final approach for the left runway, while the pilot of the Cirrus was flying a right traffic pattern for the right runway. Data from an on-board recording device showed that the Cirrus’ airspeed on the base leg of the approach was more than 50 kts above the manufacturer’s recommended speed of 90 to 95 kts. As the Cirrus made the right turn from the base leg to the final approach, its flight path carried it through the extended centerline for the assigned runway (right), and into the extended centerline for the left runway where the collision occurred. At the time of the collision, the Cirrus had completed about ½ of the 90° turn from base to final and its trajectory would have taken it even further left of the final approach course for the left runway. The pilot of the Swearingen landed uneventfully; the pilot of the Cirrus deployed the airframe parachute system, and the airplane came to rest upright about 3 nautical miles from the airport. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage to their fuselage. During the approach sequence the controller working the Swearingen did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot regarding the location of the Cirrus and the potential conflict. The issuance of traffic information during simultaneous parallel runway operations was required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65Y, which details air traffic control procedures and phraseology for use by persons providing air traffic control services. The controller working the Cirrus did issue a traffic advisory to the Cirrus pilot regarding the Swearingen on the parallel approach. Based on the available information, the pilot of the Cirrus utilized a much higher than recommended approach speed which increased the airplane’s radius of turn. The pilot then misjudged the airplane’s flight path, which resulted in the airplane flying through the assigned final approach course and into the path of the parallel runway. The controller did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot of Swearingen regarding the location of the Cirrus. The two airplanes were on different tower frequencies and had the controller issued an advisory, the pilot of the Swearingen may have been able to identify the conflict and maneuver his airplane to avoid the collision.
Probable cause:
The Cirrus pilot’s failure to maintain the final approach course for the assigned runway, which resulted in a collision with the Swearingen which was on final approach to the parallel runway. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the controller to issue a traffic advisory to the Swearingen pilot regarding the location of Cirrus, and the Cirrus pilot’s decision to fly higher than recommended approach speed which resulted in a larger turn radius and contributed to his overshoot of the final approach course.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B250GT Super King Air in Gwalior

Date & Time: May 6, 2021 at 2100 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VT-MPQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Indore - Gwalior
MSN:
BY-373
YOM:
2020
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Indore on an ambulance flight to Gwalior, carrying one passenger, two pilots and a load of boxes containing Covid vaccines. On final approach by night, the airplane collided with an aircraft arrester barrier system located about 80 metres short of runway 06R threshold. On impact, the aircraft nosed down, causing the nose gear to be torn off and the nose to be destroyed. Both propellers detached and both main gear collapsed. The fuselage was bent near the tail. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries.

Crash of a Gulfstream G150 in Ridgeland

Date & Time: May 5, 2021 at 1033 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N22ST
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New Smyrna Beach – Ridgeland
MSN:
251
YOM:
2008
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9100
Captain / Total hours on type:
100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
32
Aircraft flight hours:
2580
Circumstances:
The pilot in command (PIC) and second-in-command (SIC) completed an uneventful positioning flight to pick up passengers and then continued to the destination airport. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information revealed that, while en route, the PIC expressed a desire to complete the flight as quickly as possible and arrive at the destination before another airplane that was also enroute to the destination airport, presumably to please the passengers. The PIC compared the flight with an automobile race, and the airplane’s overspeed warning annunciated multiple times during the descent. The flight crew elected to conduct a straight-in visual approach to land. Throughout the final approach, the airplane was high and fast, as evidenced by the SIC’s airspeed callouts. When the SIC asked whether s-turns should be made, and the PIC responded that such turns were not necessary. An electronic voice recorded by the CVR repeatedly provided “sink rate” and “pull up” warnings while the airplane was on final approach, providing indications to the crewmembers that the approach was unstable, but they continued the landing. The airplane touched down about 1,000 ft down the 4,200-ft-long runway. The PIC described that the airplane’s wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and ground air brakes did not function after touchdown, but witness and video evidence showed that the thrust reversers deployed shortly after touchdown. In addition, tire skid marks indicated that wheel braking occurred throughout the ground roll and increased heavily during the final 1,500 ft of the runway when the antiskid system activated. The ground air brakes did not deploy. The airplane overran the runway and came to rest about 400 ft past the departure end of the runway in marshy terrain. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage. The switch that controlled the automatic deployment of the ground air brake system was found in a position that should have allowed for their automatic deployment upon landing. There was no evidence to indicate a preaccident mechanical malfunction or failure with the hydraulic system, wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and weight-on-wheel switches, or electrical issues with either air brake switches. The airplane’s ground air brake deployment system logic required that both throttle levers be below 18° (throttle lever angle) in order to activate. The accident airplane’s throttle lever position microswitches were tested after the accident. The left throttle microswitch tested normal, but the right throttle microswitch produced an abnormal electrical current/resistance during initial testing. When the throttle was touched and then further manipulated by hand, the electrical resistance tested normal. The investigation was unable to determine whether the intermittent right throttle microswitch resistance prevented the ground air brakes from deploying because the testing was inconclusive. Landing performance calculations showed that, without ground air brakes, the landing ground roll exceeded the runway that was available from the airplane’s touchdown point about 1,000 ft down the runway. Mobile phone video evidence revealed that a quartering tailwind of about 10 to 15 knots persisted during the landing, which exceeded the manufacturer’s tailwind landing limitation of 10 knots for the airplane, and thus would have further increased the actual ground roll distance beyond that calculated. Throughout the final approach, the flight crew received several indications that the approach was unstable. The flight crew was aware that the airplane was approaching the runway high, fast, and at an abnormal sink rate. Both pilots had an opportunity to call for a go-around, which would have been the appropriate action. However, it is likely that the external pressures that the PIC and SIC accepted to complete the flight as quickly as possible influenced their decision-making in continuing the approach.
Probable cause:
The flight crew’s continuation of an unstable approach and the failure of the ground air brakes to deploy upon touchdown, both of which resulted in the runway overrun. Contributing was the crew’s motivation and response to external pressures to complete the flight as quickly as possible to accommodate passenger wishes and the crew’s decision to land with a quartering tailwind that exceeded the airplane’s limitations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Hattiesburg: 4 killed

Date & Time: May 4, 2021 at 2301 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N322TA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Wichita Falls – Hattiesburg
MSN:
760
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
7834
Captain / Total hours on type:
500.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7610
Circumstances:
The pilot was flying a non precision approach in instrument meteorological conditions at night. While flying the procedure turn for the approach, the airplane’s speed decayed toward the stall speed before the airplane accelerated back to the standard approach speed. During the descent from the final approach fix, the airplane’s descent stopped for about 30 seconds and then the airplane descended at a rate of about 1,300 ft per minute. The airplane decelerated and continued to descend until the airspeed was about 85 knots (about 7 knots above the calculated stall speed for flaps 20°) and the altitude was 500 ft mean sea level. The last recorded data point showed the airplane about 460 ft mean sea level and 750 ft from the accident site. The airplane impacted a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued and destroyed the airplane. Impact signatures were consistent with a low-energy impact. Examination of the airframe and engines did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. Signatures on the engines and propellers were consistent with both engines providing power at impact. A review of the pilot’s toxicological information found that the level of eszopiclone in his specimens was subtherapeutic and thus not likely a factor in the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with an inadvertent aerodynamic stall from which the pilot was unable to recover.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the airplane during the night instrument approach which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall from which the pilot was unable to recover.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Cranfield

Date & Time: Apr 29, 2021 at 1425 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-HYZA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cranfield - Cranfield
MSN:
46-36130
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
86
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
34620
Captain / Total hours on type:
1588.00
Circumstances:
On the morning of the accident flight, G-HYZA was flown for approximately 16 minutes on test flight 85. The flight test team debriefed the results and prepared the aircraft for flight 86. The plan for this flight was for the HV battery to be switched off at the end of the downwind leg then, if able, to fly three or more circuits at 1,000 ft aal using the HFC only to provide electrical power. The flight test team discussed experimenting with combinations of higher airspeeds and propeller rpm that would reduce the aircraft angle of attack and improve the mass flow of air through the radiator which provided cooling for the HFC. This was considered as a potential strategy to manage a slow rise in temperature in the HFC which they had observed in previous flights when flying on that power source alone. The test card for flight 86 was not amended to reflect this intention. At 1406 hrs, following a normal start using both the HV battery and HFC to provide electrical power, the HV was switched off to preserve its electrical capacity. The aircraft taxied to the holding point and was cleared to line up on Runway 03. The weather was fair with good visibility and light winds from 010°. The aircraft entered the runway and backtracked to the threshold where the pilot commenced a run-up of the propulsion system to ensure the HFC could achieve thermal stability within the flight test parameters. Once the temperatures in the HFC were stable, the pilot switched on the HV battery to bring both power sources online and commenced the takeoff run. As the aircraft accelerated and the power lever was advanced, the observer operated the high temperature override switch to maintain the temperature of the HFC within the operating limits. After takeoff, the pilot turned onto the crosswind leg and climbed to the circuit height of 1,000 ft agl. During the downwind leg of the right-hand circuit, the pilot stated the power was set to 95 kW, the propeller to 2,500 rpm and the airspeed to 100 kt. Once stabilized at these parameters, which were at variance with the flight test card conditions, the observer confirmed that the HFC operating temperatures were within limits. He then instructed the pilot to reduce power to 90 kW to assess the effect on the airspeed, which reduced to approximately 95 kt. The pilot increased the power to 95 kW to regain the target speed. The pilot set the power by reference to his display unit which was located below the throttle quadrant. When he looked up from this task, he recognized that the aircraft was in a late downwind position. He turned onto base leg and commented that they were losing speed in the turn. The observer suggested that they could increase power to 120 kW to regain the lost airspeed, then reduce power before turning off the HV battery to re-establish the test conditions. He also suggested a reduction in propeller rpm. The pilot increased power to 120 kW but did not reduce the propeller rpm. As he started to turn onto final, the pilot briefed that once he had established straight and level flight he would reduce the power slightly and turn off the HV battery leaving the electrical motors powered by the HFC. He called final on the radio and was cleared by ATC to fly through at circuit height. Approaching the runway threshold at approximately 940 ft agl, the pilot reduced power to 90 kW, set the airspeed to 90 kt then selected the HV battery to off. Immediately, all electrical drive to the propeller was lost. The pilot and observer made several unsuccessful attempts to reset the system to restore power from the HFC with the observer stating the action to be taken and the pilot making the switch selection. The observer instructed the pilot to select the HV battery to on to reconnect the alternative power source. HV power was not restored so the observer instructed the pilot to attempt a system reset with the HFC in the off position. Electrical power was still not restored and at 440 ft agl the observer declared “the voltage is too high”, to which the pilot replied, “we’ve got to do something quick”. The observer called for a further reset attempt and adjusted the power lever. The aircraft had now travelled the length of the runway and was at approximately 320 ft aal when the observer reported that power could not be restored. The pilot transmitted a MAYDAY call and initiated a turn to the left to position for a landing on Runway 21. Almost immediately he recognized that he did not have sufficient height to complete the manoeuvre so lowered the landing gear and selected full flap for a forced landing in a field that was now directly ahead on a north-westerly heading. The aircraft touched down at approximately 87 kt ground speed on a level grass field. The pilot applied the brakes, and the aircraft continued its movement until it struck, and passed through, a hedge during which the left wing broke away. The nosewheel and left main wheel entered a ditch and the aircraft came to an abrupt stop. The pilot and observer were uninjured and exited the aircraft through the upper half of the cabin door. The airport fire service arrived quickly at the scene. The observer returned to the aircraft and vented the hydrogen tank to atmosphere and disconnected the HV battery to make the aircraft safe.
Probable cause:
The loss of power occurred during an interruption of the power supply when, as part of the test procedure, the battery was selected off with the intention of leaving the electrical motors solely powered by the hydrogen fuel cell. During this interruption the windmilling propeller generated a voltage high enough to operate the inverter protection system, which locked out the power to the motors. The pilot and observer were unable to reset the system and restore electrical power.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Belo Horizonte: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 20, 2021 at 1430 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PR-MLA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Belo Horizonte - Belo Horizonte
MSN:
35-072
YOM:
1976
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha Airport for a local test flight. After landing on runway 13, the crew encountered difficulties and the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through the perimeter fence (striking concrete poles) and came to rest against trees, broken in two. The copilot aged 76 was killed while both other occupants were injured.

Crash of a Learjet 25B in Toluca

Date & Time: Apr 18, 2021 at 1527 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XB-PIZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cancún - Toluca
MSN:
25-193
YOM:
1975
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Cancún, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage while on approach to Toluca-Licenciado Adolfo López Mateos. Decision was taken to complete a belly landing on runway 15/33. The airplane slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 9 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.